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 TRANSGRESSIVE CAREGIVING 
LAURA T. KESSLER* 
ABSTRACT 
 Family caregiving can be a form of political resistance or expres-
sion, especially when done by people ordinarily denied the privilege of 
family privacy by the state. Feminist and queer legal theorists have, 
for the most part, overlooked this aspect of caregiving, regarding un-
paid family labor as a source of gender-based oppression or as an un-
dervalued public commodity benefiting children. This Article ad-
dresses this gap in the feminist and queer legal theory literature, 
demonstrating the way that family caregiving can be a liberating 
practice through a detailed historical analysis of the law regulating 
the sexuality, reproduction, and parenting of African Americans, gay 
people, and straight men. The story of transgressive care presented in 
this Article is particularly relevant to the present debates in our coun-
try over same-sex marriage and welfare. Because political expression 
is a fundamental value protected by our Constitution, recognizing the 
political significance of transgressive caregiving adds a new justifica-
tion for supporting the care practices of transgressive caregivers, 
while also providing a conceptual basis for limiting unwanted state 
intervention into their families. By revealing how extended care net-
works and minority communities are coconstitutive, this Article also 
invites us to fundamentally rethink the way in which law regulates 
families in a wide range of areas, such as child custody, foster care, 
and adoption. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A. The Claim 
 Can family caregiving be a form of political resistance or expres-
sion? It can, especially when done by people ordinarily denied the 
privilege of family privacy by the state. 
 Feminist and queer theorists within law have, for the most part, 
overlooked this aspect of caregiving, regarding unpaid family labor as 
a source of gender-based oppression or as an undervalued public 
commodity. Consequently, prominent feminist and queer legal theo-
rists have set their sights on wage work or sexual liberation as more 
promising sources of emancipation for women.1  Although other legal 
                                                                                                                      
 1.  See Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and De-
sire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 182 (2001); Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1881, 1886-92 (2000).  Similar contributions from junior scholars include Kerry L. Quinn, 
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feminists continue to focus on the problem of devalued family labor, 
these theorists tend to justify increased support for care work pri-
marily on the benefits it confers on children and society,2 on liberal 
theories of societal obligation,3 on ending gender oppression,4 or on 
simple human needs.5 
 This Article examines a less well-explored conception of family 
caregiving within the feminist and queer legal theory literature, re-
vealing the way that family caregiving can be a liberating practice for 
caregivers qua caregivers.6 Specifically, care work can constitute an 
affirmative political practice of resistance to a host of discriminatory 
institutions and ideologies, including the family, workplace, and 
state, as well as patriarchy, racism, and homophobia. I label such po-
litical work “transgressive caregiving” and locate it most centrally—
although not exclusively—in the care work of ethnic and racial mi-
norities, gays and lesbians, and heterosexual men. 
 Transgressive caregiving occurs all around us, despite widespread 
attempts by state and federal lawmakers to domesticate it.7 Unmar-
ried parents now make up one-third of households with children less 
than eighteen years old,8 and unmarried parenthood is the predomi-
nant family form in the African-American community.9 Somewhere 
between one million and nine million children have at least one gay 
                                                                                                                      
Mommy Dearest: The Focus on the Family in Legal Feminism, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
447, 458-70 (2002) and Laura A. Rosenbury, Some Thoughts on Sex Negativity (Apr. 4, 
2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 2. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH 48 (2003) [herein-
after FINEMAN, MYTH]; Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 62-63 
(2002); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, 
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 18-19 (2000). 
 3.  See, e.g., ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND 
WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS 49-72 (2004); Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public Value: 
Linking Responsibility, Resources, and Republicanism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1673 passim 
(2001); Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1408 
(2001). 
 4. See, e.g., FINEMAN, MYTH, supra note 2, at 37; JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING 
GENDER 13-39 (2000); Becker, supra note 2, at 103-05; McClain, supra note 3, at 1680. 
 5. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 2, at 57, 97-109. 
 6. Critical race theorists are a major exception to this point. See, e.g., PEGGY COOPER 
DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES (1997); DOROTHY 
ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY [hereinafter ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY] 
(Vintage Books 1999) (1997); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD 
WELFARE 237-38 (2002) [hereinafter ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS]; Twila L. Perry, Trans-
racial and International Adoption: Mothers, Hierarchy, Race, and Feminist Legal Theory, 
10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101, 116-31 (1998) [hereinafter Perry, Transracial and Interna-
tional Adoption]; Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege and Dependency in the Search 
for Theory, 82 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2491-92 (1994) [hereinafter Perry, Alimony]. 
 7. See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C.  
 8. JASON FIELDS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING 
ARRANGEMENTS: 2003, CURRENT POPULATION REP. P20-553, at 8 (2004). 
 9. Id.  Here, I refrain from using the common term “single parent” because it ob-
scures the extended care networks of many unmarried parent families.  See discussion in-
fra Parts II.A, II.B. 
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or lesbian parent in the United States.10 In 2003, 4.6 million couples 
cohabited outside of marriage,11 and children were present in about 
forty percent of those households.12 Finally, although I hesitate to 
paint too rosy a picture of recent improvements in the gendered divi-
sion of household labor within marriage, men have increased their 
share of housework over the past few decades.13 These contexts illus-
trate that the conventional wisdom that caregiving is experienced 
primarily as a condition of patriarchal oppression, or even as a be-
nign activity benefiting children and society, tells only part of the 
story. 
 My thesis regarding the transformative political potential of care 
is necessarily partial, for it relies on a view of care as a practice 
whose meaning is fluid and dependent upon the contexts in which it 
is performed. Caregiving is not one single thing, but a complex prac-
tice in dynamic relationship with other social practices and institu-
tions. A woman who does significantly more housework and child 
care than her husband is likely to view caregiving work differently 
than an unmarried welfare recipient who wishes to gain an exception 
to her state’s workfare program in order to spend more time with her 
infant child14 or a lesbian choosing to bring a child into her family 
through alternative insemination.15 
 Even this wide range of examples does not fully capture the con-
tingency of the meaning and experience of care. The experience of 
care is a function not only of the caregiver’s status—for example, 
“stay-at-home wife,” “welfare recipient,” “lesbian mother”—but also of 
the multiple and diverse relationships an individual caregiver has to 
institutions and people around her. So, for example, an African-
American attorney who chooses to work part time so she can devote 
more time to her family challenges a host of gender, class, and race-
based stereotypes that have historically served to subordinate women 
of color.16 Along the same lines, a gay man in an intimate relation-
                                                                                                                      
 10. Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents 
Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 164 (2001) (discussing the different definitions of “gay” that 
affect this estimate). See generally LAURA BENKOV, REINVENTING THE FAMILY: THE 
EMERGING STORY OF LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTS 34-81 (1994) (documenting the increase in 
childbearing and childrearing among lesbians and gay men). 
 11. See FIELDS, supra note 8, at 16. 
 12. Id. at 17. 
 13. See Francine D. Blau, Trends in the Well-Being of American Women, 1970-1995, 
36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 112, 150-55 (1998) (showing that, from the 1970s to the 1990s, the 
amount of time spent by women on housework declined from four times that spent by men 
to two or three times that spent by men); Scott Coltrane, Research on Household Labor: 
Modeling and Measuring the Social Embeddedness of Routine Family Work, 62 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1208, 1208 (2000) (same). 
 14. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 15. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 16. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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ship in which a relatively traditional division of household labor is 
practiced, with one partner serving as the primary breadwinner and 
the other serving as the primary stay-at-home parent, may neverthe-
less experience his wish to receive societal recognition of his family 
as an assertion of equal citizenship.17 And a married man who seeks 
a family leave from work may experience the request as a challenge 
to the male-breadwinner ideal, as will his employer in all likelihood, 
even though his wife may be doing the bulk of the domestic labor.18 
Similarly, a woman’s efforts to convince a family law judge to value 
her unpaid domestic labor in a divorce proceeding challenges the 
class-based subordination of women perpetuated by divorce law, 
which works with gender to allow a male elite to retain property.19 
Her argument remains potentially transformative even if the woman 
married and bore children in part due to heteronormative and repro-
normative societal pressures and even if her argument may also rein-
force traditional gender roles to some extent. Any group inequality, 
in short, intersects with others in complex ways.20 As numerous 
scholars have established, no single aspect of identity is sufficiently 
stable to have fixed meanings, whether positive or negative.21 
 In keeping with this complexity and contingency, this Article de-
parts from other legal feminist work, including my own, that has ex-
amined caregiving as a status largely corresponding with the catego-
ries “woman” or “mother.”22 Rather, drawing on standpoint episte-
mology and postmodern theory, I examine care work as a practice 
with transformative potential contingent on the situatedness of the 
caregiver. Such an approach has at least seven advantages: First, 
reconceptualizing care work as a practice with unstable and complex 
meanings engaged in by women, men, mothers, and nonmothers re-
sponds to feminist and queer critiques of essentializing sex or gender. 
Second, this conception of care builds bridges between feminist legal 
theory and queer and race theory. Third, viewing care work as a 
practice with political or expressive significance might protect fami-
lies from unwanted state intervention, a concern that is particularly 
                                                                                                                      
 17. See discussion infra Part II.B.  
 18. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 19. See generally Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 
82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2236-41 (1994) (uncovering and analyzing a system of family property 
rules, unchanged since coverture, that allocates ownership of family wealth to husbands). 
 20. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist 
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 584-85 (1990). 
 21. See, e.g., ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1998); Kathryn Abrams, Ti-
tle VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479 passim (1994). 
 22. See Laura T. Kessler, Is There Agency in Dependency?: Expanding the Feminist 
Justifications for Restructuring Wage Work, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS 
373-99 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005). 
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acute within racial and sexual minority communities. Fourth, read-
ing political significance into the practice of care might serve as an 
additional basis to articulate a theory of rights for caregivers, build-
ing on accounts based on the public value of children, the state’s obli-
gation to provide for the needs of its citizens, and gender discrimina-
tion. Fifth, such a conception may provide a richer and more positive 
account of caregiving work than can be conveyed by the story of gen-
der oppression alone. Sixth, recognizing the political significance of 
transgressive caregiving work may provide a basis for articulating a 
theory of rights for transgressive caregivers while avoiding some of 
the disciplinary effects typical of formal equality justifications. Sev-
enth and finally, thinking of care work as a practice that occurs out-
side of blood or marriage ties may serve to decenter the normative 
structure of the nuclear family.23  
 This Article is part of a larger project in which I seek to develop a 
theory of cultural feminism based on individuals’ capacity for politi-
cal agency within the context of nurturing functions, rather than on 
relational theories of the self.24 This reconstructed cultural feminism 
can bridge the differences among legal feminists in the care work dis-
course, as well as bring together diverse critical theory communities. 
It does this by expanding beyond feminist legal theory’s preoccupa-
tion with the oppressive aspects of family care work.25 Certainly, 
there are serious and legitimate bases for this preoccupation.26 How-
ever, not all women share a history of subservience to men,27 and 
men can be and are partners with women in their quest for gender 
equality in certain contexts.28 
                                                                                                                      
 23. See Elizabeth B. Silva & Carol Smart, The ‘New’ Practices and Politics of Family 
Life, in THE NEW FAMILY? 1-12 (Elizabeth B. Silva & Carol Smart eds., 1999). This concep-
tion of care work as a “practice” is influenced by the work of Pierre Bourdieu, who was in-
terested in the way in which the family as a social category is reproduced through lan-
guage and everyday practices. See Pierre Bourdieu, On the Family as a Realized Category, 
13 THEORY CULTURE & SOC’Y 19, 21 (1996). Although Bourdieu has less to say about how 
language and everyday practices may also undermine the traditional family, his move from 
status to practice constitutes an important step toward that claim, which is discussed more 
fully in Part I.B, infra. 
 24. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); ROBIN WEST, CARING 
FOR JUSTICE 14, 117 (1997). 
 25. See supra text accompanying notes 8-13. 
 26. Indeed, I have written on the gendered division of labor within marriage, its effect 
on women’s labor force attachment, and the failure of employment discrimination law to 
remedy this problem. See Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimina-
tion Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal 
Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 (2001). 
 27. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER (1995) [hereinafter 
FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER] (examining and critiquing the cultural and legal processes 
which designate the sexual intimate connection, and the marital family in particular, as 
the dominant construction of the family within our society). 
 28. See discussion infra Parts II.B, II.C. 
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 Furthermore, gender is not the only source of oppression with 
which feminism should be concerned. This project is part of the legal 
feminist effort to integrate the perspectives of other liberatory social 
movements more deeply and thus to make effective alliances. Each 
group must learn to think from the perspective of the lives of all of 
the humans whose interests they claim to represent, and this is true 
of feminism, too. “Thinking from women’s lives”29 means thinking 
from all women’s lives.30   
 Adopting this methodology of thinking from multiple lives leads, 
at least tentatively, to a new insight about care within feminist and 
queer legal theory: Although family caregiving may simply seem to 
support patriarchy, closer examination reveals that it can also be a 
deeply and complexly subversive practice. Specifically, when prac-
ticed by individuals whom the state has historically denied the privi-
lege of family privacy, caregiving work may constitute a positive po-
litical practice of resistance to oppression. Ethnic and racial minori-
ties, gay men and lesbians, and heterosexual men are constituencies 
whose care work and intimate relationships have been heavily regu-
lated by the state. Analyzing these three groups is the heart of this 
project. 
B.   The Basis for the Claim 
 Before I turn to an examination of specific types of transgressive 
caregiving practices, it will be helpful to clarify the basis of my claim 
that caregiving may have positive political significance. In consider-
ing this claim, the question arises: Do persons who engage in trans-
gressive caregiving see what they are doing as politics? If not, may 
the practice of care in certain contexts have disruptive meanings that 
critical legal scholars might wish to exploit, putting aside the indi-
vidual consciousness of the caregiver? The answer to both of these 
questions is “yes,” at least to a greater extent than many legal femi-
nists and queer legal theorists have acknowledged. My claim that 
“transgressive caregiving is politics” is both existential and epistemo-
logical. 
 To put the existential claim simply, social science research dem-
onstrates that transgressive caregiving often has conscious political 
meaning for those who practice it.31 This consciousness is achieved 
through the shared social situation of those who engage in transgres-
sive caregiving and through a common history of oppression. This ex-
istential claim fits in with the tradition of standpoint epistemology 
                                                                                                                      
 29. SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? THINKING FROM 
WOMEN’S LIVES (1991). 
 30. Here, I am paraphrasing Harding. See id. at 285-86. 
 31. See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C. 
8  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
 
within feminism, which asserts that women (or any systematically 
oppressed group) have superior knowledge of the character of their 
oppression than other individuals. This knowledge allows them to see 
social inequality and to challenge it where others cannot.32 Stand-
point theory also posits that preferable outcomes result when we 
theorize from the position of the most disadvantaged, because those 
deeply situated within oppression are better able to see it, describe it, 
and develop less partial strategies for its elimination.33 For example, 
starting from the perspective of a lesbian may enable us to compre-
hend matters that might otherwise be invisible, not just about the 
lives of gay women but also about heterosexual men and women’s 
lives. Thus, feminist standpoint epistemology gives us a tool for see-
ing the political significance of certain acts that may be unrecogniz-
able from a majoritarian perspective. 
 However, it is not necessary to my claim that a person engaging in 
transgressive caregiving possess any conscious intention, for post-
modern theory teaches us that a practice can have powerful political 
meaning and effects regardless of what the individual engaging in it 
thinks. According to this theory, family care work receives its mean-
ing from its relation to the context in which it is practiced and regu-
lated.34 For example, to a certain degree, divorce law, social welfare 
law, and the doctrine of family privacy suggest that women are natu-
rally suited for care work and men for wage work; that only hetero-
sexual women and men deserve state protection for their caregiving 
practices; that a “normal” family is one in which a man and woman 
reproduce biologically; and that a “normal” family is one in which the 
male breadwinner ideal is practiced. Because black families, gay 
families, and families where men do significant care work often do 
not reflect these norms,35 the law has tended to construct them and 
the care provided in those arrangements as “abnormal.”  
 But there is a more positive side to this story, for the discursive 
process just described works in both directions. Thus, majoritarian 
conceptions of care, gender roles, and racial and sexual hierarchies 
can be disrupted when care is practiced outside of traditional con-
                                                                                                                      
 32. See HARDING, supra note 29, at 119-33. Moreover, this privileged knowledge may 
be most accessible to socially disadvantaged individuals with multiple, conflicting identi-
ties—for example, black women, gay men, etc.—who, by simultaneously occupying posi-
tions of relative privilege and disadvantage, may be most readily able to understand how a 
system of exploitation operates. Id. at 131-32 (discussing sociologist Patricia Hill Collins’ 
conception of the “outsider within”). 
 33. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY (2002); Mari J. Ma-
tsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 323, 387-98 (1987). 
 34. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 1-2 (1990); WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 198-
204. 
 35. See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C. 
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texts. Transgressive care practices thus bring into relief the con-
structed status of traditional care practices and norms, the family, 
and the law itself. Stated another way, when previously incongruent 
identities are juxtaposed—for example, lesbian mother, married gay 
man, black housewife—opportunities are opened up for disrupting 
discursive systems that construct and oppress.36 Given this concep-
tion of how knowledge is produced, it is not necessary for individuals 
consciously to intend the political meaning of their acts for them to 
have political significance,37 for their meaning derives from the rela-
tion of the acts themselves to other institutions and acts, including 
the law.38 
 My assertion about the political implications of transgressive 
caregiving proceeds from these feminist epistemological theories. In 
making these claims I am not saying that individuals who practice 
transgressive caregiving always consciously see their care work as a 
form of political expression, although sometimes they do. Nor am I 
suggesting that transgressive care work will always be understood by 
others as political or that it will always necessarily serve to disrupt 
oppressive majoritarian norms. Rather, the circumstances of trans-
gressive caregiving make political consciousness and political trans-
formation possible. Thus, we see care in an illuminating new way if 
we understand its transgressive potential. Toward that end, this Ar-
ticle will examine the care work of African Americans, lesbians and 
gay men, and heterosexual men, demonstrating how transgressive 
caregiving may constitute a practice of political significance.  
                                                                                                                      
 36. See BUTLER, supra note 34, at 31; see also Elizabeth Anderson, Feminist Episte-
mology and Philosophy of Science, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Ed-
ward N. Zalta ed., 2004), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-
epistemology (last modified Sept. 4, 2003). 
 37. Cf. Judith Butler, Competing Universalities, in CONTINGENCY, HEGEMONY, 
UNIVERSALITY 177 (2000) (“It would be a mistake to imagine that a political claim must 
always be articulated in language. . . . [L]ives make claims in all sorts of ways that are not 
necessarily verbal.”). 
 38. While this theory may seem esoteric, it is recognized within mainstream legal dis-
course. For example, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003), located the harm of laws criminalizing sodomy not in their direct enforcement, 
but in their construction of gay men and lesbians as second-class citizens: “[B]ecause Texas 
so rarely enforces its sodomy law as applied to private, consensual acts, the law serves 
more as a statement of dislike and disapproval against homosexuals than as a tool to stop 
criminal behavior.” Id. at 583 (emphasis added). Justice Scalia at least implicitly shares 
this postmodern insight, for the “massive disruption of the current social order,” id. at 591, 
he sees in Lawrence cannot possibly follow from the elimination of a handful of sodomy 
prosecutions across the country; it is the decision’s discursive legitimization of gay and les-
bian sex and identity that he fears. But cf. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty 
of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2004) [hereinafter Franke, Domesti-
cated Liberty] (suggesting that Lawrence signals a mere tolerance of nonnormative sex, “so 
long as it takes place in private and between two consenting adults in a relationship”). 
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C.   A Note on Methodology 
 An explanatory note regarding this Article’s chosen methodology 
is also in order. There are many possible ways to structure an analy-
sis of transgressive caregiving. For example, an examination of care 
as it is practiced within nontraditional family forms such as unmar-
ried cohabitant families, single parent families, and polyamorous 
families could provide a basis for an analysis of transgressive care-
giving. Because these diverse family forms cut across race, sex, gen-
der, and sexuality lines, such an approach might better avoid the es-
sentialist problems inherent in an examination of the care practices 
of specific identity groups. There may also be less political risk in 
such an approach, because there are not as yet well-developed social 
or legal advocacy movements organized around family types. 
 However, there are certain benefits to organizing an analysis of 
transgressive care practices around specific racial or sexual identi-
ties. First, although there has been significant analysis of nontradi-
tional family forms among critical and family law scholars,39 less at-
tention has been given to the care practices of specific identity 
groups, especially within the recent feminist discourse on care 
work.40 Although race and sexual orientation are heavily implicated 
in this discourse, they have not been fully part of the conversation. At 
the risk of essentializing the groups this Article analyzes, such a di-
rect approach provides an opportunity to address some of the issues 
lurking inside this discourse. One of those issues, I contend, is the 
partial erasure of racial and sexual minorities and straight men from 
the discourse of family care work within legal feminism. The ap-
                                                                                                                      
 39. See NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES (1997); FINEMAN, 
NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 27; Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmari-
tal Cohabitation: Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1265 (2001); Cynthia Grant Bowman, Legal Treatment of Cohabitants in the 
United States, 26 LAW & POL’Y 119 (2004); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Marry Me 
Bill: Should Cohabitation Be the (Legal) Default Option?, 64 LA. L. REV. 403 (2004); Eliza-
beth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: 
Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001); Martha L. 
Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274 passim (1991); 
Linda C. McClain, Intimate Affiliation and Democracy: Beyond Marriage?, 32 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 379 (2003); Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Consider-
ing Polyamory, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 439 (2003). 
 40. Conceded, there has been scholarship on care and sexuality within critical race 
theory, but that scholarship has not been substantially incorporated within feminist and 
queer legal projects analyzing the family. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 6; ROBERTS, KILLING 
THE BLACK BODY, supra note 6; ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 6; Karen Engle et 
al., Round Table Discussion: Subversive Legal Moments?, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 197, 220-
25 (2003) (presentation of Adrienne Davis) (noting the absence of black women in legal 
feminist and judicial analyses of gender); Perry, Alimony, supra note 6; Perry, Transracial 
and International Adoption, supra note 6.  
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proach presented here constitutes an attempt to remedy that prob-
lem. 
 Second, a central premise of this Article is that we must get away 
from examining “caregiver” as a status, moving instead to an exami-
nation of how care as a practice may be transformative whenever it is 
performed. Abandoning analysis on the basis of various family types 
or forms is consistent with such a premise.  
 Third, moving from family forms to identity groups presents a 
fundamental challenge to the idea that a legitimate family is organ-
ized primarily around sexual ties.41 Even though unmarried cohabi-
tants, single parent families, and polyamorous families present radi-
cal challenges to the traditional nuclear family, examining caregiving 
even within those contexts reifies the idea that a sexual tie is central 
to the meaning of family. Specifically, such an approach suggests 
that transgressive families are traditional families except for the ad-
dition or subtraction of adult sexual partners, or the absence of a 
formal legal tie among sexual partners. As this Article will demon-
strate, the care practices of African Americans and gay people in par-
ticular extend well beyond the sexual family, often involving numer-
ous social kin in care work. These practices are obscured when care is 
studied through the lens of cohabitation, single parenthood, or poly-
amory. 
 Finally, it should be noted that the chosen methodology of this Ar-
ticle is by no means intended to suggest the equivalency of African 
Americans, gay people, and heterosexual men with regard to their 
experiences of state-sponsored oppression in the realm of family life. 
Although gay men and lesbians have been subject to state-sponsored 
violence—including castration, imprisonment, and commitment42—
African Americans suffered all of that and more under chattel slav-
ery and its aftermath. Moreover, although the closet was and re-
mains its own form of oppression, never secure in any case, passing 
has been more of an option for gay men and lesbians than for most 
African Americans. Finally, and most obviously, heterosexual men 
have historically occupied a uniquely privileged place within the law, 
especially white, heterosexual men. 
 At the same time, there remain important commonalities among 
African Americans, sexual minorities, and heterosexual men worth 
exploring. Most notably, the law and society more broadly have sys-
tematically marginalized the family care practices of each of these 
identity groups. Indeed, if there is one observation that can be drawn 
                                                                                                                      
 41. Martha Fineman has thoroughly deconstructed this notion. See FINEMAN, 
NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 27, at 145-76. 
 42. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE 
CLOSET 42-43 (1999). 
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from the research presented in this Article, it is that a central means 
of oppressing a disfavored group in our society is to wage war on 
their familyhood. The identity groups examined here were chosen be-
cause they represent especially fruitful examples of this phenome-
non, but their inclusion should not be seen as occupying the field. 
Rather, this Article represents an initial exploration of transgressive 
care intended to initiate a conversation about the potential of care as 
a form of political resistance. With these caveats in mind, it is hoped 
that the advantages of this Article’s methodology outweigh its obvi-
ous risks. 
 This Article represents an attempt at modest intervention in the 
critical legal discourse on intimacy and family care work. It would 
not have been possible without the foundational contributions of 
feminist, queer, and race scholars within law. Most important have 
been the works of Kathryn Abrams, Nancy Dowd, William Eskridge, 
Martha Fineman, Katherine Franke, Twila Perry, Nancy Polikoff, 
Dorothy Roberts, and Joan Williams. They have developed the con-
ceptual basis for a social constructionist vision of the family and the 
integration of outsider standpoints within family and discrimination 
law. I have tried to credit these prominent scholars throughout this 
Article; any failure in that regard is unintended, for this piece if any-
thing is a tribute to their pathbreaking work.  
 This Article proceeds in four parts: Part II highlights the ways in 
which caregiving is an exercise of political resistance for transgres-
sive caregivers such as African-American women, gays and lesbians, 
and straight men. Part III summarizes conventional feminist and 
queer legal theory positions on family caregiving, focusing on the ex-
tent to which many legal scholars working within these traditions 
overlook ways that caregiving may be a positive act of agency for 
caregivers. Part IV critiques this assumption and looks to a more 
complicated conception of caregiving as a form of political agency to 
resolve some of the current disagreements among critical legal theo-
rists in the care work discourse. Finally, Part V examines the impli-
cations for law of this new conception of caregiving, concluding that 
feminist and queer legal theory can transcend the current stalemate 
of the “sameness/difference” debate by further complicating our vi-
sion of caregiving work. 
II.   TRANSGRESSIVE CAREGIVING AS POLITICS 
A.   African-American Care Practices 
 The state has heavily regulated black women’s sexuality, repro-
duction, family caregiving work, and wage work from slavery to the 
present. Black women resisted and sought refuge from this structural 
discrimination in part through family and community relationships. 
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Caregiving work within black families and communities is thus im-
bued with significant political meaning that derives from blacks’ his-
torical experience of oppression. This pattern is borne out by histori-
cal materials tracing black women’s activism, as well as by contem-
porary social science research. 
 
1.   Sexuality/Reproduction/Mothering 
 Controlling black women’s reproduction was central to slavery.43 
Slave owners owned black women’s labor and commodified their bio-
logical reproduction. This was enforced through the Roman property 
doctrine of partus sequitur ventrem, establishing that the issue of a 
female slave is born in the condition of the mother.44 Put simply, 
black women’s fertility produced their owners’ labor force. 
 According to historian Deborah Gray White, “Slave masters 
wanted adolescent girls to have children, and to this end they prac-
ticed a passive, though insidious kind of breeding.”45 Techniques such 
as assigning pregnant women lighter workloads, giving pregnant 
women more attention and rations, and rewarding prolific women 
with bonuses such as clothing, money, or promises of emancipation 
were all used to increase black women’s reproduction.46 If these sub-
tle manipulations failed, then masters could and sometimes did re-
sort to outright force.47 For example, slave masters forcibly arranged 
“marriages” with the aim of producing the maximum number of 
healthy child slaves.48 Rape was common, and on some plantations a 
substantial portion of the infants born into slavery were of mixed 
race.49 Infertile women were treated “like barren sows and . . . passed 
from one unsuspecting buyer to the next.”50 Enslaved people could 
not form legally recognized marriages; intimate partnerships were 
regularly disrupted by sale, hiring out, and apprenticeships; and 
                                                                                                                      
 43. See Pamela D. Bridgewater, Un/Re/Dis Covering Slave Breeding in Thirteenth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 7 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 11 (2001). 
 44. See Margaret A. Burnham, An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law and Family Law, 
5 LAW & INEQ. 187, 215 (1987). 
 45. See DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR’N’T I A WOMAN? FEMALE SLAVES IN THE 
PLANTATION SOUTH 98 (1985). 
 46. Id. at 98-100. 
 47. Id. at 102. 
  48. Id. at 102-03; see also JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW 34-
35 (Vintage Books ed., 1986) (1985). 
 49. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 53-56. 
 50. See WHITE, supra note 45, at 101. Reported judicial decisions addressing breach of 
warranty claims based on female slaves’ infertility suggest the prevalence of this practice. 
See, e.g., Hambright v. Stover, 31 Ga. 300 (Ga. 1860) (“defect” of the womb); McCeney v. 
Duvall, 21 Md. 166 (Md. 1864) (prolapsed uterus). 
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children were regularly and permanently separated from their moth-
ers, often without notice.51 
 While a comprehensive review of black women’s resistance to their 
unique place within slavery is not possible here, one helpful example 
pertains to black feminist abolitionist ideology. Black feminist aboli-
tionists identified the commodification of enslaved women’s reproduc-
tion as central to the system of slavery.52 This vision was an alterna-
tive to mainstream abolitionist movements which defined the sine 
qua non of freedom as the right to sell one’s labor in the free market 
and which aimed to emancipate black women from their slave mas-
ters so they could come under the aegis of black patriarchs.53 In con-
trast, black women equated freedom primarily with the right to own 
their bodies unqualified by gender relations or capitalist exploita-
tion.54 
 This “recessive” strain of abolitionism developed by black women 
activists is evident, for example, in a lecture delivered by free black 
abolitionist Sarah Parker Remond. On a speaking tour of England for 
the American Antislavery Society in 1859, Remond defined property 
in the sexual body, as opposed to the laboring body, as the essential 
difference between slavery and freedom.55 Similarly, reflecting on her 
newly emancipated status, ex-slave Bethany Veney stated, “A new 
life had come to me. I was in a land where, by its laws, I had the 
same right to myself that any other woman had . . . . My boy was my 
own, and no one could take him from me.”56 This conception of free-
dom demonstrates the way in which black women transformed inti-
macy and reproduction into practices of political resistance by re-
claiming them for themselves in the face of oppression by white slave 
masters and more tangentially by black men. 
                                                                                                                      
 51. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 90-108, 237. 
 52. See AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT 30 (1998). For a similar 
analysis of slavery within law, see Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: 
An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221, 246-47 (1999) (identifying slavery as a 
“sexual political economy” and “a gendered as well as a racially supremacist institution”). 
 53. See STANLEY, supra note 52, at 30-34. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Lectures on American Slavery, ANTI-SLAVERY REP., July 1, 1859, at 148, 501.  
According to a summary of the lecture: 
She (the lecturer) [stated that she] knew something of the trials and toils of the 
women of England—how . . . they were made to “Stitch, stitch, stitch,” till wea-
riness and exhaustion overtook them. But [according to Remond] there was 
this immeasurable difference between their condition and that of the slave-
woman, that their persons were free and their progeny their own, while the 
slave-woman was the victim of the heartless lust of her master, and the chil-
dren whom she bore were his property. 
Id. 
 56. Bethany Veney, The Narrative of Bethany Veney, A Slave Woman (Worcester, 
Mass. 1889), in COLLECTED BLACK WOMEN’S NARRATIVES 38 (1988). The electronic edition 
of the Bethany Veney work is available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/veney/veney.html. 
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 The historical control of black women’s reproduction and black 
women’s resistance through family and community relations contin-
ues to the present. In the last century, with the end of the economic 
system of slavery, the regulation of black women’s sexuality and re-
production has manifested primarily through state-sponsored efforts 
to limit their childbearing. This more recent history includes the role 
of the eugenics movement in our country’s early birth control policy,57 
sterilization abuse of black women during the 1960s and 70s,58 recent 
campaigns to encourage the use of long-term birth control methods 
such as Norplant and Depo-Provera among black teenagers and wel-
fare mothers,59 and welfare reforms aimed at eliminating supposed 
financial incentives to poor, black women’s childbearing.60  
 In the modern era, black women have been accused of failing to 
discipline their children, of abusing their children, of retarding their 
children’s academic achievement, and of emasculating their sons and 
husbands.61 The alleged failure of black women’s caregiving and the 
expectation that black women should work were central themes in 
the major welfare reforms of the last decade.62 The construction of 
black women’s mothering as deviant has similarly been the basis for 
the heavy involvement of the state in black families through the child 
welfare system. Today, forty-two percent of all children in foster care 
nationwide are black, even though black children constitute only sev-
enteen percent of the nation’s youth.63 
 In response, black women activists, beginning in the 1960s, fo-
cused considerable energy on defending black motherhood and the 
black family. The Moynihan Report,64 published in 1965, served as a 
catalyst for this defense. In the report, Assistant Secretary of Labor 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan drew heavily from the work of black soci-
                                                                                                                      
 57. See ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note 6, at 56-81. 
 58. Id. at 89-103. 
 59. Id. at 104-116, 144-49. 
 60. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 
U.S.C. § 601 (2004) (transforming welfare from an entitlement program to a time-limited, 
work-focused program that includes provisions aimed at decreasing biological reproduction 
and increasing marriage rates among poor women); ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, 
supra note 6, at 209-25; Laura T. Kessler, PPI, Patriarchy, and the Schizophrenic View of 
Women: A Feminist Analysis of Welfare Reform in Maryland, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 317, 336-38 (1995) (discussing “family caps” aimed at influencing the reproductive 
behavior of welfare recipients by eliminating or limiting welfare grant increases for the 
birth of additional children).  
 61. See, e.g., Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Ac-
tion, in THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 39-124 (Lee Rainwater 
& William L. Yancey eds., 1967). 
 62. See Fineman, supra note 39, at 274-89; Kessler, supra note 60, at 365-68. 
 63. See ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 6, at 8. 
 64. See Moynihan, supra note 61. 
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ologist Edward Franklin Frazier65 to depict the black family as a 
“tangle of pathology,” an intergenerational morass of welfare depend-
ency, criminality, and illegitimacy.66 Moynihan held the uniquely ma-
triarchal structure of the black family responsible for this pathol-
ogy.67 According to the report, “matriarchal” upbringing left boys 
morally weakened and lacking the strong work ethic that would en-
able them to succeed in American society.68 It also reasoned that 
black boys needed strong male role models, and that if the black fam-
ily did not provide them, the military would; there, they would be 
properly socialized by male authority figures.69 
 Black women’s resistance to such depictions was complicated by 
their allegiance with black men in the black liberation struggle.70 The 
black community saw the report as an example of a covert govern-
mental policy of genocide against African-American people, along 
with sterilization abuse and black men’s disproportionate representa-
tion in the war against Vietnam.71 This perception moved certain 
segments of the civil rights movement toward a nationalist and pro-
natalist perspective. As explained by historian Lauri Umansky: 
[M]any black nationalists asserted that the black nation needed to 
fortify itself with numbers. On the most basic level this meant that 
blacks must have more babies. . . . [B]lacks were enjoined to resist 
by drawing themselves into father-dominated families and having 
many babies, for “procreation is beautiful, especially if we are de-
voted to the Revolution.”72 
Consistent with this ideology, black men activists urged black women 
to stop using birth control.73 
 Thus, black feminists’ efforts to reclaim the black family and black 
motherhood occurred against the backdrop of both racist, antinatalist 
policies of the white majority and sexist, pronatalist ideology within 
the black nationalist movement. In response, black activists and 
feminist writers reconceptualized black motherhood as a positive 
politics of resistance to both racial and gender oppression. For exam-
                                                                                                                      
 65. See EDWARD FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES 125-
45, 358 (1939) (dubbing the predominance of female-headed households in the black com-
munity as “the matriarchate” responsible for blacks’ poverty and family “disorganization”). 
 66. See Moynihan, supra note 61, at 75-92. 
 67. Id. at 76-80. 
 68. Id. at 76-83. 
 69. Id. at 88-89. 
 70. See Lauri Umansky, “The Sisters Reply:” Black Nationalist Pronatalism, Black 
Feminism, and the Quest for a Multiracial Women’s Movement, 1965-1974, 8 CRITICAL 
MATRIX 19, 24 (1994). 
 71. Id. at 20-21. 
 72. Id. at 21-22 (quoting Black Unity Party, Birth Control Pills and Black Children, 
in POOR BLACK WOMEN (1968), available at http://scriptorium.lib.duke.edu/wlm/poor/ 
#Birth (online archival collection at Duke University)). 
 73. Id. at 23. 
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ple, black feminist writers recast the black matriarch as a symbol not 
of emasculation but of “maternal fortitude.”74 Distinct from black ma-
triarchy, which wrongly conceptualized black women as having ac-
tual material power to govern the family or society, maternal forti-
tude reversed the logic of the castrating black matriarch, but it re-
tained an emphasis on the family as the key to liberation.75 For ex-
ample, black feminist writers such as Toni Cade Bambara pointed 
out that women’s strength had benefited entire African societies 
without emasculating their men.76 This focus on the strong African 
mother challenged Moynihan’s claim about black women’s emascula-
tion of black men. 
 Angela Davis, in a famous essay she wrote from prison, refuted 
the notion of black matriarchy through a detailed historical analysis 
of slavery that demonstrated how society had misinterpreted as fe-
male dominance the “deformed equality of equal oppression.”77 Like 
black men, black women were expected to bear the burdens of slavery 
and the lash.78 As such, their “virtue” as women was never pro-
tected.79 Even motherhood did not improve their position: 
[W]omen who had sucking [sic] children suffered much from their 
breasts becoming full of milk, the infants being left at home; they 
therefore could not keep up with the other hands: I have seen the 
overseer beat them with raw hide so that the blood and the milk 
flew mingled from their breasts.80 
Yet, Davis argued, as mothers and nurturers inside slave quarters, 
enslaved black women enabled enslaved people to endure materially 
and spiritually. Significantly, “[i]n the infinite anguish of ministering 
to the needs of the men and children around her (who were not nec-
essarily members of her immediate family), she was performing the 
only labor of the slave community which could not be directly and 
immediately claimed by the oppressor.”81 Thus, the slave woman and 
black women more generally were not to be faulted for their power,  
                                                                                                                      
 74. Id. at 27-28. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Toni Cade, On the Issue of Roles, in THE BLACK WOMAN 101, 103-04 (Toni Cade 
ed., 1970).  
 77. Angela Davis, Reflections on the Black Woman’s Role in the Community of Slaves, 
3 BLACK SCHOLAR 2, 8 (1971).  
 78. Id. at 7-8.  
 79. Id. at 7. 
 80. Id. at 8 (quoting MOSES GRANDY, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF MOSES GRANDY: 
LATE A SLAVE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 18 (1844)). 
 81. Id. at 7. 
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which never really existed in the sense implied by Moynihan’s “black 
matriarchy,”82 but were to be recognized as revolutionaries.83 
 This black feminist ideology recognizing the central role of black 
motherhood to racial resistance was distinguished from the pronatal-
ist cultural position of black nationalism. It was achieved through a 
simultaneous assertion of the right of black women to control their 
fertility and to control their vision and practice of motherhood.84 In 
sum, although the tension between antiracism and pronatalism was 
present within black feminist ideology, it represented an acknowl-
edgment of the agentic potential of black motherhood.  
 Resistance to dominant conceptions of black motherhood can also 
be found in the practice of “othermothering” in the black commu-
nity.85 Othermothers are women who assist blood mothers by sharing 
mothering responsibilities.86 They can be but are not confined to such 
blood relatives as grandmothers, sisters, aunts, cousins, or suppor-
tive fictive kin.87 Historically, othermothering has operated not only 
informally, but also through well-developed institutions and move-
ments such as black churches,88 black women’s clubs,89 black
                                                                                                                      
 82. Id. at 5.  
 83. See id. at 7; see also WHITE, supra note 45, at 159 (“When Frazier wrote that slave 
women were self-reliant and that they were strangers to male slave authority he evoked an 
image of a domineering woman. . . . [Yet] [s]lave women did not dominate slave marriage 
and family relationships . . . . Acting out of a very traditional role, they made themselves a 
real bulwark against the destruction of the slave family’s integrity”). 
 84. See, e.g., Patricia Harden et al., The Sisters Reply, in POOR BLACK WOMAN (1968), 
available in Documents from the Women’s Liberation Movement, An On-line Archival Col-
lection, Special Collections Library, Duke University, at http://scriptorium.lib. duke.edu/ 
wlm/poor/#reply. 
 85. See Patricia Hill Collins, The Meaning of Motherhood in Black Culture and Black 
Mother/Daughter Relationships, 4 SAGE 3, 4-5 (1987); Rosalie Riegle Troester, Turbulence 
and Tenderness: Mothers, Daughters, and “Othermothers” in Paule Marshall’s Brown Girl, 
Brownstones, 1 SAGE 13, 13 (1984). 
 86. See sources cited supra note 85. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Cheryl Townsend Gilkes, The Roles of Church and Community Mothers: Am-
bivalent American Sexism or Fragmented African Familyhood?, 2 J. FEMINIST STUD. 
RELIGION 41, 43-44 (1986). 
 89. The Black Club Movement developed around the turn of the twentieth century to 
address the urgent needs of the poor in black communities in a period of rapid industriali-
zation. Gerda Lerner, Early Community Work of Black Club Women, 59 J. NEGRO HIST. 
158, 158 (1974). Its members consisted primarily of middle- and upper-class black women. 
Id. at 160. The achievements of black women’s clubs and black club women are significant, 
including the development and operation of kindergartens, nursery schools, day care cen-
ters, orphanages, libraries, public health clinics, hospitals, shelters for juvenile delin-
quents, and old-age homes in black communities. Id. at 159; Stephanie J. Shaw, Black 
Club Women and the Creation of the National Association of Colored Women, 3 J. WOMEN’S 
HIST. 10, 18-19 (1991). 
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community service organizations,90 and the black civil rights move-
ment.91  According to black feminist writers, othermothers have 
formed one of the important bases of power within black civil soci-
ety.92 
 Othermothering is credited with contributing to black survival, 
but its significance for women’s liberation is just as great. As a prac-
tice, othermothering threatens both patriarchal and capitalist norms. 
Most obviously, to the extent that othermothering is defined by 
women-centered, fluid, family-like networks that have different pur-
poses—for example, socialization, reproduction, consumption, emo-
tional support, economic cooperation, and sexuality, which may over-
lap but are not coterminous93—othermothering undermines the pa-
triarchal family, the male-breadwinner ideal, and the notion of bio-
logical motherhood. Perhaps less obviously, it also threatens capital-
ist norms, for it moves away from the concept of children as the pri-
vate property of individual parents.94 
 On an individual level, the experience of unconditional love has 
been especially important in the black parenting experience. Black 
children affirm their mothers; this affirmation is important in a soci-
ety plagued by racism and the politics of black womanhood. As legal 
feminist Dorothy Roberts explains, “The mother-child relationship 
                                                                                                                      
 90. “Community mothers” are black community workers committed to improving con-
ditions in black communities. See Arlene E. Edwards, Community Mothering: The Rela-
tionship Between Mothering and the Community Work of Black Women, 2 J. ASSOC. RES. 
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model, those women who “catch” legal husbands, who live in single-family 
homes, who can afford private school and music lessons for their children, are 
deemed better mothers than those who do not. In this context, those African-
American women who continue community-based child care challenge one fun-
damental assumption underlying the capitalist system itself: that children are 
“private property” . . . . 
See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 182. 
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continues to have a political significance for Black women. Black 
women historically have experienced motherhood as an empowering 
denial of the dominant society’s denigration of their humanity.” 95 Al-
ice Walker offers a glimpse of the positive liberatory potential of the 
black mother-child relationship: 
[I]t is not my child who tells me: I have no femaleness white 
women must affirm. Not my child who says: I have no rights black 
men must respect. 
It is not my child who has purged my face from history and her-
story and left mystory just that, a mystery; my child loves my face 
and would have it on every page, if she could, as I have loved my 
own parents’ faces above all others . . . .  
 . . . .  
 We are together, my child and I. Mother and child, yes, but sis-
ters really, against whatever denies us all that we are.96 
 In sum, black women activists and feminist writers have long rec-
ognized the potentially positive political power of family and commu-
nity caregiving. This recognition flows not so much from material ac-
counts of black women’s role in biological reproduction as from a con-
ception of black women’s oppositional moral agency.97 Black women 
have expressed this moral agency not by rejecting care work—an un-
tenable strategy given the importance of caregiving and the family to 
combating racial and economic oppression—but by practicing care 
consistent with antiracist, antisexist ideology. The next section will 
explore the significance of black women’s paid work experiences to 
the “transgressive care as politics” conception. 
2.   Wage Work 
 The wage work that black women have performed has to a signifi-
cant extent been in the service of whites. For at least seventy-five 
years after emancipation, black women were confined to two occupa-
                                                                                                                      
 95. See ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 6, at 238; see also Perry, Transracial 
and International Adoption, supra note 6, at 117-18 (“Black women see mothering as a po-
litical undertaking, one in which they must do what they can to protect their children from 
a racist society and to teach their children how to survive on their own in a racially hostile 
world.” (footnote omitted)). 
 96. See Alice Walker, One Child of One’s Own: A Challenging Personal Essay on 
Childbirth and Creativity, MS., Aug. 1979, at 8, 42-50, 72-75. 
 97. But see Patricia Haden et al., A Historical and Critical Essay for Black Women in 
the Cities, 3 NO MORE FUN AND GAMES: A J. OF FEMALE LIBERATION 71 (1969), reprinted in 
VOICES FROM WOMEN’S LIBERATION 316-24 (Leslie B. Tanner ed., 1970) (venerating the 
black maternal body as the source of civilization and criticizing the appropriation of 
women, blacks, and nature by white men in pursuit of urbanization, industrialization, and 
capitalism). 
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tions, field work and domestic work for white families.98 After the mi-
gration to northern cities, most black women moved solely into do-
mestic work in urban settings.99 Black women who were not domes-
tics typically worked in factories as janitors or in heavy labor.100 
Whereas special protective legislation rendered many occupations 
unfit for white women, occupations in which black women predomi-
nated escaped regulation entirely.101 
 Many black women sought to retreat from domestic and factory 
work, not to imitate white middle-class notions of domesticity and 
femininity, which were also bound up in racism, but rather to 
strengthen the political and economic position of their families. As 
historian Patricia Hill Collins explains, “Their actions can be seen as 
a sustained effort to remove themselves from the exploited labor force 
in order to return the value of their labor to their families and to find 
relief from the sexual harassment they endured in domestic ser-
vice.”102 Those who could not retreat from paid work—that is, most 
black women—did not conceptually separate it from their family care 
work. Rather, they connected economic self-reliance with mother-
hood, viewing paid work as providing a better chance for their chil-
dren.103  Thus, contrary to dominant conceptions of wage work within 
                                                                                                                      
 98. See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 53-54.  
 99. From 1890 to 1920, black women’s employment as domestic servants hovered 
around forty percent. PHYLLIS PALMER, DOMESTICITY AND DIRT: HOUSEWIVES AND 
DOMESTIC SERVANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1920-1945 12 (Ronnie J. Steinberg ed., 1989). 
With the Depression diminishing job options and World War I halting the waves of white, 
European immigration that had supplied the majority of domestic servants in previous 
decades, domestic service became racially defined as an occupation. See id. at 13. By 1940, 
black women made up over sixty percent of domestic workers nationally. Id. at 13. 
 100. Specifically, according to Collins: 
In the South, Black women entered tobacco factories, cotton mills, and flour 
manufacturing. Some of the dirtiest jobs in these industries were offered to Af-
rican-American women. In the cotton mills Black women were employed as 
common laborers in the yards, as waste gatherers, and as scrubbers of machin-
ery. With Northern migration, some Black women entered factory employment, 
primarily in steam laundries and the rest in unmechanized jobs as sweepers, 
cleaners, and ragpickers. 
See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 57 (citation omitted). 
 101. See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK 185, 188 (1982). Indeed, a central 
theme animating protective labor laws was a growing eugenics movement and concern 
about “race suicide.” Id. at 185. Hence, Justice Brewer’s statement in Muller v. Oregon, 
upholding Oregon’s ten-hour work day for women, “[A]s healthy mothers are essential to 
vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest 
and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.” 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908). 
 102. See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 54. 
 103. Summarizing three qualitative studies of domestics of color, historian Evelyn Na-
kano Glenn explains: 
[D]omestics saw their responsibilities as mothers as the central core of their 
identity. The Japanese American women I interviewed, the Chicana day work-
ers Romero interviewed, and the African American domestics Bonnie Thornton 
Dill interviewed all emphasized the primacy of their roles as mothers . . . . As a 
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liberal and radical feminism, work was not an “escape” from family 
obligations. Such a position would have been incomprehensible in 
light of the discrimination and exploitation that most black women 
experienced in the workforce. Rather, paid work was seen as an ex-
tension of family work. 
 Even in contemporary society, the work performed by many poor 
employed black women resembles duties long associated with domes-
tic service.104 With the increased commodification of domestic labor in 
the last half of the twentieth century, black women are dispropor-
tionately employed as service workers in institutional settings where 
they “carry out lower-level ‘public’ reproductive labor.”105 On average, 
approximately one-third of black women and men find work in the 
low-paid service sector serving as cooks, waitresses, laundry workers, 
day care workers, and health aides to service the needs of affluent 
middle-class families.106  
 As with slavery and domestic work for whites during the first half 
of the twentieth century, a comprehensive review of black women’s 
resistance to labor force exploitation in the modern service economy 
is not possible here. However, a discussion of the welfare rights 
movement of the 1960s provides an important case in point. Com-
prised primarily of poor black women, the movement organized cam-
paigns to demand higher welfare benefits, civil rights protections, 
and better treatment by caseworkers.107 Support for women’s roles as 
mothers was central to the political strategy and ideology of the Na-
                                                                                                                      
Japanese immigrant single parent expressed it, “My children come first. I’m 
working to upgrade my children.” . . .  
 . . . .  
  In a similar vein, Pearl Runner told Dill, . . . 
  . . . “I really feel that with all the struggling that I went through, I feel happy 
and proud that I was able to keep helping my children, that they listened and 
that they all went to high school. So when I look back, I really feel proud, even 
though at times the work was very hard and I came home very tired. But now, 
I feel proud about it. They all got their education.” 
See Evelyn Nakano Glenn, From Servitude to Service Work: Historical Continuities in the 
Racial Division of Paid Reproductive Labor, 18 SIGNS 1, 18-19 (1992) [hereinafter Glenn, 
Servitude] (quoting EVELYN NAKANO GLENN, ISSEI, NISEI, WAR BRIDE: THREE 
GENERATIONS OF JAPANESE AMERICAN WOMEN IN DOMESTIC SERVICE 240 (1986) and Bon-
nie Thornton Dill, The Means to Put My Children Through: Child-Rearing Goals and 
Strategies Among Black Female Domestic Servants, in THE BLACK WOMAN 113 (La Frances 
Rodgers-Rose ed., 1980)). In this passage, Glenn also refers to Mary Romero, Day Work in 
the Suburbs: The Work Experience of Chicana Private Housekeepers, in THE WORTH OF 
WOMEN’S WORK 77 (Anne Statham et al. eds., 1988). Cf. also Denise A. Segura, Working at 
Motherhood: Chicana and Mexican Immigrant Mothers and Employment, in MOTHERING: 
IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY 211 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et al. eds., 1994). 
 104. See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 62; Glenn, Servitude, supra note 103, at 19-20. 
 105. Glenn, Servitude, supra note 103, at 3. 
 106. See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 62. 
 107. See Premilla Nadasen, Expanding the Boundaries of the Women’s Movement: 
Black Feminism and the Struggle for Welfare Rights, 28 FEMINIST STUD. 271, 272 (2002).  
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tional Welfare Rights Organization,108 which by 1972 identified itself 
as a women’s organization.109 Although resonating with a rising trend 
within black nationalism to reinforce traditional gender roles for 
women, this strategy was fundamentally different, for its goal was 
increased independence of women from men.110 The focus on gaining 
financial support for motherhood also stood in contrast to white lib-
eral feminist ideology that employment, not motherhood, led to lib-
eration. As historian Premilla Nadasen explains, “[Welfare activists] 
proposed that women have the option of staying home by providing 
adequate public support. This, in itself, was a radical challenge to the 
socially defined gender roles of poor Black women, who had never 
been seen primarily as homemakers or mothers.”111 
 Although this discussion has focused primarily on poor and work-
ing class women, it should be noted that black women professionals 
have not escaped workplace exploitation or domestic servant roles. 
Black middle-class women have been dubbed the “new mammies” or 
“modern mammies” by black feminist theorists.112 Black women pro-
fessionals are disproportionately employed in the government sector, 
where they are responsible for “the personal needs of the destitute 
and the weak in public institutions.”113 According to these theorists, 
black women professionals are expected to fix systems that are in cri-
sis due to underfunding, infrastructure deterioration, and demoral-
ized staffs.114  
 When considered in the context of this history, black women’s care 
work—whether performed in a single-parent family, in a traditional 
marriage, or other intimate partnership—can be understood at least 
in part as an act of resistance to wage market exploitation, not sim-
ply as a form of patriarchal oppression.115 This vision contrasts with 
the “cult of true womanhood”116 associated with the traditional family 
ideal and opposed by many feminists, in which family care work is 
defined as being primarily private, potentially at odds with women’s 
liberation, and apolitical. 
                                                                                                                      
 108. Id. at 278. 
 109. Id. at 274. 
 110. Id. at 279. 
 111. Id. at 286. 
 112. See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 65; BARBARA OMOLADE, THE RISING SONG OF 
AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN 55 (1994). 
 113. See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 65. 
 114. Id.; see also Elizabeth Higginbotham, Black Professional Women: Job Ceilings and 
Employment Sectors, in WOMEN OF COLOR IN U.S. SOCIETY 113-31 (Maxine Baca Zinn & 
Bonnie Thornton Dill eds., 1994). 
 115. See Perry, Alimony, supra note 6, at 2494 (“For women who do not have the option 
of attractive, well-paying professional jobs, staying home may not be considered a sacrifice; 
it may be seen as a luxury.”). 
 116. See Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AMER. Q. 151, 
151-74 (1966). 
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3.   Contemporary Social Science Research 
 The history just recounted is corroborated by contemporary social 
science research exploring the meaning of motherhood for black 
women. These studies demonstrate that black motherhood consti-
tutes a positive political practice, often conscious, of resistance to ra-
cial- and gender-based oppression. 
 For example, one small qualitative study of seven teenage black 
mothers found that mothering was a form of “resistance to the idea 
that young, Black motherhood was ‘deviant.’ ”117 All of the women in 
the study expressed the idea that mothering was a form of black 
pride. Through motherhood, “the women . . . were asserting that a) 
they could have children and b) under the tyranny of anti-Black ra-
cism as a means of survival, it was imperative to do so.”118 While the 
study found that heterosexism may have subconsciously contributed 
to the teenage mothers’ decisions to bear children, “resistance to ma-
jor oppressive ideologies of Blackness, womanhood, and motherhood” 
played a conscious, significant role.119 This study demonstrates the 
continuity of the ideology of motherhood as resistance among young 
black women. 
 A second qualitative study of twenty working-class African-
American women found that for most, and possibly all of the women, 
raising children was not seen or practiced as an individual undertak-
ing.120 Good mothering was not defined by the mother’s singular, ir-
replaceable presence.121 Rather, shared care arrangements most often 
were the norm, not just to accommodate the mothers’ job or school 
schedules, but as part of a view of the “value of shared child rearing 
and the benefit to children of close kin relationships.”122 Exclusive 
motherhood was seen as neither practical nor desirable. For example, 
one mother “wanted her two children to be mothered by her sister 
and aunts so that they would grow up as she had, surrounded by 
kin.”123 The shared child-rearing arrangements often were regular-
ized, long term, and extensive, that is, occurring two to four days a 
week for several years.124 The women also resisted the assumption 
that legal marriage was required for good mothering; they did not 
express strong desires to marry or to rely on male breadwinners. At 
                                                                                                                      
 117. See Crystal’Aisha PerrymanMark, Resistance and Surrender: Mothering Young, 
Black, and Feminist, 2 J. ASSOC. RES. ON MOTHERING 130, 134 (2002). 
  118. Id. at 135. 
  119. Id. at 135-36. 
 120. See Linda M. Blum & Theresa Deussen, Negotiating Independent Motherhood: 
Working-Class African American Women Talk About Marriage and Motherhood, 10 
GENDER & SOC’Y 199, 206-07 (1996). 
 121. Id. at 207. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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the same time, they valued long-term partnerships and the presence 
of fathers in their children’s lives. Thus, they practiced independence 
from “male family headship,” but not rejection of men.125 Contrary to 
mainstream arguments that black single-parent motherhood is a re-
sult of cultural pathology stemming from welfare dependency or the 
lack of stable employment for black men, this study suggests that it 
is at least in part an expression of a distinct, positive, conscious ideal 
of community-based independence involving shared family caregiving 
and nonmarital partnerships with men. 
 While there are fewer studies on the meaning of family care work 
to black middle-class women,126 cultural evidence suggests that they 
also see their domestic labor as a form of political resistance to ra-
cism. For example, Mocha Moms is a national support group for 
“mothers of color who have chosen not to work full-time outside of the 
home in order to devote more time to their families.”127 According to 
the Mocha Moms mission statement, full-time parenting by mothers 
of color is a political act because “[slave] mothers could not partici-
pate in the raising of their children” and generations of black moth-
ers worked while “generations of white mothers enjoyed the privilege 
of being able to stay at home and spend time with their children.”128 
According to founder Jolene Ivey, Mocha Moms’ conscious politiciza-
tion of motherhood is a response to contemporary conditions as well: 
You can say that mothering is the same whether you’re White, 
Black, or green . . . . It is and it isn’t. I’m the mother of five Black 
boys. I can’t raise them the way a White woman would raise her 
sons. I have to do things like teach them how to act if the cops stop 
them.129 
                                                                                                                      
 125. Id. at 208. While this study represents but one contemporary example, its findings 
are consistent with other social science research on African-American kinship networks. 
See, e.g., CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK 
COMMUNITY 62-89 (1974). 
 126. The closest study within law is Bernie D. Jones, Single Motherhood by Choice, 
Libertarian Feminism, and the Uniform Parentage Act, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 419 (2003) 
(discussing “single motherhood by choice” among older, economically independent women 
as a statement of empowerment). 
 127. See About Mocha Moms, http://www.mochamoms.org/about.html (last visited Dec. 
2, 2005).  The name itself suggests a group of women who can afford to take their kids to 
Starbucks for playdates, as well as racial pride. 
 128. See Mocha Moms, Anti-Discrimination Statement,  http://www.mochamoms.org/ 
anti_disc.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2005). 
 129. See Ylonda Gault Caviness, The Mommy Club: Black Stay-at-Home Mothers Look 
to One Another for Support, ESSENCE MAG., Aug. 2002, at 152. Lesbian mothers share this 
perspective on motherhood. See, e.g., Linda Mulley, Lesbian Motherhood and Other Small 
Acts of Resistance, in THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 311, 317 (Alexis Jetter et al. eds., 
1997) (“[T]here are differences between being a mother and being a lesbian mother. . . . 
[T]he lesbian mother [must] educate her children about the hate that exists in the world, 
and how that hate can affect them.”). 
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Another member explained that she responds to the curious eyes of 
strangers with the refrain, “No, I’m not the nanny.”130 In sum, Mocha 
Moms represents a conscious effort to resist the unique way in which 
black women experience the intersection of sexist and racist ideology 
with regard to family life.131 
4.   Summary: Black Women’s Care as Politics 
 When considered in the context of the history, body of social sci-
ence research, and cultural evidence presented here, black women’s 
caregiving can be understood at least in part as an act of resistance 
to the exploitation and control of their sexuality, mothering, and 
wage work by men and the state. This conception of caregiving as an 
affirmative act of political resistance is well-developed within black 
feminist thought. Patricia Hill Collins notes that African-American 
women’s contributions to their families’ well-being in the face of 
structuralized racism suggest that black women see their family care 
work more as a form of resistance to oppression than as a form of ex-
ploitation by men. She highlights how this conception of political ac-
tivism varies from traditional liberal conceptions of politics as resis-
tance that is effected through public institutions in the public sphere: 
“Prevailing definitions of political activism and resistance misunder-
stand the meaning of these concepts in Black women’s lives. Social 
science research typically focuses on public, official, visible political 
activity even though unofficial, private, and seemingly invisible 
spheres of social life and organization may be equally important.”132 
Similarly, dominant accounts of motherhood within legal and politi-
cal theory (including much feminist legal theory) as an institution in 
which women are apolitical, isolated with their children within pri-
vate families, and removed from politics and social struggle are in-
consistent with central understandings of caregiving for many black 
women.133 For such women, reproduction and care are not just bio-
                                                                                                                      
 130. See Monica Leas, Stay-at-Home Mothers Grow in Number; Mocha Moms Fill a 
Void, Columbia News Services, at http://www.jrn.columbia.edu/studentwork/cns/2003-06-
22/316.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2005). 
 131. Id. To be sure, Mocha Moms is not without apparent contradictions. For example, 
the organization’s official platform includes “a strong commitment to marriage and to the 
support of our husbands.” See About Mocha Moms,  http://www.mochamoms.org/ 
about.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2005). These seemingly traditional aspirations regarding 
care present significant complexities when we consider the background against which they 
developed. That is, marriage may be a transgressive act in a community where state-
sanctioned marriage was denied historically and in which unmarried motherhood is the 
norm. As discussed in the next Part, this insight equally applies to the gay community. 
 132. See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 202. 
 133. See Eileen Boris, The Power of Motherhood: Black and White Activist Women Re-
define the “Political”, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 25, 48-49 (1989); Annelise Orleck, Radical 
Mothers in International Perspective, in THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 3 (Alexis Jetter et 
al. eds., 1997). 
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logical or developmental functions but are also an expression of poli-
tics.134 
B.   Gay/Lesbian Care Practices 
 Gay men and lesbians also have long suffered state-sponsored dis-
crimination with regard to their reproduction, sexuality, and family 
life.135 As in the race context, the state has effected this discrimina-
tion through the denial of substantial rights and benefits of citizen-
ship. Gay men and lesbians have challenged this discrimination in 
part through their intimate relationships, not solely outside of them 
as traditional liberal theory would suggest. Given the possibility of a 
radical alternative to the hetero-patriarchal family presented by 
same-sex intimacy, the potential for political emancipation (as well 
as oppression) through family and intimate life is well understood by 
gay men and lesbians and by the larger society. This understanding 
of the political significance of intimacy within the gay community is 
supported by historical materials and contemporary social science re-
search. 
1.   Sexuality/Reproduction/Parenting 
 In the realm of family and intimate life, the state has relied on 
sexual orientation to deny gay and lesbian individuals sexual pri-
vacy, marriage and its benefits, child custody, alternative reproduc-
tion services, and adoption rights. Indeed, a core historical purpose of 
                                                                                                                      
 134. This is not to say that all transgressive caregiving among black women represents 
a particular political stance against racism or patriarchy.  Indeed, bearing children outside 
of marriage, for example, may represent black women’s practical response to demographic 
and economic realities.  See Twila L. Perry, Race Matters: Change, Choice, and Family Law 
at the Millennium, 33 FAM. L.Q. 461, 464-65 (1999) (identifying the shortage of black men 
at every age group and the precarious economic situation of many black men as critical fac-
tors affecting black women’s low marriage rates). Yet, as this Part has demonstrated, 
state-sponsored oppression of black family life significantly colors its meaning, transform-
ing family care work at least partly into a practice of political significance for many African 
Americans. 
 135. This section builds on the work of William Eskridge and Nancy Polikoff, whose 
scholarship has defined the field of gay parental rights and “gaylaw” more generally. See  
ESKRIDGE, supra note 42; David L. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay 
and Lesbian Family Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 523, 524-30 (1999); Nan 
D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Liti-
gation Strategy, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 691 passim (1976); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does 
Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-
Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 527-43 (1990) [hereinafter 
Polikoff, Redefining Parenthood]. 
 A note on terminology is apropos here. I use “gay men and lesbians” to undermine the 
assumption that findings about gay men hold equally for lesbians. At times, however, I 
also employ “gay” as a generic term embracing both women and men. Although other sex-
ual and gender nonconformists are not explicitly included, i.e., bisexuals, transgendered 
people, and transsexuals, many of the claims of this section apply equally to all individuals 
whose sex, gender, and sexuality do not neatly line up according to dominant norms. 
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family law has been the promotion of heterosexual, monogamous 
marriage and patriarchal gender relations. For example, coverture, 
adultery, legitimacy, and other pre-1970s family regulations insti-
tuted procreative, heterosexual, patriarchal marriage as the Ameri-
can norm. Although constitutional litigation has resulted in the 
elimination of most de jure preferences for the patriarchal family,136 
it continues a robust de facto existence in the law. For example, fam-
ily law, income security law, and tax law all privilege heterosexual, 
married individuals, especially men within heterosexual marital re-
lationships.137 The marginalization and elimination of nonheterosex-
ual, nonpatriarchal intimacy has been an essential corollary to this 
normalization project. 
 The state’s aggressive stance with regard to sexual noncomformity 
began in earnest after World War I, increased in intensity after 
World War II, and has subsided to a certain degree in the face of the 
modern gay rights movement.138 A full recounting of this history is 
beyond the scope of this Article. However, certain themes emerge 
from this history that shed light on my central claim that transgres-
sive caregiving may constitute a form of political resistance or ex-
pression. 
 First, the state has sought to enforce compulsory heterosexuality 
through family law, rendering the family a key site of emancipatory 
struggle for gender and sexual nonconformists. To be sure, the state 
has pursued its heteronormative goals in a wide range of contexts,  
                                                                                                                      
 136. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (decriminalizing private, 
consensual sodomy);  Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (equalizing the rights of 
marital and nonmarital children with regard to paternity statutes of limitation); Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (protecting extended families from 
state intervention); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282-84 (1979) (invalidating gender-based 
spousal support statutes); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 464-65 (1972) (decriminaliz-
ing the use of contraception by unmarried persons). De jure support for the patriarchal 
family continues in some areas, most notably with regard to same-sex marriage. See 
sources cited infra note 188 and discussion in this Part. 
 137. See, e.g., FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 27, at 143-64 (tracing and 
criticizing the law’s privileging of heterosexual, monogamous pairings); Martha T. 
McCluskey, Caring for Workers, 55 ME. L. REV. 313, 326-27 (2003) (detailing the privileg-
ing of married couples conforming with traditional gender roles within tax and social secu-
rity law); Williams, supra note 19, at 2248-54 (demonstrating the continued informal op-
eration of coverture in the context of divorce).  
 138. See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 42 (reviewing history of state rules relating to 
gender and sexual nonconformity). Prior to World War I, most regulation of sexual noncon-
formity was achieved through family and social pressure. Where the law did come into 
play, it focused primarily on policing gender nonconformity, such as female prostitution 
and cross-dressing. Id. at 18-24. 
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including the military,139 employment,140 and immigration;141 public 
and semi-public spaces such as cafes, bars, social clubs, bathrooms, 
and bathhouses;142 and with regard to speech.143  But the legal regula-
tion of the family, through rules that seek to control the sexuality, 
reproduction, and parenting of gay men and lesbians, represents a 
central component of the state’s heteronormalization effort.144  
 Second, the protection of children from “oversexed,” “predatory” 
gay men has been a recurring theme in the history of state regulation 
of same-sex intimacy and family life. Indeed, social historians attrib-
ute the development of the concept of the “homosexual” in America 
around the turn of the twentieth century in part to cultural anxieties 
about the protection of the sexual innocence of children.145 These 
anxieties translated into legal rules with both benign and harmful ef-
fects. Under the auspices of child protection, states adopted increas-
ingly strict laws prohibiting child molestation and rape, but they also 
used child protection as a pretext for the widespread criminalization 
of adult, consensual, same-sex intimacy and the civil regulation of 
gay reproduction, adoption, and parenting.146 For example, until rela-
tively recently, many states criminalized same-sex sexuality,147 no 
state recognized same-sex marriage,148 and express presumptions ex-
                                                                                                                      
 139. See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 934 (4th. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding 
that the Navy’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy was constitutionally applied to expel a lieu-
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sumption that he had engaged in homosexual acts); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 697-98 
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 140. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110-11 (11th. Cir. 1997) (en banc) 
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 141. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 42, at 35-36, 132-34, 383-84. 
 142. Id. at 78-80, 93-95, 112-16; see also Allan Bérubé, The History of Gay Bathhouses, 
in POLICING PUBLIC SEX, 187-220 (Ephen Glenn Colter et al. eds., 1996). 
 143. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 42, at 76-78, 95-96, 116-25. 
 144. Admittedly, these regulatory contexts are not exclusive. For example, sodomy 
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 145. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 42, at 3. Contributing to these anxieties were new un-
derstandings of children’s gender and sexual development. The other set of anxieties lead-
ing to the emergence of the category “homosexual” surrounded “increased social and eco-
nomic opportunities for women outside the home, which fueled not only a robust feminist 
movement but also a reaction that emphasized rigid gender lines and roles.” Id. 
 146. Id. at 60-61, 136-37; PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE 
CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 61-66, 85-87, 90, 124-25, 156-63 (1998).  
 147. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding Georgia’s sodomy 
law). 
 148. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971). For a review of the 
history of the struggle over same-sex marriage, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 42, at 134-35 and 
Chambers & Polikoff, supra note 135, at 524-30.  
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isted against child custody for gay or lesbian parents, particularly 
when a heterosexual parent sought custody.149 
 To be sure, there has been enormous progress in all of these areas 
in the past two decades. In the past two years alone, the U.S. Su-
preme Court decriminalized private, consensual gay sex;150 through 
judicial or legislative action, the state of Massachusetts151 and the 
countries of Canada,152 South Africa,153 and Spain154 overturned or 
cleared the way for legislative repeal of those jurisdictions’ opposite-
sex requirements for marriage; and the executives of several Ameri-
can cities and counties directed their clerks to extend the privilege of 
marriage to same-sex couples.155 Many states, municipalities, and 
corporations now provide some rights and benefits to domestic part-
ners.156 
 Moreover, the majority of states no longer take into account the 
sexual orientation of a parent in custody disputes. This approach, 
                                                                                                                      
 149. See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 692-93 (Va. 1985). For a detailed review of 
the struggle over gay parenting, see Chambers & Polikoff, supra note 135, at 532-43; 
Hunter & Polikoff, supra note 135, passim; Polikoff, Redefining Parenthood, supra note 
135, at 527-43. 
 150. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). 
 151. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003). Simi-
lar cases are pending in appellate courts in California, New Jersey, New York, and Wash-
ington states. See Lambda Legal Marriage Project, http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/issues/record2?record=9 (last visited Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Lambda Marriage 
Project]. 
 152. See In re Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, [2004] D.L.R. 193 (clearing the way 
for legislative repeal of Canada’s ban on same-sex marriage); Civil Marriage Act, 2005 
S.C., ch. 33 (Can.) (legalizing same-sex marriage in Canada). 
 153. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, No. CCT 60/04, slip op. at 51-52, 100-01 
(S. Afr. CC Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/ 
5257.PDF (holding that excluding same-sex couples from marriage represents an unjusti-
fied violation of the constitutional rights of equal protection, nondiscrimination, and dig-
nity, and giving the South African Parliament one year to legalize same-sex marriage or 
the court’s order will take effect). 
 154. See Ley 13/2005, de 1 de julio, por la que se modifica el Código Civil en materia de 
derecho a contraer matrimonio (B.O.E. 2005, 11364), available at http://www.boe.es/boe/ 
dias/2005/07/02/pdfs/A23632-23634.pdf; see also Renwick McLean, Spain Legalizes Gay 
Marriage; Law Is Among the Most Liberal, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2005, at A9. 
 155. Here I am referring to the events surrounding Valentine’s Day 2004 when, follow-
ing the lead of San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom, officials in New Paltz, New York, 
Multnomah County, Oregon, and Sandoval County, New Mexico, began issuing marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples, resulting in some 7000 licenses when all was said and done. 
See Carolyn Marshall, Dozens of Gay Couples Marry in San Francisco Ceremonies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A24; Evelyn Nieves, Calif. Judge Won’t Halt Gay Nuptials; New 
Mexico County Briefly Follows San Francisco’s Lead, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2004, at A1; 
Portland Oregon to Allow Gay Marriages, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Mar. 2, 2004, available at 
LEXIS (News Library); Sabrina Tavernise & Thomas Crampton, Gay Couples to Be Wed 
Today in New Paltz, Mayor Declares, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at B2. 
 156. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 499-501 (2d ed. 2002). Most recently, the state of Connecticut, with-
out any order of a court, passed a domestic partnership law. See 2005 Conn. Legis. Serv. 
05-10 (West). 
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known as the “nexus test,” makes the sexual orientation of a parent 
irrelevant unless there is evidence that it will negatively impact the 
best interests of the child.157 And more than ten states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia now recognize “second-parent” adoption, which is 
the right of the partner of a biological parent to adopt without termi-
nating the parental rights of the biological parent, thereby ensuring 
legal ties between children and both their lesbian or gay parents 
where the parents seek to formalize the relationship.158 In this spirit, 
the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution,159 a major restatement and reform effort in family law, 
recognizes functional parenthood by augmenting traditional defini-
tions of parenthood based on blood and marriage with the concepts of 
the parent by estoppel and the de facto parent.160 Although no state 
has formally adopted these ALI proposals, many states have pro-
                                                                                                                      
 157. See, e.g., Downey v. Muffley, 767 N.E.2d 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that 
there was no rational basis for trial court order prohibiting ex-wife from cohabiting with 
same-sex partner while living with her children.); Fulk v. Fulk, 827 So. 2d 736 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2002) (holding that trial court was precluded from placing too much emphasis on 
wife’s lesbian affair as a basis for awarding custody to husband and that the judge should 
have considered that the husband had trapped his pregnant wife in the home and that he 
had threatened to kill her and her family); Damron v. Damron, 670 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 
2003) (holding that modification of child custody from ex-wife to ex-husband based on ex-
wife’s homosexual household was clearly erroneous); Hogue v. Hogue, 147 S.W.3d 245 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (restraining order that prohibited husband from exposing child to his 
“gay lifestyle” did not describe the prohibited acts in reasonable detail and was unenforce-
able).  
 158. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8601, 9000 (West 2004); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/2 (2004); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102 (2004); In re Hart, 806 A.2d 1179, 1186-87 (Del. Fam. Ct. 
2001); In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 859-61 (D.C. 1995); In re Petition of K.M., 653 N.E.2d 
888, 893-94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1256-57 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2004); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption of 
Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 538-39 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); In re Adop-
tion of Carolyn B., 774 N.Y.S.2d 227, 228-29 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); In re Adoption of 
R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202-03 (Pa. 2002); In re Adoption of M.J.S., 44 S.W.3d 41 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 2000); State ex rel. D.R.M., 34 P.3d 887, 894 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (dicta). In a re-
cent California case, the court recognized a nonbiological gay mother’s right to a second-
parent adoption even over the wishes of her former partner, where the adoption proceed-
ings had been initiated before the couple’s separation. See Sharon S. v. Superior Ct., 73 
P.3d 554, 574 (Cal. 2003). 
 159. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. 
 160. See id. § 2.03. Parents by estoppel and de facto parents are individuals who, 
though not legal parents under state law, lived with the child for a significant period of 
time and acted in the role of parent for reasons primarily other than financial compensa-
tion, pursuant to an agreement with the legal parent, when a court finds that recognition 
of the individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests. Id.  Although not relevant here, 
some important differences exist between the two categories. Id. Note also that the ALI  
PRINCIPLES specifically prohibits consideration of the sexual orientation of a parent in cus-
tody matters. Id. § 2.12(1)(d). 
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posed them, and several state courts have recognized functional par-
ents as legal parents applying these and other theories.161 
 In 2000, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws revised the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973, governing in 
part the status of children born through donor insemination, to re-
move bias in favor of married couples.162 Although not revised explic-
itly with lesbians in mind, the change was made “in light of . . . the 
constitutional protections of the procreative rights of unmarried as 
well as married women.”163 In sum, the law is moving toward the rec-
ognition of gay and lesbian care practices, as well as the care prac-
tices of individuals who may parent in extended or other less tradi-
tional family arrangements.  
 At the same time, it would be a mistake to conclude that gay men 
and lesbians have achieved full freedom or equality with regard to 
the law of domestic relations. The state continues to exercise signifi-
cant regulatory control over same-sex intimacy and family life. For 
example, despite the adoption of the “nexus” doctrine, courts still 
may deny gay and lesbian parents custody or visitation for other 
seemingly insufficient reasons, suggesting that there is still bias op-
                                                                                                                      
 161. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing former 
lesbian partner of biological mother as a “presumed parent” under the Uniform Parentage 
Act); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675, 678 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing former lesbian partner 
of gestational mother—and the genetic mother of the child—as a natural mother under the 
Uniform Parentage Act, and refusing to apply statute treating a sperm donor as if he is not 
a natural father); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 81, 83 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing 
former lesbian partner of biological mother as a parent pursuant to an estoppel theory); In 
re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 564 (Col. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 2004 WL 2377164 (Col. 
2004); 125 S. Ct. 2551 (2005) (recognizing former domestic partner of adoptive mother as a 
“psychological parent”); In re the Parentage of A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126, 130-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2004) (recognizing former domestic partner of biological mother as a parent by estoppel); 
Jones v. Barlow, Case No. 034907803 (Utah 3d Dist. Ct. 2004) (holding that former lesbian 
partner of biological mother may meet the threshold factors for in loco parentis status) (on 
file with author), appeal docketed, No. 20040932 (Utah Oct. 29, 2004); In re Parentage of 
L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 177 (Wash. 2005) (holding that former lesbian partner of biological 
mother may be a de facto parent); In re Clifford K., 610 S.E.2d 138, 157 (W.Va. 2005) (hold-
ing that former lesbian partner of deceased biological mother had standing to intervene in 
custody proceeding under “exceptional cases” provision). For a comprehensive review of the 
various equitable theories recognized by courts and some state legislatures, see Polikoff, 
Redefining Parenthood, supra note 135, at 483-509 and ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 159, § 
2.03, reporter’s notes, cmts. b-c. 
 162. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2002). Specifically: 
The 2000 UPA further increases anonymity protections [previously afforded 
only to married couples] by removing the . . . marriage requirements, providing 
that “[a] donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted repro-
duction.” Thus, the 2000 UPA makes it easier for women, who are either single 
or partnered with women, to have children without being vulnerable to a do-
nor’s fatherhood claims and also provides donors with increased security from 
being held financially or otherwise responsible for the child. 
Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory 
of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 20 (2003). 
 163. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2002). 
2005]                         TRANSGRESSIVE CAREGIVING 33 
 
erating in custody disputes.164 For example, courts applying the 
nexus test commonly find a gay parent’s “lifestyle” sufficiently harm-
ful to limit custody or visitation, especially if the parent resides with 
an intimate partner.165 And some states still explicitly retain a pre-
sumption against custody by an openly gay or lesbian parent166 or re-
tain it as a factor in the best interest determination.167 Such rules 
and decisions effectively operate as a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in 
the context of custody law.168  
 Although relatively early and widespread acceptance of second-
parent adoption for gays and lesbians is a hallmark of the American 
gay rights movement,169 increasing anxieties over same-sex marriage 
                                                                                                                      
 164. See, e.g., Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996) (denying custody to lesbian 
mother not because she was a lesbian but because did not have a stable lifestyle); Hertzler 
v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 949 (Wyo. 1995) (limiting visitation of mother not because of her 
lesbianism, but because both parents could not resolve their conflict over religious and gay 
values (mother snuggled with children and her female companion in bed, had children 
march with her in a gay and lesbian rights parade, and had children participate in a com-
mitment ceremony with her companion)).   
 165. For example, in 2004, an Idaho court modified a gay father’s previously shared 
custody arrangement even more than his ex-wife had requested, ruling that his children 
could visit him only if he did not reside with his partner. McGriff v. McGriff, 99 P.3d 111, 
120-21 (Idaho 2004). Even though “[s]exual orientation, in and of itself, cannot be the basis 
for awarding or removing custody,” the court justified its affirmance, inter alia, on the ba-
sis of the “[f]ather’s plan to openly reside with his homosexual partner,” which could not be 
minimized in light of the conservative Mormon community in which the family resided, 
and his “unilateral decision to discuss his sexual orientation with one of the children.” Id. 
at 116-19. 
 166. See, e.g., L.A.M. v. B.M., 906 So. 2d 942 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (holding that Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), did nothing to disrupt that state’s presumption against 
child custody for gay parents, and affirming a change of custody from a lesbian mother to a 
heterosexual father pursuant to that presumption). 
 167. For example, in 2005, a Mississippi court transferred custody of two girls from 
their lesbian mother to their heterosexual father. See Davidson v. Coit, 899 So. 2d 904, 
906-07 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). “[T]he substantial change in circumstances was the fact that 
Davidson exposed the children to the sexual nature of her relationships with other 
women,” even though the mother’s sexual orientation was known by the court at the time 
of the original custody determination. Id. at 910. The court also based its decision on the 
fact that Davidson’s partner was the children’s primary caregiver, id. at 911, which it 
found troubling, and the fact that the father regularly attended church with the girls. Id. 
at 911-12. The appellate court affirmed, noting that “the court can consider a homosexual 
lifestyle as a factor relevant to the custody determination of the child, as long as it is not 
the sole factor.” Id. at 911. 
 168. See also In re Z.B.P., 109 S.W.3d 772, 779 (Tex. App. 2003) (upholding change in 
custody from a mother to father, in part, because the mother was living with a “female 
paramour” in a “non-traditional family setting”); Jenkins v. Jenkins, No. 05-98-01849-CV, 
2001 WL 507221, at *6 (Tex. App. May 15, 2001) (holding that wife could take her children 
and move away from husband, in part, because he had disregarded the best interests of the 
children by “introduc[ing] [them] to his new [male] paramour”). For a comprehensive re-
view of cases on this issue, see ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 159, § 2.02, reporter’s notes, 
cmt. f.  
 169. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partners but Not Parents/Recognizing Parents 
but Not Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the United States, 17 N.Y.L. 
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 711 passim (2000) (describing and analyzing the divergent paths taken 
by European countries and America with regard to gay rights, and specifically the progres-
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beginning in the 1990s fueled renewed attention on preventing lesbi-
ans and gay men from adopting. From 1994 to 1999, four states en-
acted prohibitions on second-parent adoption by same-sex couples;170 
four additional states embraced similar prohibitions in the early part 
of this decade.171 For example, in 2002 a Nebraska court denied a pe-
tition by two mothers to have the nonbiological mother adopt their 
son, even though she had helped to raise him from birth, was his 
primary caretaker, and demonstrated “remarkable parenting 
skills.”172 In 2000, the Utah legislature passed a law restricting adop-
tion to married couples and unmarried individuals not cohabiting in 
a sexual relationship.173 Although not formally stated, its purpose 
was widely perceived as the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from 
adoption in a manner that would withstand constitutional attack.174 
In contrast, every state in the country except Florida permits gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual persons to petition individually to adopt chil-
dren,175 evidencing the existence of a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in 
the context of adoption as well as custody. 
 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas176 de-
criminalizing private, consensual sodomy on substantive due process 
grounds has thus far had little impact on state-sponsored discrimina-
tion against gay men and lesbians in the area of parental rights. For 
example, in 2004 gay foster parents Steven Lofton and Roger Croteau 
failed in their constitutional attack of Florida’s statutory ban on 
adoption by gay people. The court upheld the law, even though Lofton 
and Croteau were the only parents of their foster child, Bert, since he 
was an infant.177 Similarly, an Alabama court held in 2004 that Law-
                                                                                                                      
sion from parenting to partnership rights in the United States, and partnership to parent-
ing rights in Europe). 
 170. See In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); In re Adoption of 
Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999); In re Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1998); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994).  Earlier prohibitions in-
cluded Florida and New Hampshire. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (Supp. 2004) (enacted 
1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 170-B:2(XV), 170-F:2 (IV) (2005) (enacted 1986), repealed 
by Act of May 3, 1999, 1999 N.H. Laws 18. 
 171. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (2004); In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 
378 (Neb. 2002); cf. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7502-1.4(A) (2004) (prohibiting the recognition of “an 
adoption by more than one individual of the same sex from any other state or foreign juris-
diction”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1 (2004) (prohibiting adoption by unmarried cohabi-
tants). 
 172. Lambda Legal, In Court, referring to In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 378, 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/cases/record?record=161 (last visited Dec. 2, 
2005). 
 173. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1 (2004). 
 174. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996). 
 175. See Lamba Legal, Overview of State Adoption Laws,  http://www.lambdalegal.org 
/cgi-bin/iowa/news/resources.html?record=399 (last visited Mar. 13, 2005). 
 176. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 177. See Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827 
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005). 
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rence did nothing to disrupt that state’s presumption against child 
custody for gay parents, transferring custody from a lesbian mother 
to a heterosexual father.178  
 Finally, the 1973 version of the Uniform Parentage Act or its 
equivalent favoring married couples with regard to alternative in-
semination remains in force in nearly half the states,179 leaving lesbi-
ans utilizing alternative insemination at risk of paternity claims by 
sperm donors.180 Among the mere ten or so American states formally 
legalizing surrogacy,181 virtually all require the intended parents to 
be a married couple, thereby excluding gay men.182 Surrogacy is 
unlawful, unlawful for compensation, or highly uncertain due to an 
absence of developed legal rules in most other states.183 Even in pro-
gressive states, gay men and lesbians may face uncertainty with re-
gard to court recognition of their contracts aiming to establish famil-
ial rights and obligations.184 And, of course, same-sex marriage is still 
illegal in all but one American state,185 with an enormous backlash  
                                                                                                                      
 178. See L.A.M. v. B.M., 906 So. 2d 942 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004). 
 179. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT refs. & annots, prefatory note (2002) (“As of December, 
2000, UPA (1973) was in effect in 19 states . . . ; in addition, many other states have en-
acted significant portions of it.”). Only Delaware, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming have 
adopted the 2000 version of the Act. Id. 
 180. See, e.g., Tripp v. Hinckley, 736 N.Y.S.2d 506, 506 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that sperm 
donor was entitled to be treated as a parent, rather than a sperm donor limited to terms of 
parties’ written visitation agreement, and that he was not barred by doctrines of waiver or 
estoppel from seeking more frequent visitation); Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (granting sperm donor parental rights even though trial judge had 
characterized petitioner as an “outsider” who was “attacking” mother, her partner, and 
their child’s family and had concluded that a filiation order “would not be in [the child’s] 
best interests”). 
 181.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Art. 8 refs. & annots., cmt. (2002).  
 182. See Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CARE L. 147, 166-72 (2000). 
 183. Id. For a case illuminating the complexities and risks of entering a gestational 
surrogacy contract (even for heterosexual couples) in states with ambiguous or absent legal 
rules, see J.F v. D.B., No. 15061-2003, 2004 WL 1570142 (Pa. Com. Pl. Apr. 2, 2004), in 
which a court refused to enforce a gestational surrogacy contract. 
 184. For example, a California appellate court refused to recognize a formal contract 
entered into by lesbian partners and incorporated into a family court judgment establish-
ing joint parental rights. See, e.g., Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 126 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2004).  The California Supreme Court reversed on the narrow ground that the bio-
logical mother was estopped from attacking the validity of a stipulated judgment that she 
had sought, not reaching the question of the validity of the judgment. See Kristine H. v. 
Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 695 (Cal. 2005). 
 185. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
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developing in the wake of the Massachusetts decision,186 America’s 
2004 “winter of love,”187 and earlier victories.188 
 The protection of children from sexual predation and “abnor-
mal”—that is, gay—sexual development remains an implicit if not 
explicit justification for these legal precedents. For example, gay par-
ents fare much better when seeking to create or formalize parental 
                                                                                                                      
 186. In September 2005, Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly certified a ballot 
question to repeal same-sex marriage in Massachusetts.  See National Briefing in New 
England: Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at A20.  
 Within one week of the Goodridge decision, United States Senator Wayne Allard intro-
duced a federal constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage. Federal Mar-
riage Amendment, S.J. Res. 4026, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).  Similar amendments have been 
proposed each year since 2002.  See Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments 
to The United States Constitution Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 611, 656-57 
(2004). 
 The 2004 election season saw thirteen states newly amend their constitutions to define 
marriage as a union between one man and one woman.  See ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1; 
GA. CONST. art. I, § 4; KY. CONST. § 233A; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (upheld in Forum for 
Equality v. McKeithen, 893 So. 2d 715 (La. 2005)); MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25; MISS. CONST. 
art. XIV, § 263A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; N.D. CONST. art. XI, 
§ 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; UTAH 
CONST. art. I, § 29. 
 In April 2005, Kansas voters approved a constitutional ban. See 2005 Kan. Sess. Laws 
211; Kansas Voters Approve Amendment Banning Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 
2005, at A3.  State constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage have been ap-
proved by the legislatures and are scheduled for statewide vote in five additional states.  
See Sanctity of Marriage Amendment of 2005 Ala. Adv. Legislature. Serv. 35 (LexisNexis); 
2005 S.C. Acts. 45; 2006 S.D. Bal. Meas. 1; 2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts 751; 2005 Tex. Sess. Law 
Serv. 6 (West). 
 Some of these amendments are so sweeping as to potentially deny any sort of legal rec-
ognition of a same-sex relationship.  For example, Utah’s constitutional provision reads: 
“(1) Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman.  (2) No other 
domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same 
or substantially equivalent legal effect.” UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29. 
 187. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. With the exception of Massachusetts, 
swift and successful litigation resulted in the invalidation of most of the marriage licenses 
granted to gay couples in 2004. See Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 
459, 488 (Cal. 2004); Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 102 (Or. 2005). New Paltz’s mayor as well as 
two Unitarian ministers were subject to criminal charges, ultimately dismissed, for per-
forming weddings for same-sex couples. See People v. West, 780 N.Y.S.2d 723 (N.Y. Just. 
Ct. 2004); People v. Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S.2d 899 (2004). New Mexico’s attorney general de-
clared the licenses granted by the Sandoval County clerk “invalid under state law” the 
same day they were issued. See Nieves, supra note 155. 
 188. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (1999); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1998); NEB. 
CONST. art I, § 29 (2000), held unconstitutional by Citizens for Equal Protection v. Brun-
ing, 367 F.Supp.2d 980, 1009 (2005); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21 (2002); Defense of Marriage 
Act of 1996 (DOMA), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738c and 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (defining mar-
riage as a union between a man and a woman for federal purposes and relieving states of 
any obligation to recognize, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a same-sex marriage 
validly entered into in another state); CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (2004) (constituting an ex-
ample of a “mini-DOMA,” of which there are presently approximately forty, defining mar-
riage as a union between a man and woman for state law purposes). These measures were 
triggered by legal challenges in Hawaii and Vermont in the 1990s threatening to make 
same-sex marriage legal in those states. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993); 
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). 
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rights if they are not actively involved in an intimate relationship.189 
Once so involved, protection from discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation becomes far less certain. In such instances, concerns 
about “abnormal” childhood sexual, social, and emotional develop-
ment often overpower the law’s relatively recent commitment to pro-
tecting gays and lesbians from status-based discrimination in family 
matters, and traditional analyses governing similar nongay cases will 
not apply.190 Judges and the state often frame their anxiety regarding 
children in terms of their prerogatives to encourage “optimal” set-
tings for child rearing in heterosexual, two-parent families.191 This 
suggests that gay and lesbian families provide second-class but satis-
factory settings for children. But the persistence of these outcomes 
even in cases where the losing parent has lasting, strong, loving ties 
with the child,192 and sometimes even where competent heterosexual 
parents are nowhere to be found,193 suggests that the more insidious 
and older conception of “homosexuality as an evangelistic cult”194 cre-
ating “a new generation of perverts”195 is at play in many of these de-
cisions.196 
                                                                                                                      
 189. To paraphrase Richard Mohr, courts may give parental rights to gays by “ones,” 
but they remain less likely to give rights to gays by “twos.” See RICHARD D. MOHR, GAY 
IDEAS: OUTING AND OTHER CONTROVERSIES 82 (1992). 
 190. See supra notes 164-68. 
 191. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d at 961 (“The department 
posits three legislative rationales for prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying [includ-
ing] ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing, which the department defines as ‘a two-
parent family with one parent of each sex’ . . . .”).  
 192. See, e.g., supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 193. See, e.g., supra note 177 and accompanying text; Kevin McDermott, The Fight for 
Austin, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 17, 2005, at A1 (reporting the story of five-year-old 
Austin Johnson, whom a trial court judge removed from his lesbian foster mother’s home 
and returned to his grandparents, who had allegedly fractured his skull and leg).  Austin 
Johnson was returned to his foster mother by order of the Supreme Court of Illinois.  See 
In re Austin W., 823 N.E.2d 572, 589 (Ill. 2005). 
 194. JENKINS, supra note 146, at 63.  
 195. Id. 
 196. Indeed, this reasoning was explicit in the Florida Supreme Court’s recent decision 
upholding Florida’s ban on adoption by gays and lesbians: 
The Florida legislature could rationally conclude that homosexuals and hetero-
sexual singles are not “similarly situated in relevant respects.” . . . 
[H]eterosexual singles, even if they never marry, are better positioned than 
homosexual individuals to provide adopted children with education and guid-
ance relative to their sexual development throughout pubescence and adoles-
cence . . . . Although the influence of environmental factors in forming patterns 
of sexual behavior and the importance of heterosexual role models are matters 
of ongoing debate, they ultimately involve empirical disputes not readily ame-
nable to judicial resolution—as well as policy judgments best exercised in the 
legislative arena. For our present purposes, it is sufficient that these considera-
tions provide a reasonably conceivable rationale for Florida to preclude all ho-
mosexuals, but not all heterosexual singles, from adopting. 
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 821-22 (11th Cir. 
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005).  
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 Within the context of this history, the meaning of sexual intimacy, 
parenting, and family life to gay men and lesbians takes on particu-
larly acute political meaning. Sex, reproduction, and parenting—
realms traditionally associated with the private family sphere within 
traditional liberal discourse—may constitute practices of conscious, 
political resistance to subjugating legal (and other) narratives.197 This 
account is in tension with some feminist and queer legal discourse, 
which has framed an individual’s decision to remain partner- or 
child-free as an important form of resistance to the patriarchal fam-
ily.198 But a categorical rejection of the transformative potential of 
care work and parenting does not sufficiently recognize the history of 
state-sponsored discrimination in the realm of gay family life or the 
radical challenge to heterosexual reproduction and family relations 
posed by same-sex intimacy. 
2.   Contemporary Social Science Research 
 The notion that gay care practices may constitute a positive, po-
litical practice of resistance is supported by a significant body of so-
cial science research. To paraphrase anthropologist Kath Weston, 
“gay families we choose,” including families in which children are 
present, represent opportunities for a radical departure from conven-
tional understandings of kinship.199 This understanding of the trans-
formative potential of the gay family is a relatively recent conception, 
at least as a conscious matter. Prior to the 1980s, claiming a gay or 
lesbian identity was understood by many gays, lesbians, and society 
more broadly to be a rejection of the family and a departure from 
kinship.200 This understanding was based on two questionable as-
sumptions: that gay men and lesbians do not have children and that 
they do not form enduring relationships. Weston explains: 
 It is but a short step from positioning lesbians and gay men 
somewhere beyond “the family”—unencumbered by relations of 
kinship, responsibility, or affection—to portraying them as a men-
ace to family and society. A person or group must first be outside 
and other in order to invade, endanger, and threaten.201 
                                                                                                                      
 197. For a fascinating analysis of the active way in which courts discursively construct 
sexual identities through custody cases, see Kimberly Richman, Lovers, Legal Strangers, 
and Parents: Negotiating Parental and Sexual Identity in Family Law, 36 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 285 (2002). 
 198. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 199. See KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE 2 (Richard D. Mohr et al. eds., 1991). 
 200. Id. at 22. 
 201. Id. at 23. See also Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy, 
Interdependence, and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265, 293-94 (2000) 
(“Law tells all people that lesbians and gay men are lone individuals despite the fact that 
they have ‘familistic’ relationships. This story is both false and stigmatizing.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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Beginning roughly in the 1980s, many gay men and lesbians began to 
reject this othering discourse, recognizing that conformity with 
dominant conceptions of the isolated gay person living outside affec-
tive relational ties may represent a form of internalized oppression 
itself. Toward that end, they sought to reconceptualize kinship in-
stead of rejecting it, systematically laying claim to a distinctive type 
of family characterized by Weston as a “family of choice.”202 
 Pursuant to this increasingly conscious redefinition project, lesbi-
ans and gay men have engaged in care and kinship practices that 
contest the centrality of biology and heterosexual intercourse to the 
meaning of family. As Weston’s anthropological research on gay and 
lesbian kinship demonstrates, a gay family of choice may include lov-
ers, ex-lovers, friends, co-parents, and children brought into the fam-
ily through adoption, foster care, prior heterosexual relationships, 
and alternative reproduction.203 Although many middle-class Ameri-
cans define friendship in terms of emotional support, gay families of 
choice are characterized by both affective ties and the sharing of ma-
terial resources:204 
Services exchanged between members of different households who 
considered themselves kin included everything from walking a dog 
to preparing meals, running errands, and fixing cars. Lending 
tools, supplies, videotapes, clothes, books, and almost anything 
else imaginable was commonplace in some relationships. Many 
people had extended loans to gay or straight kin at some time. 
Some had given money to relatives confronted with the high cost of 
medical care in the United States, and a few from working-class 
backgrounds reported contributing to the support of biological or 
adoptive relatives (either their own or a lover’s).205 
 The AIDS epidemic provides a specific example of how chosen 
families are constitutive of gay communities. John-Manuel Andriote, 
in his exploration of how gay culture was reshaped by the disease, 
notes that “[w]hen AIDS first struck gay men, in 1981, activists 
quickly rallied to share information, provide services, raise money, 
prevent new infections, and demand assistance from a skittish fed-
eral government.”206 Support groups and “buddy programs” were or-
ganized throughout the country.207 Volunteer “buddies” helped out 
                                                                                                                      
 202. WESTON, supra note 199, at 26-29, 118-19. It is noteworthy that this developing 
consciousness within the gay community formed around the same time that cultural femi-
nism began to reconceptualize affective family ties as a means of challenging dominant 
gender norms. See GILLIGAN, supra note 24. 
 203. See WESTON, supra note 199, at 3, 31, 111-12. 
 204. Id. at 113. 
 205. Id. at 114. 
 206. See JOHN-MANUEL ANDRIOTE, VICTORY DEFERRED: HOW AIDS CHANGED GAY LIFE 
IN AMERICA 1 (1999). 
 207. Id. at 109. 
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with grocery shopping, cleaning, cooking, and emotional support.208 
This impressive generosity and volunteerism served to sustain many 
men whose families had alienated them and friends had stopped call-
ing.209 The AIDS epidemic also opened new possibilities for imagining 
lesbians and gay men as members of a unified community. In the 
words of one lesbian activist, “People used to say to me all the time, 
‘Why do you work with AIDS and GMHC [Gay Men’s Health Crisis]? 
They wouldn’t work for breast cancer.’ . . . That’s partly true—but 
what did it have to do with the fact that all my friends were dy-
ing?”210 
 Like the tradition of othermothering within the black community, 
gay families of choice are made up of fluid networks that have differ-
ent purposes—including emotional support, economic cooperation, 
socialization, reproduction, consumption, and sexuality—which over-
lap but are not coterminous.211 The willingness of gay men and lesbi-
ans to care for each other in sickness and in health has been central 
to the success of their bids over the last quarter century to recogni-
tion and dignity as a community and as couples. Such families of 
choice also undermine the defining features of the hetero-patriarchal 
family: heterosexual sexual relations, the male breadwinner ideal 
(and the sexual division of family labor on which it rests), and bio-
logical reproduction. 
 The addition of children to gay families of choice does not neces-
sarily diminish their transformative potential. Although “childless-
ness as resistance” is a strong theme within certain strands of femi-
nist and queer theory inside of law,212 researchers of gay and lesbian 
families within the social sciences have demonstrated how lesbian 
parenting may also “represent[] a radical and radicalizing challenge 
to heterosexual norms that govern parenting roles and identities.”213 
 For example, according to sociological studies, lesbian parenting is 
characterized by a more egalitarian division of household labor than 
heterosexual families;214 the detachment of motherhood from its bio-
                                                                                                                      
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 117 (interview by John-Manuel Andriote with Sandi Feinblum, in New York 
City, N.Y. (Apr. 26, 1995)). 
 211. See WESTON, supra note 199, at 108. 
 212. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 213. See Gillian A. Dunne, Opting into Motherhood: Lesbians Blurring the Boundaries 
and Transforming the Meaning of Parenthood and Kinship, 14 GENDER & SOC’Y 11, 11 
(2000). 
 214. Id. at 13; see also PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES  
127-31, 148-51 (1983); MAUREEN SULLIVAN, THE FAMILY OF WOMAN: LESBIAN MOTHERS, 
THEIR CHILDREN, AND THE UNDOING OF GENDER ch. 4 (2004) [hereinafter SULLIVAN, THE 
FAMILY OF WOMAN]; WESTON, supra note 199, at 114; Valory Mitchell, Two Moms: The 
Contribution of the Planned Lesbian Family to the Deconstruction of Gendered Parenting, 7 
J. FEMINIST FAM. THERAPY 47, 55 (1995); Maureen Sullivan, Rozzie and Harriet? Gender 
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logical roots through social motherhood;215 the inclusion of known 
sperm donors in some cases who actively co-parent,216 becoming a 
“junior partner in the parenting team”;217 and the involvement of so-
cial kin in children’s lives.218 As one mother stated, “Our close friends 
really drew in and became aunties. It’s like it created an extended 
sort of family with a lot of our friends. Astrid [our daughter] has 
many aunties.”219 Although there is less empirical information about 
gay fatherhood compared with lesbian motherhood,220 preliminary so-
ciological studies demonstrate that gay fathers are “more astute to 
children’s needs, more nurturant in providing caregiving, and less 
traditional than heterosexual fathers who typically perceive their 
principle parenting function to be that of provider.”221 
 Psychologists have observed the potentially restorative, affirming 
effect of parenthood for gay men and lesbians. Children affirm their 
gay and lesbian parents; this affirmation is important in a society 
plagued by homophobia.222 As Dorothy Allison writes in an autobio-
graphical account of the tensions she experienced within her family 
of origin: 
“Family” is a big word, but very painful. The word “family” hides 
everything—including the people that you are despised by and yet 
hang on to . . . . I hang on to my birth family pretty hard, some-
times over their protests. I’ve also built a completely separate fam-
ily, which includes my lover, . . . our son, Wolf, our Daddy donor, . . 
. Wolf’s godmother, . . . and GrandMary. We’ve constructed a fam-
ily—and it’s a family of people who have become related by dint of 
                                                                                                                      
and Family Patterns of Lesbian Coparents, 10 GENDER & SOC’Y 747, 756 (1996); Renate Re-
imann, Shared Parenting in a Changing World of Work: Lesbian Couples’ Transition to 
Parenthood and Their Division of Labor 219 (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City 
University of New York) (on file with author). 
 215. See SULLIVAN, THE FAMILY OF WOMAN, supra note 214, at ch. 3; Susan E. Dalton 
& Denise D. Bielby, “That’s Our Kind of Constellation”: Lesbian Mothers Negotiate Institu-
tionalized Understandings of Gender within the Family, 14 GENDER & SOC’Y 36, 57 (2000); 
Dunne, supra note 213, at 15. 
 216. See SULLIVAN, THE FAMILY OF WOMAN, supra note 214, at ch. 7; Dunne, supra 
note 213, at 25. 
 217. Dunne, supra note 213, at 25. 
 218. See id. at 14; Fiona Nelson, Lesbian Families: Achieving Motherhood, 10 J. GAY & 
LESBIAN SOC. SERVS. 27, 38-39 (1999). 
 219. Nelson, supra note 218, at 39. 
 220. This lack of research in all likelihood is a product of the lower incidence of gay 
male parenting due to the continued force of traditional gender roles and the significant 
additional hurdles gay men face compared with lesbians in gaining access to alternative 
reproduction. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text. Gay men’s invisibility within 
research on fatherhood may also reflect a preoccupation with the experience of mothers 
within mainstream sociology and a focus on specific forms of gay-centered lifestyles in 
work on sexuality. 
 221. Jerry J. Bigner, Raising Our Sons: Gay Men as Fathers, 10 J. GAY & LESBIAN SOC. 
SERVS. 61, 64 (1999). 
 222. See Deborah F. Glazer, Lesbian Motherhood: Restorative Choice or Developmental 
Imperative?, 4 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY 31, 37 (2001). 
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having a child together. It’s also a family of friends, which is pretty 
much something I discovered in the lesbian and gay community.223 
 To be sure, not all same-sex intimacy and parenting can be under-
stood in terms of conscious, political resistance. Like heterosexual in-
dividuals, gay men and lesbians choose parenthood for complex, even 
retrograde reasons. For example, many contemporary lesbian and 
gay parents procreated within heterosexual marriages that they had 
entered with the hope of escaping the social and emotional conse-
quences of homophobia.224 Lesbian parenthood outside of marriage 
still may represent conformity with repronormative forces imposed 
on all women in our society. It cannot be denied that through moth-
erhood, lesbians make their lives “intelligible” to the larger society.225 
As such, gay parenthood may be a symptom of oppression as much as 
a practice of resistance. 
 At the same time, because gay and lesbian parenthood is more of-
ten than not a product of long deliberation and significant effort, the 
possibility that it will be experienced as a conscious, affirmative po-
litical practice is significant. Gay men and lesbians will never acci-
dentally or casually find themselves “expecting” a child.226 Rather, 
they have to make an affirmative decision, planning every step of the 
way. This process can be rigorous. In addition to the significant legal 
obstacles discussed earlier, prospective gay and lesbian parents often 
must navigate discrimination within the medical and mental health 
communities, which operate as gatekeepers to alternative reproduc-
tion, adoption, and foster care.227 Alternative reproduction and adop-
                                                                                                                      
 223. Dorothy Allison, The Allison/Layman Family, in LOVE MAKES A FAMILY: 
PORTRAITS OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER PARENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES 
17 (Peggie Gillespie ed., 1999). 
 224. See Jerry J. Bigner & R. Brooke Jacobsen, The Value of Children to Gay and Het-
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at 165. 
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tion also entail a significant financial investment.228 Gay men and 
lesbians cannot count on extended families for support when they 
choose to add children to their families.229 Obtaining or maintaining 
custody even of children born in the context of prior heterosexual un-
ions is not assured.230 In sum, because the process of becoming a par-
ent for gay men and lesbians often is so rigorous, greater possibility 
for political consciousness exists than for parenthood that occurs 
within the context of most heterosexual relations. Gay parenthood 
cannot be reduced to a gender-reinscribing performance; sociological 
and anthropological studies of gay families bear this out.231 
 Finally, gay and lesbian care practices may have powerful political 
effects irrespective of individual political consciousness. This is be-
cause identical symbols can carry very different meanings in differ-
ent contexts. By disconnecting family formation and reproduction 
from heterosexual relations, extended gay kin networks and gay par-
enthood reveal heterosexuality and biology to be mere symbols of a 
privileged relationship. To the extent that these symbols still consti-
tute the central organizing principles of family law, then, same-sex 
intimacy serves as a powerful destabilizing force against the law it-
self. As such, care can be deeply transgressive and possess significant 
political potential. This account of care as a positive politics contrasts 
with dominant accounts of care within certain strands of feminist 
and queer legal theory.232 
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3.   Summary: Gay Men and Lesbians’ Care as Politics 
 When considered in the context of the history of state regulation 
and control of the sexuality, reproduction, and family life of gay men 
and lesbians, gay care practices can be understood at least in part as 
acts of political resistance. This conception of caregiving as a form of 
politics is well developed within certain strands of feminist and queer 
thought outside of law. According to these theorists, far from ap-
proximating the heterosexual norm, gay family life (including gay 
parenting) is a testament to the concept of difference.233 Such theo-
rists reject the normalizing tendency of formal equality justifications 
for rights as dangerous, because it obscures the radical alternative 
gay and lesbian lives can model. For these theorists, claiming “differ-
ence” is not an empirical generalization but a political act. In the 
words of sexuality theorist Jean Carabine: 
Often the experience of being Othered acts as a catalyst for indi-
viduals and groups to transform a negative positioning as Other 
into a positive political identity, as with black, woman, gay, lesbian 
and disabled. It is the experience of being Othered rather than dif-
ference per se that results in individuals and groups claiming a 
positive identity out of a negative categorization. In this way, po-
litical identity is constructed out of and through the experience of 
oppression.234 
 This conception of political activism also varies from traditional 
liberal conceptions of politics because it transforms the private 
sphere of the family into a site of political resistance. As we shall see, 
this idea has much to offer to the discourse over care work within 
feminist and queer legal theory.235 Before exploring that proposition, 
the transformative potential of the care practices of heterosexual 
men will be briefly explored. 
C.   Care Practices of Men 
 The idea of testing and proving one’s manhood is one of the defin-
ing experiences in American men’s lives. In his 1996 book, Manhood 
in America, Michael Kimmel argues that the quest for manhood—the 
effort to achieve, to demonstrate, to prove men’s masculinity—has 
been one of the formative and persistent experiences of men’s lives.236 
In the twentieth century, this quest for manhood was defined primar-
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ily through the family wage system. Under this economic and gender 
system, earning was the sole responsibility of husbands and unpaid 
domestic labor was the only proper long-term occupation of women. 
However, even at its height, the family wage system never quite 
worked. Working class men and men of color could not typically sup-
port their families on a single wage.237 Middle-class men were subject 
to the monotony of the modern workplace and alienation from their 
wives and children.238 Today, as an empirical matter, the family wage 
system is almost completely eroded. In an environment of rapid eco-
nomic globalization the real wages of men have stagnated—or in the 
case of the least skilled men, substantially declined.239 Given the 
breakdown of the family wage system, married women’s paid work is 
necessary to provide just the basics for their families.240 
 Despite this breakdown, the family wage ideal remains as a pow-
erful norm that structures the workplace and the division of house-
hold labor within married families. Martin Malin’s work on fathers 
and parental leave demonstrates the substantial workplace resis-
tance facing men who seek paternity leave.241 He explains: 
[E]mployers often do not provide parental leave for men, and when 
they do, they often hide it under generalized classifications causing 
many men to overlook its availability. Second, parental leave for 
men is almost always unpaid; this makes it financially impossible 
for the father, who is saddled with the traditional role of primary 
breadwinner, to use it. Third, fathers who wish to take even un-
paid parental leave are deterred by a high level of workplace hos-
tility.242 
 Although this statement was made over a decade ago, subsequent 
research demonstrates the continued existence of employer hostility 
toward men who seek to deviate from the male breadwinner role. For 
example, a 2001 study of work and family conflict within the legal 
profession found that only about ten to fifteen percent of surveyed 
law firms and Fortune 1000 companies offer the same paid parental 
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leave to men and women.243 Few fathers in law firms feel free to ask 
for more than a few weeks of paternity leave.244 Almost half of the 
male lawyers surveyed thought that it would not be acceptable for 
them to request part-time work, and almost no business or profes-
sional setting finds substantial numbers of men taking advantage of 
family-friendly policies.245 
 The workplace hostility experienced by men who may wish to par-
ticipate in family caregiving is also evidenced by the dramatic fluc-
tuations of men taking care of children during periods of economic re-
cession. For example, census data reveal that the proportion of fa-
thers taking care of preschoolers shifted dramatically upwards dur-
ing the economic recession of 1988 to 1991, and then shifted back 
down to prerecession levels by 1993.246 Similarly, fathers who do not 
work, who work part-time, or who work at night are more likely to 
care for preschool children.247 This data suggest that the male bread-
winner ideal and paid employment constitute a significant barrier to 
male involvement in family care work. 
 Significantly, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Nevada De-
partment of Human Resources v. Hibbs,248 which upheld the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in the face of a constitutional chal-
lenge on federalism grounds, recognized this history of employment 
discrimination against men with regard to family care work. The 
plaintiff, William Hibbs, worked for Nevada’s Department of Human 
Resources.249 He sought leave under the FMLA to care for his ailing 
wife, who was recovering from a car accident, experiencing chronic 
pain and suicidal tendencies, and waiting to undergo neck surgery.250 
Nevada granted his request but allegedly terminated him before he 
exhausted his leave. He lost at the trial level on the ground that his 
FMLA claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment,251 and the 
Ninth Circuit reversed.252 
                                                                                                                      
 243. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, AM. BAR ASS’N, BALANCED LIVES: CHANGING THE 
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 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See LYNNE M. CASPER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MY DADDY TAKES CARE OF ME! 
FATHERS AS CARE PROVIDERS 2-3 (1997). 
 247. Id. at 3. 
 248. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 249. Id. at 724. 
 250. See id. at 725; Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2-3, Hibbs v. Dep’t of Human Re-
sources, 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-16321), 1999 WL 33621168; Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, Remarks to the American Constitution Society, July 23, 2002, available at 
http://www.acslaw.org/events/july23/July23Transcript.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2005). 
 251. Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state is immune from suit under state or fed-
eral law by private parties in federal court absent a valid abrogation of that immunity by 
Congress or an express waiver by the state. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, ,64-
68 (1996). 
 252. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725. 
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 In his decision reinstating Hibbs’ claim and upholding the FMLA, 
Justice Rehnquist found that Congress’s passage of the FMLA was 
justified on the basis of our country’s long history of workplace dis-
crimination against women, but he also emphasized the continued 
relevance of stereotypes against men: “Stereotypes about women’s 
domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a 
lack of domestic responsibilities for men. Because employers contin-
ued to regard the family as the woman’s domain, they often denied 
men similar accommodations or discouraged them from taking 
leave.”253 
 The employment context nicely demonstrates society’s devaluation 
of men’s family care work, but perhaps the most compelling context 
in which to study this phenomenon is in the realm of family law. A 
full discussion of the ways in which men who seek to participate in 
family care work may be disadvantaged in family disputes is beyond 
the scope of this Article. Among other complexities raised by such a 
discussion is the manipulation of equality rhetoric by men’s and fa-
thers’ rights groups to gain substantial material and power advan-
tages over women.254 Critiquing this trend has been one of the major 
projects of feminist legal theory; it cannot be fairly summarized or 
addressed here. However, at the risk of diminishing the seriousness 
and depth of that problem, it is worth briefly discussing the construc-
tion of men as inauthentic family caregivers within the law. 
 As Nancy Dowd’s research on the status of fathers within the law 
persuasively has shown, family law has largely conceived of fathers 
as the owners of children or as family breadwinners, but support for 
the nurturing aspect of fatherhood is very limited.255 For example, the 
law of paternity defines fatherhood “by the status it can confer upon 
children, rather than in terms of responsibilities, obligations, rela-
tionship, or nurturing.”256 For most of the twentieth century, states 
presumed men unfit to serve as custodians of children in the absence 
of a child’s mother.257 Although the law has moved dramatically in 
                                                                                                                      
 253. Id. at 736. There is some suggestion that Justice Rehnquist’s willingness to write 
the majority opinion in Hibbs was due to his own experience with transgressive caregiving. 
See Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 140 
n.272 (2003) (citing Linda Greenhouse, Ideas & Trends: Evolving Opinions; Heartfelt 
Words from the Rehnquist Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, § 4, at 3 (discussing Rehnquist’s 
involvement with the care of his grandchildren)). 
 254. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE 
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 86-89 (1991) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE 
ILLUSION OF EQUALITY]; FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 27, at 201-13; HERBERT 
JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION 136-43 (1988). 
 255. See NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 4 (2000). 
 256. Id. at 5. 
 257. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658-59 (1972) (holding unconstitutional 
state rule presuming unwed fathers unfit to raise their children upon the death of the 
mother); Ex parte Devine, 398 So.2d 686, 687, 696-97 (Ala. 1981) (holding unconstitutional 
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the direction of shared parenting after divorce,258 joint physical cus-
tody is still quite rare and most custody and visitation schemes as-
sume only a limited fathering role.259 After divorce, men are treated 
by the law primarily as economic providers, even though most men 
do not fulfill even that role.260 Historically, the welfare system was 
intended to support the family caregiving of women. Men were pre-
sumed able to work, and the public welfare system for men was de-
signed primarily around their links to the workforce in the form of 
unemployment, income security, and worker’s compensation insur-
ance.261 Although these latter social insurance systems provide sig-
nificantly greater benefits, come with fewer conditions, and are gen-
erally considered “entitlements” in our society, the gendered bifurca-
tion of the public welfare state in America also evidences the disfa-
vored status of caregiving men within the law. 
 In addition to this history, two recent Supreme Court decisions 
further highlight the construction of men as inauthentic family care-
givers within the law. In 2001, the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of a statute giving immigration preference to children 
born abroad to unmarried American mothers, but not to unmarried 
American fathers.262 The plaintiff was a nonmarital father who had 
raised a child abandoned by his foreign mother.263 The Court justified 
the sex-based rule—and the son’s deportation—because “[i]n the case 
of a citizen mother . . . the opportunity for a meaningful relationship 
between citizen parent and child inheres in the very event of birth . . 
. . The same opportunity does not result from the event of birth . . . in 
the case of the unwed father.”264 
 In 2004, the Supreme Court rejected a father’s First Amendment 
challenge to the policy of his daughter’s public elementary school re-
quiring teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.265 Demon-
strating an astonishingly technical reading of custody law, the Court 
held that only the child’s mother had standing to challenge the pol-
icy, even though the parents shared joint legal custody and the father 
                                                                                                                      
state rule presuming the mother to be the proper person to be vested with custody of young 
children after divorce). 
 258. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 159, § 2.08. This provision, which proposes allo-
cating physical custodial responsibility to approximate the time each parent spent per-
forming caretaking functions prior to their separation, will result in a true shared custody 
outcome where parents equally split caretaking tasks before divorce. Id. 
 259. See DOWD, supra note 255, at 132-42. 
 260. Id. at 143. 
 261. See id. at 146; LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND 
THE HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890-1935, at 7 (1994). 
 262. See Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).  
 263. Id. at 53. 
 264. Id. at 65. 
 265. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
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had a strong presence in his daughter’s life,266 because the family 
court order granting custody had stated that the mother “will con-
tinue to make the final decisions . . . if the two parties cannot mutu-
ally agree.”267  
 In sum, when men engage in care work—even men in traditional 
marriages with relatively traditional gender patterns—they resist 
the male breadwinner ideal, the current structure of work, and the 
continued construction of men as inauthentic caregivers within fam-
ily and social welfare law. Thus, again, we see that family caregiving 
may be subversive of patriarchy when manifested in the form of 
transgressive care practices. This transgressive caregiving story is 
contrary to the dominant feminist accounts of care work, which will 
be discussed in Part III. 
III.   FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORIES OF CARE 
 This Part contrasts the positive political potential of care pre-
sented in Part II with the dominant accounts of care work within 
feminist and queer legal theory. As we shall see, many such theorists 
explicitly or implicitly reject family caregiving as a potentially liber-
ating practice for caregivers qua caregivers. For the most part, femi-
nists and queer theorists engaged in the recent legal academic dis-
course over care work instead regard family labor as a source of gen-
der-based oppression or as an undervalued public commodity at best. 
They have set their sights on wage work or sexual liberation as more 
promising sources of emancipation for women. Although some legal 
feminists continue to focus on the problem of devalued family labor, 
they have tended to justify societal support for care work primarily 
on the basis of the oppression it causes for women, the benefits it con-
fers on children and society, or the material needs it creates for care-
givers. In this Part, I will aim to supplement these accounts by em-
phasizing the transgressive caregiving part of the “care” story, recov-
ering care work as a potential source of liberation for women (and 
men).268 
                                                                                                                      
 266. See Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nur-
turing Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 8, on file with author) 
(“[H]e and his daughter’s mother co-parented their daughter, sharing physical custody and 
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 267. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 14 n.6. The plaintiff in Elk Grove, Michael Newdow, is a 
strong advocate for a father’s constitutional rights on the basis of a genetic tie. See Dowd, 
supra note 266, at 3 & n.14. This discussion is not meant to serve as an endorsement of 
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 268.  This section builds on the work of the feminist, race, and queer theorists cited in 
Part II, as well as the work of legal feminists such as Kathryn Abrams, who have high-
lighted the possibilities of human agency under conditions of oppression. See sources cited 
50  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
 
 Divisiveness has defined feminism in general, legal feminism in-
cluded. Some of the principal debates have been about the meaning of 
equality for women and the best way to achieve it, about gender and 
race, and most recently, about the nature of law itself—that is, 
whether it is essentially disciplinary or liberatory.269 The subject of 
family labor has been central to these debates. Indeed, the signifi-
cance of domestic labor for women has defined some of the core con-
troversies among legal feminists in the United States—from tensions 
between joint marital property and women’s suffrage advocates in 
the nineteenth century270 to contemporary feminist debates over the 
Equal Rights Amendment,271 divorce reform,272 and employer-
sponsored maternity leave benefits.273 As we shall see, the latest con-
troversy within legal feminism also centers on care. 
 There are many ways to characterize this age-old legal feminist 
split regarding domestic labor.274 I will describe it as a divide between 
maternalists and nonmaternalists, because it captures the current 
legal feminist controversy over care in the broadest, most bottom-line 
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See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (1999); CRITICAL 
RACE FEMINISM (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997); FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (D. Kelly 
Weisberg ed., 1993); FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: AN ANTI-ESSENTIALIST READER (Nancy E. 
Dowd & Michelle S. Jacobs eds., 2003); FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND 
GENDER (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991). For an interesting history 
of the legal feminist canon, see Linda K. Kerber, Writing Our Own Rare Books, 14 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 429 (2002). 
 270. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning 
Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075-82 (1994) (contrasting the 
antebellum joint marital property movement, which celebrated women’s family role, with 
the postwar women’s suffrage movement, which discounted it). 
 271. See Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argu-
ment for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209, 222-23 (1998) (describing 
the constitutional litigation strategy spearheaded by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU 
Women’s Rights Project as the product of a compromise between the “sameness” and “dif-
ference” feminists in the debates over adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment). 
 272. See, e.g., FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, supra note 254 (arguing that sub-
stantive, not formal, equality should have been the objective of divorce reform); Williams, 
supra note 19. 
 273. Compare Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: 
Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. 513, 517-18 (1983) (concluding that the equal treatment approach is by itself in-
adequate to ensure equal employment opportunity for women), with Wendy W. Williams, 
Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 351-80 (1985) (offering a rationale for the “equal 
treatment” approach for pregnancy and other characteristics unique to one sex). 
 274. Common descriptions of the split include: equal treatment/special treatment, 
sameness/difference, formal equality/substantive equality, liberal (or radical)/cultural, 
tomboy/femme, equal parenting advocates/maternalists, and postmodern/liberal (or cul-
tural). 
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terms.275 Maternalists share a focus on ending the devaluation and 
nonrecognition of family labor within law.276 Nonmaternalists are 
concerned with other aspects of women’s identity such as sexuality 
and wage work. They question the maternalist preoccupation with 
dependency relationships. Such a preoccupation, according to the 
nonmaternalists, essentializes women around caregiving, reinforces 
gender roles, and perpetuates repronormativity and heteronormativ-
ity, two pillars of gender oppression.277 This account admittedly over-
states the divide. Some maternalist work is deeply threatening to the 
heterosexual family278 and some maternalists are focused on work-
place equality.279 Moreover, nonmaternalists are concerned about de-
pendency in certain contexts.280 
 However, my purpose here is not to explore these commonalities, 
which warrant further attention. Rather, I will focus on a more prob-
lematic commonality among critical legal scholars. Whatever their 
other differences (and commonalities), many feminist and queer legal 
theorists explicitly or implicitly reject family care work as a poten-
tially liberating practice for caregivers qua caregivers. This is appar-
ent in the rejection of caregiving as constitutive of women’s identity 
by the nonmaternalists. To anyone familiar with debates within legal 
feminism over women’s reproduction and care work, this is nothing 
new. Perhaps less well explored, however, is the implicit rejection of 
caregiving as a potentially liberatory practice by maternalists. Ma-
ternalists have tended to characterize family care work as a state of 
gender oppression that should be relieved through care-regarding le-
gal doctrines, as a public good or value that should be recognized 
through compensation, or as a needs-producing condition that should 
be supported. These justifications present a powerful challenge to 
gender discrimination and market ideology, which together marginal-
ize family care work and family caregivers. However, they stop short 
of recognizing care as a mechanism of positive social transformation 
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for caregivers themselves. That is, maternalists have rationalized 
their project in a particular way that incorporates—or can be read as 
incorporating—an implicit assumption that care is of little value to 
caregivers themselves. In this section, I review the maternalist and 
nonmaternalist accounts of care work in some detail, demonstrating 
the shared position on care outlined here. Ultimately, I argue for a 
more complex conception of family care work that recognizes it as a 
deeply and complexly subversive practice with potential as a tool of 
political transformation for caregivers. 
A.   Maternalist Conceptions of Care 
 We start with maternalist conceptions of care because the recent 
controversy over care within legal feminism was sparked by this body 
of work, which has grown substantially in both its objects of critique 
and sophistication in the past decade.281 Since that time, there have 
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renewed attention by maternalists to the role of the workplace and state in the devaluation 
of family labor and fueled an increasingly sophisticated maternalist critique of the market 
as a mechanism of social control and inequality. At the same time, rapid political progress 
of the gay rights movement and the coming of age of queer theory revived nonmaternalist 
interest in the family. These developments set the two sides of the divide on an inevitable 
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 The “sameness/difference” controversy within legal feminism in the 1980s was primarily 
a disagreement about political strategy; however, the current controversy is deeper and 
more dangerous, for it involves fundamental questions about the role of law in social 
change and the viability of feminist legal theory as a politically useful construct. In this 
climate, our energies are not best spent saving feminist legal theory from fragmentation, 
defections, or even death; such outcomes are as inevitable as the epistemological develop-
ments that produced legal feminism. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). Rather, legal feminists and other critical scholars should be 
working to develop a rich set of theories connecting legal feminisms together and connect-
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will require critical theorists to live with the inevitable discomfort that comes with change 
and growth. For similar sentiments, see Symposium, Why a Feminist Law Journal?, 12 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 414, 638-72 (2003) (“Why Do We Eat Our Young?” panel). 
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been at least five monographs,282 four law review symposia,283 and a 
number of free-standing articles in law reviews exploring the de-
valuation of care work within law.284 A number of developments fuel 
this expanding critique. Living wages and the social welfare state—
our core societal supports for families—are eroding at an accelerating 
pace in an environment of political conservatism and rapid economic 
globalization. Legal maternalists have been particularly sensitive to 
the role of law in this undoing, notwithstanding the neoliberal regime 
which regards this stage of “late modernity” as natural, progressive, 
and unworthy of intervention.285 This process is occurring during a 
period of unprecedented prosperity in America, rendering the new le-
gal and economic order especially ripe for criticism. 
 The sustained attention to care by some legal feminists may also 
be fueled by the sense that care work as a source of continued ine-
quality for women has escaped the major feminist political action and 
law reform efforts of the past thirty years.286 For example, women  
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 285. I borrow here Austin Sarat and Jonathan Simon’s term for the current stage of 
late capitalism. See Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?: Cultural 
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3, 15 (2001). 
 286. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 26, at 389-429 (detailing the failure of American em-
ployment discrimination and family leave laws to address the profound differences be-
tween men and women with regard to caregiving despite women’s presence in the paid la-
bor force for more than two decades); Williams & Segal, supra note 284, at 110-11, 119-20 
(implicitly characterizing discrimination against caregivers at work as first-generation sex 
discrimination).  
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have achieved significant progress with regard to sexual harass-
ment,287 sex stereotyping,288 and wage parity289 at work. But there 
remains a persistent and significant wage gap290 and labor force “at-
tachment gap”291 between mothers and other workers.292 Our coun-
try’s family leave policies are far behind other industrialized na-
tions.293 Women and children continue to be worse off economically 
after divorce than men.294 Individuals who claim social security as 
dependents of their employed spouses—typically women who have 
marginalized their wage work in order to devote significant time to 
domestic labor—are disadvantaged relative to their partners with re-
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 294. See Kessler, supra note 26, at 357-58. 
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gard to retirement security.295 And support for a robust social welfare 
state in America has all but disappeared.296 
 Much of the recent legal feminist scholarship on caregiving is 
aimed at more fully articulating a critique of free market ideology, 
which has emerged as a dominant theoretical framework in Ameri-
can law. Among the free market concepts critiqued by the maternal-
ists are autonomy, efficiency, utility, rationality, and even the mar-
ket. Martha Fineman has been at the forefront of this effort, exposing 
the way market ideology hides the dependency of privileged indi-
viduals and institutions while constructing caregivers as irresponsi-
ble and dependent. In addition to her own substantial body of schol-
arship in this regard, she conceived and sponsored a series of work-
shops on feminism and economic theory that has worked to signifi-
cantly advance the legal feminist critique of law and economics.297 
 Joan Williams also has been central to this effort, theorizing,298 se-
curing major grant support for,299 and implementing a litigation and 
public education campaign to end employment discrimination against 
caregivers.300 Williams’ efforts have produced impressive results, in-
cluding the following: an array of legal theories giving plaintiffs the 
potential for recovery for discrimination relating to caregiving 
status,301 model human resource policies aimed at avoiding bias 
against family caregivers,302 a program to help law firms recruit and 
retain attorneys by offering meaningful reduced-hours schedules,303 
and collaboration among legal scholars and experts in the fields of 
                                                                                                                      
 295. This results from the following social security rules: A woman must remain mar-
ried for ten years before she has any claim based on her spouse’s social security contribu-
tions. If she divorces before ten years, she receives no social security benefit for her domes-
tic labor. Even if married for greater than ten years, if she divorces, she loses the benefit 
upon remarriage. Also, a wife must choose, when she retires, whether to opt for benefits 
based on her own employment record or on her husband’s, despite the fact that both wage 
work and household work constitute productive labor. See Silbaugh, supra note 284, at 38-
39. 
 296. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 
U.S.C. § 601 (2004) (replacing Aid to Families with Dependent Children, an entitlement 
program, with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, a time-limited, work-focused wel-
fare program).  
 297. Fineman’s efforts culminated in an edited volume presenting this substantial cri-
tique. See FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS (Martha Albertson Fineman & 
Terence Dougherty eds., 2005). 
 298. See Joan C. Williams, Beyond the Glass Ceiling: The Maternal Wall as a Barrier to 
Gender Equality, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 1 (2003); Williams & Segal, supra note 284. 
 299. See ALFRED P. SLOAN FOUNDATION, ANNUAL REPORT, STANDARD OF LIVING AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE PROGRAMS, WORKPLACE, TRUSTEE GRANTS, available at 
http://www.sloan.org/report/2003/workplace.shtml (last visited Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter 
SLOAN ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 300. Id. 
 301. See Williams & Segal, supra note 284, at 123. 
 302. See SLOAN ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 299. 
 303. See Project for Attorney Retention, About PAR, http://www.pardc.org/about (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2005). 
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cognitive psychology and sociology on understanding how discrimina-
tion works.304 
 Maternalist legal feminists have effected their substantial critique 
of neoliberalism and its erasure of care work as a matter of public 
concern primarily through three lines of argument: caregivers should 
be supported and recognized through law because they are victims of 
gender oppression, because they are providing a valuable public ser-
vice, and because they have material needs which flow from their po-
sitions as caregivers that cannot be ignored in a just society. In the 
next three sections, I will explore each of these justifications in de-
tail, exploring their enormous potential as well as their limitations in 
certain regards. 
1.   Care as a Source of Gender Oppression 
 Nonmaternalists, as we shall see, view care work as a form of 
gender oppression, but they do not have a monopoly on this perspec-
tive. Although nonmaternalist liberal and radical feminists are well 
known for their critique of the oppressive and stultifying nature of 
domestic labor,305 this view is largely shared by maternalists, who 
also count liberal and radical legal feminists in their ranks.306 Indeed, 
it can fairly be said that the foundation of maternalist legal feminism 
is a theory of women’s oppression stemming from the gendered divi-
sion of family labor and the law’s role in instantiating it.  
 For example, Joan Williams has developed a theory of women’s 
gender oppression she calls “domesticity.”307 Domesticity is an ideo-
                                                                                                                      
 304. See Symposium, Litigating the Glass Ceiling and the Maternal Wall: Using Stereo-
typing and Cognitive Bias Evidence to Prove Gender Discrimination, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 287, 287-88 (2003). 
 305. See, e.g., BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 19 (1963) (calling the life of 
the 1950s American housewife “the problem that has no name”); CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 191-94 (1989) (asserting that 
family privacy is “a right of men ‘to be let alone’ to oppress women one at a time”).  
 306. See, e.g., ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND 
INSTITUTION 13 (1976) (“[M]otherhood as an institution has ghettoized and degraded fe-
male potentialities.”); Polikoff, Redefining Parenthood, supra note 135, at 560. 
 307. I expect that Williams may disagree with my placement of her in the maternalist 
camp, given that she has explicitly disavowed herself as a maternalist. See Joan Williams, 
“It’s Snowing Down South”: How to Help Mothers and Avoid Recycling the Same-
ness/Difference Debate, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 812, 815 & n.8 (2002) [hereinafter Williams, 
Snowing Down South]. However, our definitions of maternalism differ. Mine includes all 
legal feminists who are devoted to the legal recognition of family labor. Her definition of 
maternalism—the ideology of “women committed to giving traditionally feminine gender 
performances”—more closely corresponds to what is commonly known as cultural femi-
nism. Id. at 815. Because Williams has dedicated a substantial part of her life’s work to 
ending discrimination against women who adopt traditionally male lifestyles as well as 
against women (and men) who conform to feminine gender roles, she is not a maternalist 
according to her own definition. Indeed, she is the author of a seminal critique of cultural 
feminism. See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 802-09 
(1989). Williams is a maternalist, however, according to my broader definition. Her explicit 
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logical system that organizes market work around the life experi-
ences of men and marginalizes family caregivers. She argues that 
domesticity is a form of sex discrimination against women (and men) 
that feminists should work to eliminate through the reorganization of 
market and family work.308 Central to the concept of domesticity is 
the idea that family care work is compulsory and oppressive: “[S]ocial 
forces . . . get encoded as women’s choice to devote themselves to 
caregiving rather than to market work. . . . Many women end up as 
they do not because they, from the beginning, shared an ethic of care. 
Maybe they were just making the best of a bad deal.”309 Williams en-
visions a world in which care work is shared more equally between 
women and men, and in which the workplace is structured around 
the life patterns of people with family responsibilities. 
 Not all maternalist legal feminists focus on the drudgery of care 
work or the unfairness of its compulsory nature for women. For ex-
ample, although noting that women take on primary caretaking roles 
“within the constraints of social conditions, including history and 
tradition,”310 Martha Fineman is less concerned about the assignment 
of caretaking to women than Williams. Her focus is more narrowly on 
the inequities that flow from the assignment (a concern which Wil-
liams shares) and on obtaining support for caretakers in the form of 
state financial support and institutional accommodations: 
Even if someone does “consent” in the sense of taking risks or for-
going opportunities to undertake dependency work, should that let 
society off the hook? Should society tolerate the situation of de-
pendency within the family and the mandated personal sacrifices a 
                                                                                                                      
acceptance of the inevitability of motherhood among women also supports her placement in 
the maternalist camp. 
 I lay out this defense with some trepidation for two reasons. First, like most legal femi-
nist work today, neither Williams nor any of the other scholars I discuss in this Article can 
be placed in the traditional boxes that have been used to describe the various strands of le-
gal feminism. More than ever, feminist legal theory defies neat categorization. The tradi-
tional stages of equality feminism, difference feminism, dominance feminism, antiessen-
tialism, and postmodern feminism were oversimplifications when the terms first emerged, 
and they are almost incoherent now, given that each has made a lasting imprint on legal 
feminism. The result of this cross fertilization is that all legal feminism today is blended, 
with certain ideas or themes from each of these strands appearing together in virtually all 
legal feminist work. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 269, at 71. Second, there is great superfi-
ciality, danger, and power involved in any categorization project. For these reasons, I have 
attempted to keep my categories broad and to avoid the use of tired legal feminist catego-
ries in this Article. Any association of “maternalism” with the narrow category of cultural 
feminism is unintended by this author. With these disclaimers in mind, I forge ahead with 
this analysis. 
 308. See WILLIAMS, supra note 4 (especially chs. 6 & 7). 
 309. Id. at 188-89. Although it is not the core of her theory of domesticity, Williams 
also has acknowledged the positive political potential of care work when performed by less 
privileged women such as women of color and working class women. Id. at 161-68. This Ar-
ticle builds and expands on that insight. 
 310. See FINEMAN, MYTH, supra note 2, at 41. 
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caretaker typically encounters under current societal arrange-
ments? In other words, are some conditions just too oppressive or 
unfair to be imposed by society even if and when an individual 
openly agrees to or chooses them?311 
Other maternalist legal feminists, such as Mary Becker, go as far as 
to suggest that care work may include an element of pleasure.312 
 Although Fineman and Becker are perhaps less focused than Wil-
liams on shifting the actual performance of domestic labor from 
women to men and the market, they also embrace a conception of 
care work as gender oppression as central to their maternalist pro-
jects. In Becker’s words: 
Traditionally, women have been—and women continue to be—
caretakers of dependents, the young, the old, and others unable to 
care for themselves. Women have done this work for no pay, in 
their own families, or for low pay, when caring for dependents in 
other women’s families. . . . Workers with significant caretaking 
responsibilities are at a disadvantage in the wage-labor market, in 
politics, sports, and other “public” areas of human endeavor. . . . 
[U]ntil we place greater value on caretaking and provide support 
for caretakers of dependents, women will continue to be un-
equal.313 
 These examples demonstrate that, contrary to assertions by some 
nonmaternalist legal feminists, few maternalists are crude Gilli-
ganists314 who embrace romanticized conceptions of the gratifications 
of domestic labor or biological explanations of women’s suitability for 
care work.315 To be sure, some maternalist language, given a superfi-
cial reading, may suggest an essentialization of women around moth-
ering. For example, Martha Fineman refers to “mothers” and “chil-
dren” in her discussion of the parent/child dyad as the prototypical 
nurturing unit deserving legal protection. However, Fineman explic-
itly rejects the proposition that only women can or should be moth-
ers, or that only children are the legitimate subjects of care work.316 
                                                                                                                      
 311. See id. at 42. 
 312. See Becker, supra note 2, at 71. 
 313. See Mary Becker, Towards a Progressive Politics and a Progressive Constitution, 
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2007, 2039 (2001). 
 314. Here, I borrow Mary Joe Frug’s term for a politically conservative, reductive read-
ing of Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice. See Mary Joe Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal 
Scholarship: Can We Claim “A Different Voice”?, 15 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 50 (1992). 
Neither I nor Frug attributes “crude Gilliganism” to Carol Gilligan herself. 
 315. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 1 (suggesting that maternalists view motherhood as 
a “biological imperative” and fail to see the fundamental oppression of repronormativity).  
 316.  She explains: 
Mother is a metaphor with power to make the private visible. . . . The 
Mother/Child metaphor represents a specific practice of social and emotional 
responsibility. . . . 
. . . .  
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Rather, like nonmaternalist legal feminists, maternalists conceive 
family care work as a socially constructed, gendered practice that 
serves as a source of inequality for women. Indeed, a conception of 
care work as oppression is foundational to the maternalist project of 
increasing societal support for care work through law and to the 
other conceptions of care they have proposed and developed in recent 
years, which are discussed in the following sections. 
2.   Care as a Subsidy, Public Good, or Public Value 
 Recently, there has been a discernable shift in the rhetoric of legal 
maternalism from discrimination theory to the economic language of 
public goods and subsidy. Given the centrality of economic thinking 
to the destruction of progressive social policies supporting depend-
ency, this move may be a matter of strategy.317 
 Fineman has employed the language of subsidy to expose the 
myths of individual independence, autonomy, and self sufficiency as-
sumed by market ideology. According to Fineman, society and all its 
public institutions are dependent on the uncompensated and unrec-
ognized dependency work assigned to caretakers within the private 
family: 
 In complex modern societies no one is self-sufficient, either eco-
nomically or socially. Whether the subsidies we receive are finan-
cial (such as governmental transfer programs or favorable tax pol-
icy) or nonmonetary (such as the uncompensated labor of others in 
caring for us and our needs), we all live subsidized lives. 
 . . .  Those who adhere to the myths of autonomy and independ-
ence must recognize that the uncompensated labor of caretakers is 
an unrecognized subsidy, not only to the individuals who directly 
receive it but, more significantly, to the entire society.318 
 Joan Williams has similarly employed the subsidy concept to cri-
tique autonomy as the organizing principle of the American work-
place. According to Williams, the American “ideal worker” norm can 
exist only with the benefit of a “flow of household work from 
                                                                                                                      
. . . [M]en can and should be Mothers. . . . [T]he Child in my dyad stands for all 
forms of inevitable dependency—the dependency of the ill, the elderly, the dis-
abled, as well as actual children. 
FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 27, at 234-35. 
 317. Perhaps it is also due to co-optation, a possibility legal feminists have begun to 
explore. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Gender and Law: Feminist Legal Theory’s 
Role in New Legal Realism, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 405 (discussing legal feminism’s role in de-
privileging economics over the rest of the social sciences within mainstream legal scholar-
ship). 
 318. See FINEMAN, MYTH, supra note 2, at 50; see also Martha Albertson Fineman, The 
Inevitability of Dependency and the Politics of Subsidy, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 89, 91-93 
(1998). 
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women.”319 These analyses suggest that the family is subsidizing the 
workplace and society.  
 Maternalists also have employed the idea of care as a “public 
good” in their arguments for increased legal and societal recognition 
for care work, an economic concept related to subsidy. A public good 
is one that is nonrivalrous (meaning that once it has been produced 
everyone can benefit from it) and non-excludable (meaning that once 
it has been created it is impossible to prevent nonpaying individuals 
from gaining access to it).320 Martha Fineman argues that the family 
is crucial to the reproduction of important public goods such as chil-
dren, workers, consumers, and taxpayers:321 
The mandate that the state (collective society) respond to depend-
ency . . . is not a matter of altruism or empathy . . . , but is primary 
and essential because such a response is fundamentally society 
preserving. If infants or ill persons are not cared for, nurtured, 
nourished, and, perhaps, loved they will perish—we could say that 
they, therefore, owe an individual debt to their caretakers. But, it 
should also be apparent that without this type of caretaking in the 
aggregate there could be no society.322 
Mary Becker is also a proponent of the “children as public goods” the-
ory,323 which she traces to feminist economists Paula England and 
Nancy Folbre.324 
 Drawing on political theory, Linda McClain makes a similar ar-
gument in her conceptualization of care work as constitutive of im-
portant public values, including caring, democracy, community, and 
civic participation.325 She argues that the government should provide 
support for care because it is part of its responsibility to foster indi-
                                                                                                                      
 319. See Joan Williams, Toward a Reconstructive Feminism: Reconstructing the Rela-
tionship of Market Work and Family Work, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 89, 95-96 (1998). Williams 
has used this notion to challenge both the androcentric structure of work and divorce laws 
that classify the primary wage earner’s increased future earning capacity post-divorce as 
separate property. See Williams, supra note 19.  
 320. See Paul M. Johnson, Auburn University, A Glossary of Political Economy Terms, 
at http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss (last visited Dec. 2, 2005). 
 321. Fineman, supra note 3, at 1410.  
 322. Id. at 1410 n.17. The classic definition of a public good is one that would not be 
produced by the private market absent government funding, making the analogy inapt. See 
Johnson, supra note 320. However, economists recognize that at least a partial provision of 
public goods often occurs when there is a group of persons who feel they stand to benefit 
personally from a particular public good to such an unusually large degree that it is 
worthwhile for them to go ahead and just pay for the whole thing while ignoring the many 
other small-time free riders as irrelevant. Id. 
 323. See Becker, supra note 2, at 62-63 (“Children are a ‘public good,’ that is, a benefit 
to the general society like a good defense system or good roads.”). 
 324. See Nancy Folbre, Children as Public Goods, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 86, 86 (1994) 
(“[A]s children become increasingly public goods, parenting becomes an increasingly public 
service.”). 
 325. See McClain, supra note 3, passim. For an eloquent account of this argument out-
side of law, see FOLBRE, supra note 282, at 22-80. 
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viduals’ capacities for self-government. She views families as “seed-
beds of civic virtue,” which, “in a good society, serve as places or 
sources of growth or development of capacities and virtues important 
to being good citizens and good people.”326 The political theories of 
liberalism and civic republicanism McClain draws upon are con-
cerned with government’s role in fostering capacities for good citizen-
ship generally. McClain’s focus is on one aspect of the spectrum of 
government interest in this area: “nurturing children and ensuring 
their moral development and education in order to prepare them to 
take their place in the wider culture, as responsible, self-governing 
persons.”327 In other words, it is the job of government to help parents 
in their responsibility of raising upstanding, productive citizens.328 
 Finally, although not explicitly invoking the language of public 
goods, Joan Williams has at times come close to this conception. She 
suggests that litigation against employers who discriminate against 
family caregivers may be won by emphasizing the importance and 
value of children in our society. In her words, “These cases can, and 
should, be framed around family values. There is a very widespread 
and uncontroversial sense [among judges and juries] that children 
need and deserve time with their parents. That’s one of the things 
that give these cases ‘legs.’ ”329 
 All of these conceptions of care—as a subsidy, public good, or pub-
lic value—are aimed at reconstructing care as a public responsibility, 
or at least at shifting part of that responsibility to public institutions 
such as employers and the state. As McClain states in discussing 
welfare reform, “The definition of personal responsibility that in-
formed the passage of PRWORA [the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996] reflected an impover-
ished and unsupportable conception of the proper relationship be-
tween parental and public responsibility for the support and well-
being of children.”330 Martha Fineman embraces the same goal: “I am 
arguing for the assertion of collective or public responsibility for de-
pendency—a status or condition that historically has been deemed 
appropriately assigned to the private sphere.”331 
 3.   Care as a Source of Legitimate Needs 
 A final conception of care work promoted by legal maternalists 
centers on the legitimate needs of caregivers and those who depend 
                                                                                                                      
 326. See McClain, supra note 3, at 1690.  
 327. Id. at 1683. 
 328. A comprehensive exposition of McClain’s theory of care will soon be available. 
MCCLAIN, supra note 282, at chs. 2-3. 
 329. See Williams, supra note 298, at 11. 
 330. See McClain, supra note 3, at 1675. 
 331. See FINEMAN, MYTH, supra note 2, at xv. 
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on them. Building on the concept of needs, Martha Fineman has de-
veloped a comprehensive theory of dependency relationships within 
families and between families and other societal institutions. Fine-
man’s theory is comprised of three interrelated points. First, depend-
ency is a natural part of human existence.332 All humans are depend-
ent for at least some part of their lives, for example, when they are 
children, when they age, or when they are sick.333 She labels this type 
of dependency biological or “inevitable dependency.”334 Second, 
“caretakers of inevitable dependents are themselves dependent on 
economic and institutional resources in order to provide that care.”335 
She calls this type of dependency “derivative dependency.”336 Fine-
man questions how it is that only some members of society are as-
signed the status of derivative dependent and asks us to consider 
“the conditions under which caretakers should be expected by the so-
ciety to undertake responsibility for inevitable dependency.”337 Be-
cause derivative dependency negatively impacts participation in the 
paid labor force, caregivers need both monetary and material re-
sources.338 Finally, linking this theory of derivative dependency with 
her work on subsidy discussed previously, she argues that the de-
pendency work traditionally relegated to derivative dependents 
within the private family is unfairly subsidizing society and all its in-
stitutions. She calls for a public response in the form of a robust so-
cial welfare state. 
 Fineman is not alone among legal maternalists who have ap-
pealed to traditional liberal conceptions of human needs and justice 
in fashioning her arguments. Mary Becker also has taken this ap-
proach. Drawing on international human rights literature and the 
work of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum in particular,339 Becker 
argues that a central goal of government should be to develop citi-
zens’ autonomy, capabilities, and connections with others.340 Poverty 
interferes with these basic human needs (and implicitly, rights) and 
highly correlates with being a woman and serving as a caretaker of 
children.341 She offers some rather compelling statistics: 
                                                                                                                      
 332. See Fineman, supra note 318, at 92-93. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. at 92. 
 336. Id.  
 337. See Jeffrey Evans Stake et al., Roundtable: Opportunities for and Limitations of 
Private Ordering in Family Law, 73 IND. L.J. 535, 542 (1998) (Martha Fineman presenta-
tion).  
 338. See FINEMAN, MYTH, supra note 2, at 36. 
 339. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 39-47 (1999); Amartya Sen, 
Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen 
eds., 1993). 
 340. See Becker, supra note 2, at 97-105. 
 341. Id. 
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[C]hildren are more likely to be poor in the United States than in 
other countries with similar economies, and the poverty rate of 
women relative to that of men is higher in the United States than 
in other similar countries. 
 . . . In the United States 38% more women than men are poor, 
yielding a poverty ratio of 1.38 (women to men). . . . [W]omen are 
less likely than men to be poor in Sweden (where only 73 women 
are poor for every 100 men). Of the industrialized nations . . . , 
with the exception of Australia, all have considerably better pov-
erty ratios for women.342 
 Becker’s analysis suggests that the United States is violating the 
human rights of children and their caregivers by not meeting their 
basic human needs. In an appeal to nonmaternalist legal feminists, 
she urges, “If, as feminists, we want to improve the situation of real 
women living in the real world, and women who often live in poverty 
with real children, we must support the care movement.”343 
 4.   Summary 
 As the previous three sections demonstrate, maternalist legal 
feminists use distinct vocabularies, envision different policy solutions 
to society’s devaluation of domestic labor, and emphasize different 
feminist traditions in their theories. Some maternalists are focused 
on restructuring the workplace; others on a more generous social wel-
fare state. Maternalist theories of care as a subsidy or public good 
challenge the idea that caregivers “owe” something in return for pub-
lic support. In contrast, Linda McClain’s theory of care as a public 
value tolerates conditions on government support for care, such as 
requiring recipients of government welfare benefits to work for wages 
outside the home. Such conditions are acceptable to her so long as 
family caretakers receive basic or “primary” goods, such as access to 
“good jobs” and safe, affordable childcare.344 Her project is “to make 
more explicit the relationship between resources and responsibil-
ity.”345 In contrast, Fineman and Williams seek to shift the rhetoric of 
responsibility more fully from the family to other societal institu-
tions. To illustrate another point of departure, some maternalists see 
men as a potential solution to the burdens of care work on women. 
For example, McClain believes the “responsible fatherhood” move-
ment, which aims to increase the incidence of marriage among wel-
fare recipients, “may encourage incremental movement away from 
the traditional male breadwinner/female caregiver model.”346 Wil-
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 343. Id. at 110. 
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 345. Id. at 1680.  
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liams’ strategy centers on employment discrimination and divorce 
laws that promote “equal parenting” by women and men.347 In con-
trast, maternalists such as Fineman and Becker seek solutions that 
are less likely to involve tying women to men.348 They wish to disrupt 
traditional family norms radically. Finally, while each of these theo-
rists draws on strands of cultural, liberal, radical, and postmodern 
legal feminism in her work, each adopts a different emphasis. 
 Despite these myriad differences, the theorists in this section 
share important assumptions and goals. Each assumes the universal 
nature of dependency and the inevitability of motherhood for women. 
As Joan Williams puts it, “American feminists have little choice but 
to take traditionally feminine gender performances as a given, for a 
simple reason: The traditions of femininity have proven remarkably 
persistent. . . . [E]ighty-five percent of women become mothers.”349 
Mary Becker concurs, “I believe that the point of feminism is to im-
prove the quality of women’s lives as lived in the real world in con-
junction with improving the lives of other vulnerable people . . . . In 
the real world, most women are mothers.”350 Each of these theorists 
also shares the goal of increased societal support for family caregiv-
ers. Because of this shared belief in the inevitability of motherhood 
and shared focus on increasing societal support for caregiving work, I 
suggest that this group of legal feminists can fairly be categorized as 
maternalists. 
B.   Nonmaternalist Conceptions of Care 
 Legal maternalism has provoked a number of critical reactions by 
a group of legal feminists I will call nonmaternalists. Nonmaternalist 
legal feminists, like maternalist legal feminists, are a diverse group 
of scholars whose members employ distinct vocabularies, envision 
different policy solutions to women’s inequality, and emphasize vari-
ous feminist traditions in their theories. What they do share is a re-
jection of the inevitability of motherhood for women and a rejection of 
maternalists’ central focus on caretakers and caretaking labor. Non-
maternalists have set their sights on other aspects of women’s iden-
tity such as sexual liberation or wage work as more promising 
sources of emancipation for women. Central to the nonmaternalist 
critique of legal maternalism is the charge—reminiscent of the 1980s 
                                                                                                                      
 347. See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 232-41. 
 348. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Fatherhood, Feminism and Family Law, 32 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2001) (“Within the family, powerful economic, cultural and 
social pressures continue to channel behavior into traditional, not egalitarian modes.”); 
Mary Becker, Caring for Children and Caretakers, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1495, 1512 (“I 
have been skeptical of the likelihood of men actually engaging in equal parenting . . . .”). 
 349. Williams, Snowing Down South, supra note 307, at 828. 
 350. See Becker, supra note 2, at 103. 
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critique of cultural feminism—that maternalism essentializes women 
around gender roles. Some nonmaternalists also question maternal-
ists’ faith in public solutions to the problem of devalued family labor, 
which they believe represents a naïve view of the state as a liberatory 
force. The next two sections will explore each of these critiques in 
more detail. 
1.   The Charge of Essentialism 
 Nonmaternalists charge maternalists with perpetuating an essen-
tialist conception of women’s identity. This critique is aimed both at 
the narrow definition of valuable care work implicit in much mater-
nalist work and at maternalists’ inattention to life endeavors other 
than care work. 
 As to the first concern, Mary Anne Case suggests that many ma-
ternalists are inattentive to the circumstances of childless women 
and women with family commitments that do not revolve around 
children:  
[P]art of what needs to be questioned . . . may be the traditional 
and limited way care obligations and family relationships have 
been defined [by legal maternalists]. . . . [T]he parents of young 
children are not the only ones with family responsibilities. I am 
the legal guardian of a mentally incapacitated mother, but no part 
of the out-of-pocket expenses of caring for my mother . . . is covered 
in anything comparable to the way that . . . my current employer 
covers certain out-of-pocket expenses associated with childrear-
ing.351 
 Case reviews a laundry list of valuable employment benefits that 
parents receive in some workplaces that are unavailable to nonpar-
ents—including larger university-owned housing units, higher mov-
ing budgets, tuition breaks for the education of dependents, higher 
salaries (if male), more valuable health care benefits, paid leave, ad-
justments to work schedules, “protected absenteeism,” baby showers, 
and even the famously unattainable “free lunch”—as well as general 
societal benefits received by parents such as tax deductions and pri-
ority parking in shopping malls.352 This analysis suggests that the 
workplace and society already are unfairly subsidizing certain pre-
ferred families with dependents.  
 Case also raises the concern that legally mandated employment 
benefits for employees with children, which some maternalists have 
                                                                                                                      
 351. See Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About 
Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1753, 1766-67 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
 352. Id. 
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sought, will cause childless women workers to suffer increased dis-
crimination and workload burdens:353  
 [T]he practical effect of localizing benefits [for children and 
their parents] at the level of the employer may be to effect some-
thing like a taking, not so much from the employer, as principally 
from one group of female employees (childless women who will re-
main childless), for the benefit predominantly of another group of 
male employees (those with wives and children).354  
 Although Case notes that many of her concerns would be ad-
dressed if workplace benefits were available regardless of parental 
status, her critique of legal maternalism is more fundamental: “The 
difficulty I have experienced goes beyond privileging certain kinds of 
family over others, and more broadly extends to a privileging of fam-
ily matters over an employee’s other life concerns.”355 Here we find 
the core of the nonmaternalist critique of legal maternalism: Legal 
maternalists, in their focus on women with children and the family 
more generally, diminish other important aspects of women’s lives. 
 Katherine Franke takes up this point in an essay challenging le-
gal feminists for insufficiently theorizing sexuality as a positive force 
in women’s lives.356 According to Franke, legal maternalists are un-
duly focused on dependency and reproduction to the exclusion of 
women’s sexuality. Similarly, feminists focused on the problems of 
sexual violence are inattentive to the pleasure producing aspects of 
women’s sexuality. She asks: 
Why do legal feminists frame questions of sexuality more narrowly 
than our colleagues in other fields? Is there something intrinsic to 
a legal approach to sexuality that deprives us of the tools, author-
ity, or expertise to address desire head on? Can law protect pleas-
ure? Should it? Or have legal feminists implicitly made the (I be-
lieve mistaken) strategic judgment that feminist legal theory can-
                                                                                                                      
 353. Id. at 1758-59. This argument is not novel; it is a classic law and economics argu-
ment against regulating discrimination in the workplace. See GARY S. BECKER, THE 
ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 5-10, 65-81 (1957); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN 
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 340-49 (1992); Chris-
tine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 passim (2000); Richard A. Pos-
ner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191, 195-98. For a careful refutation of 
the law and economics case against workplace regulation, see PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING 
THE WORKPLACE 225-311 (1990).  
 354. Case, supra note 351, at 1758 (footnote omitted). It should be noted that many re-
forms supported by maternalists, such as state-funded subsidies or insurance schemes for 
family care work, may avoid the problems of statistical discrimination Case fears. See, e.g., 
Kessler, supra note 26, at 463-64 (discussing a modified unemployment insurance scheme 
as a possible source of wage-replacement for family leave).  
 355. Case, supra note 351, at 1767. 
 356. See Franke, supra note 1. 
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not explore sexuality positively until danger and dependency are 
first eliminated?357 
 Franke points out the naturalist error committed by legal mater-
nalists who accept the inevitability of motherhood for women. Noting 
that virtually all women are mothers, she questions why feminists 
have not sought to interrogate this repronormativity. According to 
Franke, legal feminists have “[left] to queer theorists the job of pro-
viding an affirmative theory of sex,” one that sees sex as more than a 
means to reproduction or a source of violence and harm.358 Her goal is 
“a set of legal analyses, frames, and supports that erect the enabling 
conditions for sexual pleasure.”359 
 Vicki Schultz makes a similar assertion with regard to the signifi-
cance of paid work for women. In an essay that can be seen as a com-
panion piece to Franke’s, she argues that legal maternalists have 
failed to take women seriously as wage workers.360 Paid work, accord-
ing to Schultz, is the cornerstone of equal citizenship: 
                                                                                                                      
 357. Id. at 182-83. 
 358. Id. at 207. 
 359. Id. at 208. Franke’s critique of legal maternalism does not end with the suggestion 
that legal feminism needs to dedicate more attention to developing a positive theory of 
women’s sexuality—a worthy project. In the name of questioning repronormativity for 
women, and citing Marx for authority, see id. at 188-89, Franke also defends the neoliberal 
regime which many legal maternalists seek to undermine. Toward this end, Franke chal-
lenges the dichotomy implicit in legal maternalism between selfish, individualistic, eco-
nomic consumption and the generous, collective, and public social reproduction that alleg-
edly results from mothering. Private market transactions such as purchasing a Porsche or 
using a gay-friendly rainbow MasterCard, according to Franke, also reproduce society, and 
parenting is often as much about consumption as it is about social reproduction. Regarding 
the latter point, Franke states: 
What also strikes me as worthy of examination is the degree to which parent-
ing is described as productive social activity while, in many regards, parenting 
has become as much or more about consumption than production. Sylvia Ann 
Hewlett, the founder of the National Parenting Association, mused in a recent 
op-ed piece in the New York Times about how the public fails to recognize the 
financial sacrifices that mothers make to raise children. What with “therapy, 
summer camp, computer equipment and so on,” kids are just darn expensive, 
she argued. The “and so on” explicitly includes a “three-bedroom home” in her 
calculus, but surely implicitly entails Pokémon accessories, My Little Pony 
dolls, Barbies, fancy sneakers, and other expensive articles of consumption that 
are aggressively marketed to children these days. While I don’t think that chil-
dren of any economic class should be deprived of the toys and other items that 
bring joy into their lives, I am concerned about the bourgeois framing of an is-
sue that gives the larger public the tab for the marketing-induced “needs” of 
children. And all in the name of “society-preserving work.” 
Id. at 192 (footnotes omitted). Franke’s larger points regarding the disciplinary nature of 
the state and the absence of sufficient feminist theorizing on sexual liberation are impor-
tant, although I fear they will not be heard by legal maternalists given her insensitivity to 
the role of class in gender and race subordination in this, her latest intervention. For a 
more developed version of this concern, see McCluskey, supra note 137, at 320-27. 
 360. See Schultz, supra note 1. 
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 In my view, a robust conception of equality can be best achieved 
through paid work, rather than despite it. Work is a site of deep 
self-formation that offers rich opportunities for human flourishing 
(or devastation). To a large extent, it is through our work . . . that 
we develop into the “men” and “women” we see ourselves and oth-
ers see us as being. 
 . . . Our historical conception of citizenship, our sense of commu-
nity, and our sense that we are of value to the world all depend 
importantly on the work we do for a living and how it is organized 
and understood by the larger society. In everyday language, we are 
what we do for a living.361 
 From this proposition, Schultz questions feminist “family-based” 
strategies to value women’s domestic labor through divorce reform 
and welfare laws.362 Specifically, she asserts that legal maternalist 
proposals to give homemaking wives a claim at divorce on property 
which would otherwise be considered their husbands’ (for example, 
husbands’ increased future earning capacity) and proposals to in-
crease state welfare payments to women encourage women to invest 
in homemaking and thereby “reproduce the very gender-based pat-
terns of labor that create women’s disadvantage.”363 Schultz would 
rather see legal reforms that encourage the commodification of 
housework and that make fulfilling, well-paying, full-time wage work 
available to all men and women.364 Explicit in her analysis is the as-
sertion that family care work is a less promising route to equal citi-
zenship than wage work. 
2.   The Dangers of State Support for Care 
 A second critique of legal maternalism concerns maternalists’ af-
finity for public, state-based solutions to the problem of devalued 
family labor. According to this critique, maternalists’ efforts to justify 
employer and state support for dependency based on the valuable 
role of the family in social reproduction carries serious risks of gov-
ernment intrusion into the family, risks that are more likely to be 
borne by nontraditional families. Katherine Franke, who has dedi-
cated a substantial portion of her scholarship to the disciplining na-
ture of the state,365 is among the leaders of this critique. She warns of 
                                                                                                                      
 361. Id. at 1883-84. 
 362. Id. at 1899-1919. 
 363. Id. at 1900; see also Michael Selmi & Naomi Cahn, Caretaking and the Contradic-
tions of Contemporary Policy, 55 ME. L. REV. 289, 290 (2003) (asserting that proposals 
aimed at valuing domestic labor reify women’s traditional role in the home and negatively 
affect their quest for greater workplace equality). 
 364. Id. at 1900, 1928. 
 365. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regula-
tion of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 253-55 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter Franke, Becoming a Citizen]; Franke, Domesticated Liberty, supra note 38, at 1401-03. 
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the mixed blessing of state involvement for emancipatory move-
ments, citing the devastating social and economic consequences for 
African Americans of Reconstruction-era state efforts to “civilize” 
emancipated slaves by disciplining their familial lives to conform to 
the gendered rules of marriage.366 
3.   Summary 
 As the previous two sections demonstrate, like the legal maternal-
ists, nonmaternalists use distinct vocabularies, advocate a wide array 
of law reforms, and emphasize different feminist traditions in their 
theories. Some nonmaternalists are focused on workplace equality;367 
others more broadly on the regulation of sex, gender, and sexuality in 
a variety of contexts.368 Some nonmaternalists are deeply cynical 
about the role of the state in women’s liberation; others are less trou-
bled about the state as a source of oppression. For example, Franke 
suggests that legal feminists have insufficiently developed a robust 
critique of the state,369 while Schultz sees a liberal rights model as a 
promising route to women’s freedom.370 Similarly, like the legal ma-
ternalists, nonmaternalists take different positions on the role of men 
in women’s liberation. While some nonmaternalists are focused pri-
marily on empowering women outside of heterosexual relation-
ships,371 others seek “gender integration.”372 Finally, legal nonmater-
nalists emphasize different feminist traditions in their analyses, 
ranging from liberalism to postmodernism. Despite these differences, 
I suggest that this group fairly can be categorized as nonmaternalists 
in that they all resist the construction of women’s identity around 
their caregiving functions, particularly to the extent that care is de-
                                                                                                                      
 366. See Katherine M. Franke, Taking Care, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1541, 1550-51 (2001) 
(citing laws that, inter alia, permitted or required local officials to remove children from 
the homes of African-American families when their parents did not have the means to sup-
port them and laws that required freed men to be under a signed labor contract at all times 
or risk being prosecuted for vagrancy). 
 367. See Schultz, supra note 1. 
 368. See Case, supra note 280, passim (marriage); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating 
Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 13 (1995) (employment); Mary Anne Case, Two Cheers for 
Cheerleading: The Noisy Integration of VMI and the Quiet Success of Virginia Women in 
Leadership, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 347, 349-50 (single-sex college education); Franke, Be-
coming a Citizen, supra note 365 (marriage); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of 
Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 
(1995) (employment); Franke, Domesticated Liberty, supra note 38 (sex). 
 369. See Franke, supra note 366, at 1556.  
 370. See Schultz, supra note 1 (advocating law reforms in the tradition of the civil 
rights, labor rights, and women’s rights movements that will achieve a right to meaningful 
work that pays). 
 371. See Franke, supra note 1, at 183 (challenging, inter alia, compulsory heterosexual-
ity for women).  
 372. See Case, supra note 351, at 1756; Schultz, supra note 1, at 1937. 
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fined as raising children, and they all reject care work as a signifi-
cant source of liberation. 
 In essence, legal nonmaternalism is a powerful internal feminist 
critique comprised of a cluster of claims about legal maternalism, 
each revealing a separate type of essentialist error.373 First, mater-
nalists are said to embrace the essentialist error of false universalism 
by placing family-identified women with children at the center of 
their theories, thereby erasing childless women, women with care re-
sponsibilities other than children, and women committed to life en-
deavors outside the family. Second, maternalists commit the essen-
tialist error of naturalizing reproduction by accepting the inevitabil-
ity of motherhood for women—what Katherine Franke terms “repro-
normativity.” Also implicit in the latter critique is that maternalism 
naturalizes heterosexuality for women. Third, legal maternalists 
commit the essentialist error of “gender imperialism” by proposing 
state-based solutions to the problem of devalued family labor, which 
are inattentive to the ways in which race, class  and sexual orienta-
tion combine with gender to subordinate women. 
IV.   A SHARED POSITION:                                                                            
CARE IS NOT A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF LIBERATION 
 The nonmaternalist account of legal maternalism suggests a large 
gap between the two camps. I think this is wrong for two reasons. 
First, legal maternalism is not the crude form of cultural feminism 
that the nonmaternalists have made it out to be. As this section will 
demonstrate, given a fair reading, legal maternalism is far more con-
sistent with legal nonmaternalism than the nonmaternalist account 
suggests. Second, and perhaps less obvious, legal maternalists also 
view care as an oppressive practice that women should be cautious to 
define themselves around. Although maternalism does not explicitly 
adopt this position, it is apparent, however subtle, in maternalists’ 
reliance on antidiscrimination-, child-, or needs-focused justifications 
for the legal recognition of care work—all justifications that stop 
short of acknowledging the potentially positive meaning of the prac-
tice of care to individual caregivers. Thus, we see that despite their 
fundamental disagreements, both sides of the maternal-
ist/nonmaternalist divide demonstrate an explicit or implicit discom-
fort with viewing care as a practice with liberatory potential. The fol-
lowing two sections will outline this shared position and explore the 
possible reasons for it. Ultimately, I will argue that my interven-
tion—adding a conception of care as a form of politics to this debate—
                                                                                                                      
 373. For this analysis, I am indebted to Angela Harris, who has helpfully disaggre-
gated the various types of gender essentialism. See BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 293, at 
xxxvii, 1193-95. 
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has the potential to bring together more legal feminists around the 
issue of care, as well as to build bridges between legal feminism and 
other emancipatory legal movements.  
A.   How Legal Nonmaternalism Insufficiently Credits                      
the Liberatory Potential of Care 
 I will begin with legal nonmaternalism, because it presents the 
most explicit case against viewing care as a potentially liberating 
practice. It should be clear by now that legal nonmaternalists see 
caregiving primarily as a source of oppression for women. This char-
acterization is misguided. As Part II demonstrates, when care is 
practiced outside the traditional family, it can be deeply subversive of 
gender, race, class, and sexuality norms. Nonmaternalists miss this 
aspect of care work; in doing so, they exclude a great many care prac-
tices and caregivers and thus perpetuate their own form of essential-
ism. Moreover, their antiessentialist critique rests in many regards 
on a caricaturization of legal maternalism as a crude form of cultural 
feminism.374 In this way, legal nonmaternalists insufficiently credit 
the radical potential of legal maternalism and caregiving more gen-
erally to subvert gender, race, class, and sexuality norms. 
 Contrary to this caricature, legal maternalism draws on widely 
divergent legal feminist traditions. In its presentation of a compre-
hensive theory of rights, legal maternalism represents the best of the 
tradition of liberal feminism.375 In its disruption of the heterosexual 
marital family, it is deeply radical. In its highly sophisticated critique 
of neoliberalism, it represents a refreshing and sorely needed revival 
of socialist feminism. In its deconstruction of the public and private, 
its understanding of the role of law in women’s oppression, and its 
incorporation of axes of subordination other than gender (such as 
class), it is a postmodern feminism. And finally, in its strategic de-
ployment of socially constructed gender differences to unsettle ineq-
                                                                                                                      
 374. To be fair, the oversimplification of legal maternalism by nonmaternalists may 
simply be due to the difficulty of giving an opposing vision full justice when one decon-
structs it. Or, it may be a product of normal cognition. Individuals are likely to notice as-
pects of an object that are consistent with their preexisting ideas about it, and to resist in-
formation that is inconsistent with their preexisting ideas or “schemas.” See Linda Hamil-
ton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination 
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995). Thus, to the ex-
tent that legal maternalism has been associated with cultural feminism, nonmaternalists 
may tend to miss those aspects of it that are consistent with nonmaternalism. 
 375. We see this in Joan Williams’ campaign, built on a civil rights model, to end em-
ployment discrimination against caregivers at work; in Martha Fineman’s theory of rights, 
which would replace protection of the individual with protection of the caregiver/dependent 
dyad; in Mary Becker’s efforts to look to international human rights law for a theory of 
substantive economic rights for caregivers; and in Linda McClain’s efforts to put liberal 
theory to work for feminism. All of these projects fall within the liberal rights tradition as 
it has come to be broadly understood. 
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uities between the sexes, legal maternalism is indeed consistent with 
cultural feminism.376 Of course, these statements do not hold true for 
every theorist and every work falling within the tradition of legal 
maternalism described here, but they are accurate statements if we 
take legal maternalism as a whole. 
 Further, the insistence by nonmaternalists that the law reforms 
proposed by legal maternalists merely serve to perpetuate gender 
ideology insufficiently credits the subversive potential of such re-
forms. Welfare- and family-based strategies to end the devaluation of 
family labor deeply threaten gender ideology by supporting families 
where men are not primary breadwinners and by enabling women to 
exit marriage. The welfare and divorce reforms proposed by mater-
nalists also challenge our country’s class hierarchy, which systemati-
cally relegates women and racial minorities to a permanent under-
class. To critique maternalism as uniformly gender-reinforcing is to 
miss the important lesson of antiessentialism that race, gender, and 
class are complex, interdependent systems of subordination. There is 
no single “right” place of entry to attack these systems because every 
move will be both potentially progressive and retrograde. 
 For example, looking to wage work as a promising source of citi-
zenship for women, as Schultz has done, is a project worthy of femi-
nist support; but to identify it as the preferred route to women’s 
emancipation both insufficiently credits the transformative power of 
legal maternalism and perpetuates a racist, classist, and heterosexist 
understanding of the meaning of wage work. Work has meant equal 
citizenship primarily for white, straight, economically privileged 
women and men; it has been a significant source of exploitation for 
women and men of color, lower-class whites, and gay people, many of 
whom have historically occupied the bottom rungs of our wage econ-
omy.377 Moreover, the new economy of flexible labor markets, coop-
erative work arrangements, and technological innovation in which 
Schultz sees so much liberatory potential has been deployed in ways 
that reinforce status-based hierarchies. It has given professional, 
white, upper middle-class men and women relatively more free time 
and autonomy than less privileged workers, as well as a higher stake 
in the work enterprise, while delivering to the rest of the workforce 
progressively mechanized, outsourced, and contingent work charac-
                                                                                                                      
 376. See Frug, supra note 314, at 52 (providing a progressive reading of Carol Gilli-
gan’s In a Different Voice as a feminist “methodology for challenging gender”). 
 377. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing workplace discrimination against African Ameri-
cans); ESKRIDGE, supra note 42, at 125-32, 231-34 (discussing employment discrimination 
against gay people and studies demonstrating a wage gap between gay/bisexual and 
straight employees for each sex). 
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terized by increased monitoring and control.378 To be fair, Schultz ac-
knowledges the oppressive effects of modern capitalism.379 However, 
in the final analysis she maintains that wage work is a more viable 
source of women’s liberation than care, thereby diminishing the sig-
nificance of her own concession that there is nothing inherently de-
mocratizing or equalizing about the workplace.380  
 Similarly, although developing a liberationist theory of women’s 
sexuality is an important project, I question whether legal maternal-
ism constitutes as significant a roadblock to such a project as Franke 
suggests. Although many legal maternalists accept the inevitability 
of motherhood for women—indeed, this defines legal maternalism in 
part—perhaps this position should not be so facilely equated with re-
pronormativity. “Repronormativity” does not describe all reproduc-
tion, as Franke’s argument suggests. Rather, it refers to women’s re-
production for men, particularly white, straight men. The transgres-
sive parenthood that legal maternalism potentially supports may 
thus present a subversion of repronormativity, not a furtherance of 
it.381 As Part II explored, what of the reproduction and parenting of 
lesbians and gay men? Of racial minorities? Although the women at 
the center of a great deal of maternalist discourse are at least implic-
itly heterosexual, white women,382 legal maternalism easily can ac-
commodate women who do not seek to have sex with, reproduce with, 
or parent with men, as well as men who transgress traditional gen-
der roles. 
 Can we not work toward a vision in which women (and men) are 
fully, positively, freely sexual beings and parents or caregivers as 
well? Other than the fact that human beings should not have to 
choose among various potential sources of joy, is it even possible to 
single out for protection, as Franke seeks to, the “domain of sexuality 
that is the excess over reproduction”?383 Which potential allies and 
liberatory paths are cut off as well as enabled by such a dualistic no-
tion? Aside from the fact that a great deal of heterosexual sex is al-
                                                                                                                      
 378. See RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF WORK IN THE NEW CAPITALISM (1998) (exposing the flexibility of mod-
ern capitalism as merely a fresh form of oppression); Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis 
of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 556-59 (1997) (same); Mi-
chelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283, 
285 (2003) (showing how employers deploy technology in ways that perpetuate gender seg-
regation and hierarchy in the paid labor market).  
 379. See Schultz, supra note 1, at 1921-29. 
 380. For a similar critique, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Free-
dom: Low-Income Mothers’ Decisions About Work at Home and in the Market, 44 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1029, 1036-37 (2004) (“Advocacy of waged work as the principal means for 
women’s emancipation disregards the experiences of most women of color in particular.”). 
 381. See FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 27. 
 382. That is, women who are unmarried due to divorce or poverty. 
 383. See Franke, supra note 1, at 205. 
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ways potentially about reproduction, reproduction is potentially 
about sexual pleasure. Consider these findings: Many women experi-
ence increased sexual response and achieve orgasm more easily dur-
ing pregnancy.384 Some women experience intense sexual pleasure or 
even orgasm during birth.385 Although the primary justification for 
breastfeeding is the health benefits afforded to infants,386 it also hap-
pens to be highly pleasurable for many mothers.387 A recent study 
suggests the pheromones produced by lactating women and their in-
fants increased the sexual motivation of other women, measured as 
sexual desire and fantasies.388 To the extent that Franke is correct 
that women’s sexuality has been conceptualized by legal feminists as 
little more than an object of biological or economic exploitation, some-
thing like a factory,389 or as a means of giving pleasure to men, could 
not reclaiming the sexual pleasure involved in reproduction threaten 
these conceptualizations just as readily as (if not more directly than) 
the “sex for sex’s sake” approach? 
                                                                                                                      
 384. Physiologically, the increased blood flow to the pelvis, the uterus, vagina and 
clitoris is enhanced, which makes orgasm more powerful. It can also cause a heightened li-
bido. Also, the nipples and the breasts become larger, more sensitive and capable of feeling 
extreme sensation when touched or kissed. See HEIDI MURKOFF ET AL., WHAT TO EXPECT 
WHEN YOU’RE EXPECTING 233-35 (2002). 
 385. Accounts of orgasmic birth are found throughout the birth preparation literature, 
see, e.g., id., and exist in modern works of fiction such as Alice Walker’s novel, Possessing 
the Secret of Joy: 
I had the most sought-after midwife in France—my competent and funny aunt 
Marie-Thérèse, whose radical idea it was that childbirth above all should feel 
sexy. I listened to nothing but gospel music during my pregnancy, a music quite 
new to me, and to France, and “It’s a High Way to Heaven” (“. . . nothing can 
walk up there, but the pure in heart. . . .”) was playing on the stereo during the 
birth; the warmth of the singers’ voices a perfect accompaniment to the lively 
fire in the fireplace. My vulva oiled and massaged to keep my hips open and my 
vagina fluid, I was orgasmic at the end. Petit Pierre practically slid into the 
world at the height of my amazement, smiling serenely even before he opened 
his eyes. 
ALICE WALKER, POSSESSING THE SECRET OF JOY 98-99 (1992); see also CAROLE MASO, THE 
ROOM LIT BY ROSES (2000); Laura Shanley, Orgasmic Childbirth, http:/www.unassisted  
childbirth.com/sensual/orgasmic.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2005) (collecting accounts of or-
gasmic childbirth and birth erotica from various sources). 
 386. See Karen Bonuck et al., Breast-Feeding Promotion Interventions: Good Public 
Health and Economic Sense, 22 J. PERINATOLOGY 78, 78 (2002). 
387.    DIANA KORTE & ROBERTA SCAER, A GOOD BIRTH, A SAFE BIRTH, CHOOSING AND 
HAVING THE CHILDBIRTH EXPERIENCE YOU WANT 29 (1992). 
 The similarities between lovemaking and breastfeeding are . . . strong: The 
uterus contracts, the nipples become erect, the breasts receive extensive stimu-
lation, and the skin flushes. Soon after a baby is put to the breast, a letdown 
brings the milk to the infant. Although the hormone oxytocin is responsible for 
this milk-ejection reflex, nursing mothers don’t usually have orgasms when 
their milk lets down. Many nursing moms describe a feeling of well-being.  
Id. 
 388. See Natasha A. Spencer et al., Social Chemosignals from Breastfeeding Women In-
crease Sexual Motivation, 46 HORMONES & BEHAV. 362, 367 (2004). 
 389. See EMILY MARTIN, THE WOMAN IN THE BODY 37-39, 44-57 (1987) (discussing how 
gynecology adopts a factory metaphor for conceptualizing the female reproductive system). 
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 It is also worth considering the effect of women’s reproduction on 
traditional gender relationships. Women’s interest in sex with men 
decreases significantly in the postpartum period and marital satis-
faction and stability decline with parenthood.390 In some instances, 
this decline in marital satisfaction after the birth of a first child is a 
significant contributing factor to divorce.391 Perhaps reproduction is 
threatening to repronormativity and heteronormativity. Could we not 
just as easily be dusting off our Adrienne Rich392 as our Shulamith 
Firestone?393 Franke’s antiessentialist critique of maternalism un-
necessarily slams the door on these promising lines of inquiry.394 
                                                                                                                      
 390. See Alyson Fearnley Shapiro et al., The Baby and the Marriage: Identifying Fac-
tors That Buffer Against Decline in Marital Satisfaction After the First Baby Arrives, 14 J. 
FAM. PSYCHOL. 59, 67 (2000) (finding a significantly steeper decline in marital satisfaction 
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first six years of marriage); Susan E. Crohan, Marital Quality and Conflict Across the 
Transition to Parenthood in African American and White Couples, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 
933 (1996) (finding that white and African-American spouses report lower marital happi-
ness and higher marital tension after the birth of a child). 
 391. See HILARY HOGE, WOMEN’S STORIES OF DIVORCE AT CHILDBIRTH 9-11, 204 (2002) 
(finding that the transition to parenthood may contribute to divorce among previously 
happy couples); Jay Belsky & Emily Pensky, Marital Change Across the Transition to Par-
enthood, 12 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 133 (1988) (finding that the cascade toward divorce be-
gins with the first decline in the wife’s marital satisfaction after the arrival of the first 
baby). 
 392. See RICH, supra note 306 (arguing that women need liberation not from mother-
hood, but from male domination of motherhood). 
 393. See SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST 
REVOLUTION 233-34 (1970) (arguing that the only means to achieve women’s liberation is 
through the technological separation of reproduction from the female body). 
 394. I expect that linking reproduction with sexual pleasure may go beyond the pale 
for some, or may be read as diminishing the real harms of repronormativity for women. 
However, those thought experiments that make us the most uncomfortable may be the 
ones most worth pursuing. If imagining a laboring or breastfeeding woman having an or-
gasm makes us want to run away, perhaps this is exactly the image that we should con-
template. What seems so unnatural about such a scene? For one, there is a child around, 
and we know children cannot be sexual as adults are. What feminist agendas might be fa-
cilitated by challenging the “asexual child” norm? To name a few: ending abstinence-only 
sex education, challenging restrictions on abortion for minors, addressing discrimination 
against gay and lesbian youth in primary and secondary schools, and eliminating routine 
“genital correction” surgery for intersexed infants. See generally JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL 
TO MINORS: THE PERILS OF PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEX (2002). On a theoretical level, 
recognizing the sexual pleasure involved in reproduction also challenges Freudian theory 
and the notion of Victorian childhood (and correspondingly, motherhood), two theoretical 
frameworks that are deeply implicated in patriarchy.  
 Such a project is no more provocative or potentially diminishing than the argument, 
suggested by Franke, that markets can be a source of emancipation. See discussion supra 
note 359. Although I am concerned about the tendency of private, market-based strategies 
to leave behind those with the least market power, I agree with Franke that there are 
many ways to disrupt hegemonic power hierarchies. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, The Coin of 
the Realm: Poverty and the Commodification of Gendered Labor, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 
1 (2001) (showing how acceptance of market understandings of poor women’s household la-
bor may serve to increase public welfare benefits, change how we think of public welfare, 
and promote more flexible wage work arrangements); Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong 
with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory of Commodification, in 
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 However, my primary aim here is not simply defending legal ma-
ternalism. Rather, I wish to call attention to the ways in which both 
legal maternalism and legal nonmaternalism insufficiently credit the 
liberatory potential of family care work for caregivers. I expect that it 
is clear from the above analysis the degree to which nonmaternalists, 
wrongly in my view, reject care as a practice with positive political 
potential. However, as will be explored in the next section, maternal-
ism also could go further than it has in acknowledging care as a po-
tentially liberating practice for caregivers. 
B.   How Legal Maternalism Insufficiently Credits                            
the Liberatory Potential of Care 
 Legal maternalists have argued that caregivers should be sup-
ported and recognized through law because they are victims of gen-
der oppression, because they are providing a valuable public service, 
and because they have material needs which flow from their posi-
tions as caregivers that cannot be ignored in a just society. Implicit in 
the choice of these justifications, however subtle, is the rejection of 
care work as a potential source of positive political transformation for 
caregivers themselves. This is problematic for at least two reasons. 
First, in its inattention to the positive political implications of care 
work, it does not fully internalize one of the purported premises of le-
gal maternalism that care is a positive value worth mainstreaming 
throughout society. And second, to the extent that certain transgres-
sive care practices may have positive political content, legal mater-
nalism’s inattention to that meaning unnecessarily excludes a good 
number of women (and men). 
 Why have legal maternalists, of all legal feminists, relied on justi-
fications for supporting care that do not fully credit the liberatory po-
tential of care for individual caregivers? The first reason is external 
to legal maternalism. Because legal maternalists are operating 
within the confines of the discipline of law, they must speak in its 
language. This has meant turning to justifications that may not suf-
                                                                                                                      
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 303-23 (Mar-
tha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) (demonstrating how the market for human 
gametes enables gays and lesbians to escape state-based discrimination with regard to 
family formation); Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s Household Labor, 9 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997) (demonstrating how market understandings of household 
labor may undermine gender oppression). 
 However, if this postmodern impulse to see each move as both potentially subversive 
and retrograde is to be applied consistently, then we cannot so confidently dismiss strate-
gies that may not fit into our own projects. Assuming this is the case, the challenge for le-
gal feminism (and all liberatory movements) is to develop theories and strategies that 
maximize benefits while minimizing costs. Two additional criteria are that a theory must 
include as many possible allies without sacrificing its core values and goals, and a theory 
must at minimum work to protect the individuals most disadvantaged by the system one 
seeks to disrupt.  
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ficiently capture the positive potential of care for the individual. For 
example, legal maternalists’ construction of care as a matter of public 
responsibility is a direct response to the law’s definition of the private 
family as the proper societal institution for meeting the needs of de-
pendents in our society.395 The argument that children are a public 
good represents an effort to counteract, on its own terms, neoliberal 
ideology, which increasingly dominates political and legal discourse. 
Theorizing the problem of devalued care as form of gender discrimi-
nation is consistent with the rights tradition that lies at the center of 
liberal legal theory and our law. These translation efforts mean that 
the battle is already half lost when it has begun.396 This is inevitable 
for any liberatory movement that employs law; one cannot get com-
pletely outside the frame.397 
 However, if we view even oppressive regimes as discursively cre-
ated systems that are not fixed, opportunities for disruption will al-
ways exist, however small. Two methods of disruption suggested by 
postmodern theory are thinking from the perspectives of others and 
facilitating practices in which seemingly incongruent dominant 
meanings are juxtaposed, thereby revealing their constructedness.398 
Building a theory of care as politics from the perspective of trans-
gressive caregivers constitutes such an effort. Concededly, such a 
project also will inevitably be retrograde, for it employs the liberal le-
gal concept of political expression, which has been conceptualized 
within mainstream legal and political theory primarily as a negative 
right. Nevertheless, my hope is that the addition of a theory of 
“transgressive caregiving as politics” will move legal feminism one 
small step closer to facilitating the legal recognition of care while lim-
iting the inevitable risks inherent in any law project. 
 The second reason for the legal maternalist reluctance to recog-
nize that care may be political in a positive, subversive sense is pri-
marily strategic. Although legal maternalists explicitly reject the no-
tion that supporting individuals in traditional gender roles will nec-
                                                                                                                      
 395. See Fineman, supra note 3, at 1405-06. 
 396. See Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, Introduction to LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 
16 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (“Submitting left projects to the terms of lib-
eral legalism translates the former into the terms of the latter, a translation which will 
necessarily introduce tensions with, and sometimes outright cancellations of, the originat-
ing aims that animate left legalism in the first place.”). 
 397. To borrow a metaphor used by Kathleen Sullivan in an essay on women and the 
Constitution, the project of obtaining legal recognition and public support for caregiving 
work is like writing a cookbook on what to cook when there’s nothing in the kitchen. The 
main ingredients at hand have consisted of core concepts from modern legal and political 
theory, which have, for the most part, developed around the experiences and needs of men. 
It should be no surprise, then, that the theories that feminist theorists have cooked up 
have been somewhat inauthentic. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women’s 
Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 735, 763 (2002). 
 398. See Anderson, supra note 36. 
78  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
 
essarily perpetuate them, I think they implicitly harbor such a fear, 
as evidenced by their less than full exploration of the potentially 
positive meaning of caregiving for caregivers. As demonstrated by 
Part II, contrary to the nonmaternalist critique and the implicit posi-
tion of legal maternalists, care can be radical, at least to the degree 
that any practice can be. As such, legal maternalists do not have to 
turn away from care in their efforts to subvert oppressive gender, 
race, class, and sexuality norms. Rather, such a project can be fur-
thered through a fuller recognition of transgressive caregiving as 
politics. 
 On the other hand, the nonmaternalist critique presents a series 
of legitimate concerns that should be addressed by maternalists—
again, not by changing the subject as some nonmaternalists have 
suggested—but by developing a thicker, more positive conception of 
care. Here it is worth asking: Do the justifications relied upon by le-
gal maternalists tap into the full potential of legal maternalism to 
fashion a theory of justice that takes into account the broadest array 
of individuals who could be, and should be, benefited by our projects? 
Are there risks involved when we rely on justifications that construct 
the family essentially as a site of public reproduction? Who stands to 
benefit and who stands to lose from such a conception? Those indi-
viduals for whom the state has been most disciplinary—for example, 
women of color and gays and lesbians—are at serious risk from such 
a conception of care, however useful it may be to challenging the pre-
sent shift to private ordering. Further, can appeals to justice and 
human needs succeed in a country so committed to individualism and 
to liberal conceptions of rights? Will our efforts require a further ar-
ticulation of why human needs should be recognized as human rights 
in a language our legal and political systems are likely to under-
stand? And finally, can we supplement the existing conceptions of 
care with accounts that reflect the full range of care’s meaning, in-
cluding its positive potential? Here I am not arguing for a cheery 
story for its own sake or for appeasement of those tired of hearing 
about women as victims. Many are victims in many ways. But it is 
also true that caregiving constitutes a potentially empowering prac-
tice. Which additional important experiences are overlooked by these 
conceptions? I would suggest that it is the full range of experiences of 
those who engage in transgressive caregiving practices.399 
                                                                                                                      
 399. Raising these questions does not diminish the enormous strength of the maternal-
ist project or question the maternalist goal of valuing care. A movement’s theories are as 
important as its goals, for they tell a story about the world that ultimately constructs that 
world. With that insight in mind, the ideas presented here are intended to take the mater-
nalist analysis to the next level. 
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C.   Summary 
 To summarize Part IV: legal maternalism and nonmaternalism 
constitute two strands of legal feminism which can be characterized 
primarily by their fundamentally different stances on the centrality 
of reproduction to women’s identity. Nonmaternalists do not view 
women’s reproduction as inevitable or desirable. They envision a 
world in which women’s identity is not defined by this institution, 
and they eschew legal strategies that focus on women’s reproduction 
to the exclusion of other aspects of their identity such as wage work 
and sexuality. In contrast, maternalists by and large view reproduc-
tion and the gendered division of family labor as inevitable. They 
seek strategies to lessen the costs of care work for women, such as 
law reforms providing for a more robust social welfare state, rules 
that credit the contributions of unpaid domestic labor at divorce, and 
reforms that would restructure the workplace to account for family 
care work. Legal maternalists and nonmaternalists also disagree 
among each other on various important strategic matters such as 
whether men can play a positive role in women’s liberation and 
whether the state and the law are essentially liberatory or discipli-
nary in nature. However, despite these myriad disagreements, nearly 
all of the recent contributions to this discourse implicitly or explicitly 
seem to adopt the premise that caregiving is of little affirmative 
value to caregivers. This is apparent in the rejection of caregiving as 
constitutive of women’s identity by the nonmaternalists. It is also 
apparent, however subtle, in the work of maternalists in their reli-
ance on child-focused, antidiscrimination, and needs-based justifica-
tions for the legal recognition of care work. 
 Contrary to this dominant account within legal feminism, care can 
take on positive political meaning for those who engage in it. Specifi-
cally, I assert that care work can constitute an affirmative political 
practice of resistance to a host of discriminatory institutions and ide-
ologies, including the family, workplace, and state, as well as patriar-
chy, racism, and homophobia.  
 In making the assertion that caregiving can be profoundly af-
firmative, I do not mean to suggest that housework or the care of in-
timates is unidimensionally positive or empowering. It is clear that 
gender polices women of all classes, races, and sexual orientations 
into traditional caregiving roles, and that the family, like wage work, 
can be a site of oppression for women. Rather, this project seeks to 
recover caregivers’ agency, however restricted and distorted by gen-
der-based domination, from the dominant feminist accounts of care 
work within law in an effort to complicate the story of caregiving. A 
theory that presents caregiving in all its messiness as a condition of 
oppression and power, drudgery and deep satisfaction, constraint and 
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choice, public and private expression, will be fundamentally more 
transformative in nature. This is not to diminish the value of think-
ing about caregiving as a product of gender oppression or as a service 
of public significance. These constructs marshaled by maternalists to 
justify support for caregiving are important, because they erode 
autonomy and efficiency as legitimate principles for organizing mar-
ket work. Nor do I mean to suggest that because caregiving has po-
litical value, it should not be recognized as having monetary value. 
As Katharine Silbaugh has thoroughly documented, unpaid domestic 
labor is work that produces tremendous economic value.400 However, 
I worry that we lose many potential allies when we depict caregiving 
primarily as a condition of gender constraint or justify support for 
women in derivative terms.401 Thicker conceptions of caregiving pos-
sess greater potential to bring women together across their differ-
ences. 
 A few legal feminists have begun to theorize care so that theorists 
from a wider range of perspectives might want to support it. For ex-
ample, Martha McCluskey explores how strategies that seek to sup-
port “personal care” can unite more women. She defines personal 
care as the “unwaged, gendered caretaking work” critical to main-
taining workers irrespective of the caretaking needs of children, such 
as “food, shelter, clothing, health care, emotional support, social capi-
tal, job training, and transportation.”402 With this broader conception 
of care work in mind, McCluskey reveals how the U.S. federal income 
tax and social security systems direct public support to meeting the 
personal care needs of well-off men who are primary breadwinners in 
traditional marriages at the expense of unmarried workers and two-
income couples.403 Reforming these income support systems to sup-
port modest- and low-income workers regardless of marital status, 
according to McCluskey, would benefit single mothers, unmarried 
                                                                                                                      
 400. See Silbaugh, supra note 284, passim. 
 401. For a fuller articulation of the risks of seeking rights on derivative terms, see 
Martha M. Ertman, Changing the Meaning of Motherhood, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1733, 
1735-38 (2001). 
 402. See McCluskey, supra note 137, at 316. 
 403. Specifically: 
Upper income (and mostly male) married “breadwinners” with homemaking 
spouses typically receive not only “private” unpaid family labor but also major 
transfers of taxpayer dollars to support the domestic services that help sustain 
their market value and social status. In particular, the federal income tax 
“marriage bonus” should be understood as a support system for the care of af-
fluent husbands because it provides a substantial special tax break to high-
earning spouses (typically husbands) of nonearning or low-earning homemak-
ers (typically wives). Similarly, the federal social security system’s spousal 
benefits provisions also have targeted special, generous benefits to relatively 
high-income workers married to homemaking spouses, at the expense of un-
married workers and dual-earning married couples. 
Id. at 326 (footnotes omitted). 
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nonmothering women, and women in two-income marriages, that is, 
women who resist traditional gender roles to a greater or lesser ex-
tent.404 By broadening the definition of valuable care work and pro-
posing legal reforms that cut across parental and marital status, 
McCluskey’s approach has the potential to bring together legal femi-
nists, queer theorists, and critical race scholars around the issue of 
care. 
 Martha Ertman also has sought to integrate the concerns of both 
legal maternalism and nonmaternalism through her proposals to use 
private law to value homemaking labor. Specifically, Ertman sup-
ports treating the family unit similar to other economic relationships. 
Toward that end, she proposes the importation of private business 
law concepts into family and social welfare law. For example, a di-
vorcing spouse who marginalized her wage work during a marriage 
in favor of homemaking labor could be treated at divorce as a secured 
creditor consistent with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
with full rights to repossess property or to offset other debts.405 Or, 
like certain corporations and limited liability companies, “caregivers 
could enjoy limited liability for debts incurred in raising their chil-
dren, treating them as investors in the entity (either the family, the 
mother-child dyad, or the child’s citizenship).”406 Finally, “[t]he busi-
ness judgment rule, which insulates businesses from meddling, could 
also be adapted to protect mothers receiving public support from gov-
ernment intervention in their families.”407 Such private law ap-
proaches value family care work while limiting the risks of public law 
approaches, such as interference in families that do not conform to 
majoritarian values. Like McCluskey, Ertman addresses the main 
concerns of legal nonmaternalism while maintaining a focus on the 
problem of devalued family labor. As such, her work also constitutes 
a step toward bridging the maternalist/nonmaternalist divide. 
 My proposal that we recognize the positive political potential of 
caregiving continues the hard work of integrating legal maternalism 
and nonmaternalism so well begun by McCluskey and Ertman. 
Reconceptualizing care work as a political practice with unstable and 
complex meanings engaged in by women, men, mothers, and non-
mothers alike is responsive to internal feminist debates regarding 
the essentialization of women. Given our country’s longstanding tra-
dition of protecting political expression, however unpopular, viewing 
care work as a practice with potential political significance might 
minimize the risks of harmful state intervention into nontraditional 
                                                                                                                      
 404. Id. at 332-31. 
 405. See Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing 
Women’s Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17, 39-50 (1998). 
 406. See Ertman, supra note 401, at 1745. 
 407. Id. 
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families. Reading political significance into the practice of care might 
also serve as an additional basis to articulate a theory of rights for 
caregivers, building on the existing accounts of care as a source of 
need or a public good. Finally, such a conception may have broad ap-
peal by providing a more positive account of caregiving work than 
can be conveyed through the story of gender oppression alone. In the 
next Part, I will review the legal implications of this more complex 
conception of transgressive caregiving as politics. 
V.   IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW 
 What are the implications for law of recognizing transgressive 
caregiving as a political practice with subversive potential? Typically, 
resistance to oppression is not a justification for legal reform. Law 
usually is written from the perspective of the lawmakers being re-
sisted. Yet minority perspectives may have some import at particular 
historical moments, such as when a political movement already has 
begun in a positive, emancipatory direction. Although the present 
status of transgressive caregiving within the law is in many regards 
consistent with past patterns of regulation and marginalization,408 it 
is increasingly gaining recognition and protection.  
 For example, despite the persistence of state-based oppression in 
the area of gay and lesbian family rights, there has been significant 
progress on that front in the past two decades—including the elimi-
nation of presumptions against custody for gay parents, increased ac-
cess to adoption and alternative reproduction, and domestic partner-
ship benefits.409 Most significantly, in the past couple of years alone, 
the U.S. Supreme Court decriminalized private, consensual gay 
sex,410 and the Massachusetts Supreme Court overturned that state’s 
opposite-sex requirements for marriage.411 Challenges to opposite-sex 
marriage requirements are working their way through the appellate 
courts of California, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, and Washington 
states.412 These developments have spawned counter movements,413 
but it is clear that the law is moving toward the recognition of gay 
and lesbian care practices, as well as the care practices of individuals 
who may parent in extended or other less traditional family ar-
rangements. 
 At this emancipatory moment, the potential for transformation is 
great, but so are the risks that legal acceptance of previously mar-
                                                                                                                      
 408. See supra Part II. 
 409. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 410. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). 
 411. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003). 
 412. See Lambda Legal, Marriage Project, http://www.lambalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/ 
issues/record2?record=9 (last visited Dec. 2, 2005). 
 413. See sources cited supra notes 186-88.  
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ginalized relationships and care practices will come on assimilatory 
terms. As Katherine Franke reminds us: 
It is vital that we bear in mind that state recognition does not 
merely impose legal order on “facts in the world.” State ordering 
actually brings those facts into being in a range of ways, whether 
it be how individuals come to understand themselves in the 
shadow of law, by and through the law’s summons, or by the 
state’s creation of explicit and implicit incentive systems.414 
If this is true, strategies that do not easily fit within mainstream le-
gal constructs will be potentially more subversive than those that 
simply seek to articulate rights in easily cognizable terms. 
 The impulse at this historic moment of recognition for transgres-
sive caregivers, such as people of the same sex who wish to marry, is 
to use the language of equality. There are arguments for this ap-
proach. As a colleague suggested at the beginning of this project, 
wouldn’t it be much simpler and more straightforward simply to ar-
gue that transgressive caregivers are, upon closer examination, 
really just like traditional caregivers? Or, as many legal feminists 
have argued, if the goal is increased support for care, could we simply 
emphasize family values and the importance of children to society? 
Or describe the problem as one of sex discrimination, for which there 
already exists a comprehensive system of regulation? Although these 
strategies may have more appeal to lawmakers than the “transgres-
sive caregiving as politics” conception, they are also more likely to 
reify the very hierarchies they seek to undermine. Explicitly adding 
the political dimensions of transgressive caregiving to the current 
rights discourse over same-sex marriage may counteract some of its 
assimilatory effects by maintaining the difference of gay people while 
also avoiding sociobiological conceptions of “difference.”415 
 Beyond same-sex marriage, family law would be greatly enriched 
and the quality of people’s lives improved if the law recognized and 
protected transgressive care practices as a form of valuable political 
expression. For example, although many states now permit a child to 
have two legal parents of the same sex416—a significant step forward 
for transgressive caregiving practices—American family law gener-
ally takes the position that a child can have no more than two legal 
parents.417 Where consensual and in the best interests of the child, 
                                                                                                                      
 414. See Franke, Domesticated Liberty, supra note 38, at 1418 (footnote omitted). 
 415. Cf. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 231-34 (suggesting the Fourteenth Amendment should 
be interpreted expansively to include same-sex marriage in light of our country’s antislav-
ery history, which was aimed at eliminating deprivations with regard to marriage and 
family life imposed by slavery). 
 416. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text. 
 417. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130-31 (1989) (holding that a child 
did not have a due process right to maintain filial relationship with both putative natural 
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why not allow more than two adults to serve as the legal parents of a 
child, with designated primary and secondary parents, which as a 
practical matter reflects the arrangement of many families within 
minority communities already?418 Along the same lines, in the case of 
family dissolution, why not augment a child’s right to receive child 
support from only one noncustodial parent—typically a male, biologi-
cal parent?419  If we look to the parenting practices in African-
American and gay communities, a whole range of individuals are 
likely to have economic and affective ties to a child worth preserv-
ing.420 Recognizing such care practices, which can be highly func-
tional and are constitutive of such communities, would represent 
long-deserved recognition of the value of that care. 
This could take various forms.  For example, in Canada, a court 
may order more than one noncustodial parent to pay child support 
concurrently (for example, a biological father and a stepfather) if the 
nonbiological parent stood in the place of a parent to the child,421 ap-
portioning support according to the role each adult played in the 
child’s life or even applying the full guideline amount to each adult 
independently.422 Or perhaps a more robust welfare state, in which 
both the state and a set of individuals would be jointly responsible for 
a child, would be the logical consequence of a society in which care-
                                                                                                                      
father and husband); Elisa B. v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 46, 51 (Cal. 2005) (suggest-
ing in dicta that a child may have two natural mothers, except when more than two parties 
are eligible for parentage); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (refusing to recog-
nize that a child had two legal mothers where gestational mother, genetic mother, and ge-
netic father desired to continue relationship with child). This may be changing. Although 
there are few reported decisions, trial courts in a small number of jurisdictions are permit-
ting “third parent” adoption. See National Center for Lesbian Rights, Second Parent Adop-
tions: A Snapshot of Current Law, http://www.nclrights.org/publications/ 
2ndparentadoptions.htm (last updated Aug. 2003). 
 418. Although there are many ways this could be achieved—for example, through 
adoption law, contract law, or the application of equitable principles recognizing an adult 
who functions as a child’s parent—the merits of each are beyond the scope of this Article. 
Suffice it to say that there are many existing models to guide a law reform project aimed at 
further recognizing transgressive care practices. See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 159, 
§ 2.03 (1)(b)(iii)-(iv) (leaving open the possibility of three legal parents under the ALI Prin-
ciples—for example, a biological mother and father and a parent by estoppel). 
 419. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 417. For a discussion of the law’s hostility to 
multiple parenthood generally, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an 
Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family 
Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 passim (1984). 
 420. See discussion supra Part II. 
 421. See Chartier v. Chartier, [1999] S.C.R. 242 (Can.) (holding that a stepparent who 
stands in the place of a parent to a child cannot unilaterally give up that status and escape 
the obligation to provide support for that child after the breakdown of the marriage). 
 422. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE CANADA, CHILDREN COME FIRST: A REPORT TO PARLIAMENT 
REVIEWING THE PROVISIONS AND OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 
49-50 (2002), http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/sup/pub/rp/volume_2.pdf. In many provinces, 
this rule has been extended to individuals in cohabiting relationships, making the act of 
parenting (not marital status or the existence of other obligors) the determining factor in 
child support determinations. Id. at 17. 
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giving—transgressive and not—were recognized. Other law reforms 
that might follow, in one form or another, from a commitment to 
transgressive caregiving include open adoption423 and a foster care 
system where parental rights are not terminated on a fast track,424 
but are shared with foster parents consistent with a child’s welfare.425 
 In addition to informing debates surrounding the legal recognition 
of alternative family forms, reconceptualizing care as possessing 
positive political content under certain circumstances may serve to 
inform present discourses over the provision of welfare. The modern 
welfare state is characterized by time-limited, minimal grants with 
massive conditions. Whereas the 1980s and 1990s saw welfare re-
forms that aimed to influence the reproductive and parenting behav-
ior of welfare recipients,426 the present decade is characterized by re-
forms that seek to eliminate “female family headship” entirely 
through marriage promotion and time limited benefit receipt.427 Poor 
women of color have born the brunt of this assault. Political expres-
sion, however unpopular, is a fundamental value protected by our 
Constitution. Recognizing the political significance of transgressive 
caregiving thus adds a new justification for supporting the care work 
of women receiving welfare while providing a conceptual basis for 
limiting state intervention into their families. 
                                                                                                                      
 423. An open adoption is one in which “the birth parents meet the adoptive parents . . . 
[and] relinquish all legal, moral, and nurturing rights to the child, but retain the right to 
continuing contact and to knowledge of the child’s whereabouts and welfare.” Annette 
Baran et al., Open Adoption, 21 SOC. WORK 97, 97 (1976). 
 424. See ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 6, at 104-33 (discussing the dramatic 
shift in federal adoption policy in the late 1990s from the reunification of children in foster 
care with their biological families toward swift adoption of children into new families). 
 425. Obviously these reforms implicate serious issues regarding family privacy, gender 
politics, and the best interests of children. Indeed, such reforms may involve reworking 
certain constitutional principles concerning the family. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 
U.S. 57 (2000). Two points are worth making in that regard. First, the constitutional back-
ground rules that would allegedly constrain a greater recognition of transgressive caregiv-
ing are themselves a product of a set of power relations. Reconstructing such constitutional 
doctrines to more fully recognize, value, and protect transgressive care practices could re-
sult in a less partial and distorted legal regime. Second, there remains ample room for re-
vision of existing constitutional doctrines regulating family and intimate life without ele-
vating sperm donors, mere ex-lovers, and babysitters to the status of parent. Because such 
a law reform project would require careful line drawing, it would be a delicate and difficult 
one, but it would be achievable nevertheless. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 562 
(Colo. 2004) (finding that even though legal mother had a constitutionally protected paren-
tal right and her ex-domestic partner did not, the state had a compelling interest in pro-
tecting the child from the harm that would result from termination of her relationship with 
her psychological parent). 
 426. See Kessler, supra note 60, at 339-41 (describing “child exclusion,” “learnfare,” 
and “medfare” welfare reforms of the 1980s and 1990s). 
 427. See John M. Fitzgerald & David C. Ribar, Transitions in Welfare Participation and 
Female Headship (Ctr. Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 895, 2003), available at 
http://webserver01.ces.census.gov/index.php/ces/1.00/cespapers?down_key=101687 (research 
funded in part by the U.S. Census Bureau examining the effect of welfare on “female family 
headship”). 
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 Finally, as a strategy that is likely to involve a wide range of indi-
viduals, conceptualizing transgressive caregiving as a positive politi-
cal practice of resistance is likely to further advance such progressive 
law reform efforts. Much of the legal feminist and law reform dis-
course on care has been characterized by a split between those 
women who benefit from market-based solutions to the problem of 
devalued family labor and those who do not. For example, many mid-
dle-class women support punitive welfare reforms because they have 
experienced wage work as a positive source of liberation from the 
burdens of domestic labor, and because they can pass on their domes-
tic labor to less privileged women. Because they have market power 
as both employees in the paid labor force and as employers in the 
domestic sphere, they may see their interests as being at odds with 
those of poor women. Yet, many of these same women may be trans-
gressive caregivers. Perhaps they are unmarried cohabitants or les-
bian caregivers. Perhaps they are married to men who do significant 
care work, thereby enabling them to see the importance of recogniz-
ing transgressive care work. Similarly, although African Americans 
as a class generally are more conservative on certain issues implicat-
ing “family values,”428 transgressive care practices are quite prevalent 
in African-American communities. The explicit linkage of gay and 
minority care practices may thus serve to forge important coalitions 
across race lines that will strengthen both the gay liberation and wel-
fare rights movements. Finally, although the legal feminist discourse 
on care has largely conceptualized the interests of men and women as 
adverse, to the extent that men are transgressive caregivers in cer-
tain contexts, they too potentially can be part of law reform efforts 
aimed at valuing care. In sum, highlighting the common political con-
tent of transgressive caregiving across race, class, sex, gender, and 
sexuality lines may serve as a basis for more effective coalition build-
ing and law reform. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Transgressive caregiving—that is, care work performed outside of 
traditional family contexts by those whom the state has historically 
denied the privilege of family privacy—is a potentially deeply and 
complexly subversive practice. Specifically, transgressive caregiving 
is a practice that can subvert a host of discriminatory ideologies, in-
                                                                                                                      
 428. For example, the shift in favor of same-sex marriage, however subtle, is seen in 
nearly every segment of American society with two exceptions—Evangelical Protestants 
and African Americans. See News Release, The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 
Religion and Politics: Contention and Consensus 1-2, 17-18 (July 24, 2003), 
http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religion-politics.pdf (summarizing survey re-
sults). 
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cluding patriarchy, racism, homophobia, and class-based exploita-
tion. 
 Feminist and queer legal theory have neglected transgressive 
caregiving as an important form of resistance for many women and 
men.  This pattern is apparent in the explicit rejection of caregiving 
as a potentially positive source of identity by nonmaternalists. It is 
also apparent, however subtle, in the work of maternalists in their 
reliance on child-focused, antidiscrimination, and needs-based justifi-
cations for the legal recognition of care work. 
 Both sides of the maternalist/nonmaternalist divide have impor-
tant contributions to the current debate within law on the signifi-
cance of care work. It is time to do the hard work of integrating legal 
maternalism and nonmaternalism. Recognizing care as a potentially 
subversive political practice constitutes a small step in that direction. 
This thicker conception of care has the potential to bring together 
critical legal theorists around the issue of care, to produce even more 
transformative law reforms, and to build bridges among legal femi-
nism and other emancipatory legal movements. 
 
